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ABSTRACT 
 
Despite the fact that a preponderance of past studies in corporate finance mainly focus on capital 
structure decision of firms, the problems of  “what factors determine the capital structure choice of 
firms and how firms adjust their capital structure dynamically” are still riddling.  Hence, the aim of 
this study is to investigate the determinants of capital structure and capital structure adjustment 
dynamics of banks. To this end, the study employed a quantitative research approach. Specifically, 
secondary data have been collected through document review of annual reports of selected banks 
for longitudinal/panel research design. Besides, primary data have been collected through a self-
administered questionnaire distributed to the selected Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) for the 
cross-sectional survey research design of the study. As the method of data analysis, the study 
estimates both static and dynamic panel models using fixed effect and GMM estimators 
respectively. Besides, in analyzing the cross-sectional survey responses, appropriate statistical 
techniques for order-ranked and nominal/categorical items of the responses have been employed. 
Specifically, in the univariate analysis of survey responses, mean scores and percentage of 
categorical responses have been computed for order-ranked and nominal items respectively. 
Moreover, to test the significance of differences of mean scores of order-ranked and percentage of 
responses of nominal items conditional on bank characteristics, the study employed the 
nonparametric Mann-Whitney test and the likelihood ratio test respectively. As the result, the tax 
shield from interest tax deductibility, profitability and/or size of free cash flows, growth 
opportunities and regulatory pressure factors are found to be significant determinants of capital 
structure decisions, consistently in estimations of panel models and cross-sectional survey. In 
  
iv 
 
examining the capital structure adjustment dynamics, both the regression estimation and survey 
results revealed the tendency of banks in Ethiopia to set target capital structure and adjust towards 
it at a relatively faster speed of adjustment. Besides, both regression model estimation and survey 
results disclose the asymmetrical target capital structure adjustment of banks. To be specific, 
overleveraged or undercapitalized banks adjust more quickly than underleveraged or 
overcapitalized banks. Further, the speed of target capital structure adjustment is found to be 
heterogeneous across banks that differ in their absolute deviations from target capital structure, 
size, regulatory pressure for capital adequacy and ownership. Hence, by empirically examining the 
determinants and dynamics of capital structure of banks in Ethiopia, the study contributes to the 
existing body of knowledge on the subject under study, and/or it fills a gap in the existing reference 
literature on the subject. Most importantly, the study tries to untangle the capital structure issues of 
banks, especially the dynamics, in the context of the least developed financial system where there 
are no secondary market and oligopolistic banking sector. 
 
Key Terms: 
Capital Structure; Determinants of Capital Structure; Dynamics of Capital Structure; Leverage; 
Target Leverage; Target Capital Structure Adjustment; Symmetrical Target Adjustment; 
Asymmetrical Target Adjustment; Heterogeneous Target Adjustment; Regulatory Factors. 
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CHAPTER ONE: ORIENTATIONS 
1.1. Introduction 
 
In corporate finance, the capital structure decision of firms has been imperative among financial 
economists debate (Abor, 2009). Specifically, the past inquiries on the capital structure decision of 
firms focused on explaining how firms choose and adjust the mix of their debt and equity financing 
for funding of their operations (Myers, 1984; Benito, 2003). Hence, in addressing the basic 
question of capital structure decision of firms, theoretical models have been developed. Besides, in 
testing the validities of these capital structure theoretical models, voluminous empirical literatures 
have been documented (Myers, 1984; Harris & Raviv, 1991; Chen, 2004).  
 
The genesis of modern theoretical explanation of capital structure decision of firms can be traced 
back to the foundation work of Modigliani & Miller (1958) irrelevance proposition (Myers, 2001)1. 
In the absence of imperfections, Modigliani & Miller (1958) proposed and proved the irrelevance 
of capital structure decision for value maximization of firms. Understandably, the irrelevance 
proposition implies that the choice of any mix of debt and equity securities over another has 
nothing to do with value maximization (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). Later on, however, by 
departing from the frictionless world of Modigliani & Miller (1958), other theoretical models of 
capital structure have been developed to explain how and why capital structure decision of firms is 
relevant (Myers, 2001). Prominently, these theoretical models of capital structure include tradeoff 
                                                          
1
 MM irrelevance proposition transcends the traditional view of capital structure (Prasad et al., 2001). 
  
2 
 
(Modigliani & Miller, 1963; Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973; Jenson & Meckling, 1976; Miller, 1977; 
Myers, 1977; Warner, 1977; Myers, 1984; Fischer et al., 1989) and pecking order theoretical 
models (Myers, 1984; Majluf & Myers, 1984). In the tradeoff theoretical model, the capital 
structure decision of firms is explained as they balance the costs of equity or benefits of debt 
financing in the form of tax shield (Modigliani & Miller, 1963; Miller, 1977; DeAngelio & Masulis, 
1980) and reduction of agency problem (Jenson & Meckling, 1976; Jenson, 1986) with the benefit 
of equity or costs of debt financing related to costs of distress (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973; 
Warner, 1977) and agency cost of debt from asset substitution (Jenson & Meckling, 1976) and 
underinvestment (Myers, 1977) to attain target capital structure. However, in the presence of 
adjustment, firms may deviate from the equilibrium condition and tend to revert to it through time 
(Myers,1984;Frank&Goyal,2008). In contrast, in the pecking order theory, firms choose 
hierarchical financing in their capital structure decision (Majluf & Myers, 1984; Myers, 1984). In 
the pecking order theory, then, firms prefer internal financing to external financing and, in external 
financing, debt is preferred to equity financing to minimize information asymmetry related costs 
(Majluf & Myers, 1984; Myers, 1984). Unlike the tradeoff theory, the pecking order theory doesn’t 
specify the presence of target capital structure; rather, observed capital structure is the cumulative 
result of information asymmetry (Majluf & Myers, 1984; Myers, 1984).  
 
Following the predictions of these theoretical models, a large number of empirical studies have 
been conducted to test their validities over the past few decades (Harris & Raviv, 1991). These 
empirical studies mainly came along two main strands (Frank & Goyal, 2008). In the first strand, 
past empirical studies―for example, in US  (Titman & Wessels, 1988; Frank & Goyal, 2004), in 
  
3 
 
G-7 countries (Rajan & Zingales, 1995), in ten selected developing countries (Booth et al., 2001), 
in China (Chen, 2004), in Ghana (Abor,2008), in Libya (Buferna et al., 2005), among 
others―examined the determinants of capital structure of firms and tested empirical validities of 
theoretical models, in a static framework (Heshimite, 2001). In the other strand, past empirical 
studies―for example, in US (Jalilivand & Harris, 1984; Hovakimian et al., 2001; Leary & Roberts, 
2005; Flannery & Rangan, 2006), in Spain (DeMiguel & Pindado, 2001), in UK (Banjerre et al., 
2000; Ozkan,2001), in selected European countries (Antoniou et al., 2008), in Portugual 
(Serrasqueiro & Nunes, 2010), among others)―investigated and tested the theoretical predictions 
of target capital structure adjustment dynamics.  
 
However, a clear understanding of the capital structure decision of firms is still elusive (Harris & 
Raviv, 1991; Marques & Santos, 2003; Chen & Strang, 2005). The conundrum of the capital 
structure decision of firms is clearly manifested in the lack of well-documented and indubitable 
evidences on the validities of capital structure theoretical models. Noticeably, available evidences 
often appear to show a significant dependence on the observed reality and the methodology 
applied (Iwarere & Akinley, 2010; Marques & Santos, 2003). Obviously, in testing theoretical 
models, a preponderance of past empirical studies on the determinants of capital structure (Chen, 
2004; Frank & Goyal, 2004; Rajan & Zinglas, 1995; Booth et al., 2001; Abor, 2008) examined the 
factors behind the variations in observed capital structure of firms, assumed to be optimal, in a 
static framework (Drobetz & Wanzenried, 2006). Hence, these studies didn’t address the 
theoretical predictions of the determinants of the variations in the optimal capital structure 
(Heshimite, 2001; Drobetz & Wanzenried, 2006). The deficiencies of these studies mount up in 
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the presence of adjustment costs that may hinder firms to change their capital structure the way 
they desire instantaneously (Myers, 1984; Drobetz & Wanzenried, 2006). Moreover, past studies 
on target capital structure adjustment dynamics (DeMiguel & Pindado, 2001; Hovakimian et al., 
2001; Ozkan, 2001; Leary & Roberts, 2005; Drobetz & Wanzenried, 2006; Flannery & Rangan, 
2006; Serrasqueiro & Nunes, 2010) are found to be inconclusive. Contradictory evidences have 
been documented for the adjustment dynamics of firms operating in different institutional 
frameworks and adjustment costs thereof (Ozkan, 2001; Antoniou et al., 2008). Besides, these 
studies also implicitly assume the symmetrical adjustment and homogeneity of target capital 
structure adjustment across firms (Byoun, 2008; Dang et al., 2008). Hence, these studies failed to 
test the possible asymmetry and/or heterogeneities in capital structure adjustment dynamics. As 
adjustment costs may differ for overleveraged and underleveraged firms, adjustment dynamics may 
be asymmetrical (Byoun, 2008). In addition, the speed of adjustment may be heterogeneous across 
firms which may differ in their characteristics and thereby face adjustment costs differently 
(Flannery & Hankins, 2007; Dang et al., 2012). Further, past studies conducted both in static and 
dynamic frameworks use only the available accounting data and regression analysis method 
(Beattie et al., 2006). Hence, in testing theoretical models, these studies were limited to the 
variables to be available in accounting data (Beattie et al., 2006). Moreover, these studies dealt only 
with the outcomes of capital structure decision rather than the processes involved in the dynamic 
perspectives (DeJong & van Dijk, 2001; Beattie et al., 2006; Nor et al., 2012). On the top of these 
limitations, most importantly, past studies that tested theoretical models both in static and dynamic 
perspectives also focused mainly on nonfinancial firms and mostly neglected or excluded the data 
of banks and other financial firms (Baranoff et al., 2008; Gropp & Heider, 2009). On the other 
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hand, as banks differ from nonfinancial firms in their capital regulation, past studies in banking 
literature (Ediz et al., 1998; Furfine, 2000; Rime, 2000; Nachane et al., 2001; Kuo & Lee,2003) 
mainly focused on the regulatory forces and hence neglected factors predicted in the theoretical 
models of financing decisions of corporate firms, in general. Thus, evidences on the validities of 
the theoretical models of capital structure in the financial sector, particularly banking firms, are 
very limited. Likewise, evidence on the effect of capital regulation holds in banks operating in the 
presence of explicit deposit insurance (Sharp, 1995; Wall & Peterson, 1996). Hence, the existing 
evidences on the capital regulation may not hold in the capital structure decisions of banks in the 
least developing countries, like Ethiopia, as they are operating in a regulatory environment in 
absence of explicit deposit insurance (Marcus, 1989; Sharp, 1995; Wall &Peterson, 1996; Kiyota et 
al., 2007). For these reasons, it is necessary to empirically investigate the capital structure decisions 
of banking firms in Ethiopia.  
To that end, the aim of the present study is to investigate the determinants that explain the capital 
structure choices and the capital structure adjustment dynamics of Ethiopian banks using panel 
model regression and cross-sectional survey.  As a backdrop, Ethiopia is one of the East African 
countries with the population of nearly 100 million (CSA, 2012). Even if it shares many features 
with those other countries, Ethiopia is identified as one of the least developing countries with a less 
developed financial sector compared to that of other African and developing countries (Kiyota et 
al., 2007). During the period before the year 1991, state control ruled the Ethiopian economy. As 
a result, there were only state-owned financial institutions and high involvement of the government 
that funded cash flows to the politically privileged projects (Geda, 2006). However, after the year 
post-1991 or post-downfall of the military government, a new economic policy direction was 
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designed for orienting the country towards the market policy and for its development to be based 
on the private sector participation (Addison & Geda, 2003). In this regard, the financial sector 
reform was made in the year 1994 during which the roles of the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) 
in regulating financial institutions were re-proclaimed. Besides, the existing state-owned financial 
institutions were reorganized to work in a market-oriented framework, and domestic private banks 
and other financial institutions (but not foreign-owned ones) were allowed to enter the financial 
sector (Addison & Geda, 2003; Geda, 2006). In effect, even though they are underdeveloped, 
notable expansions and development of banks and other financial institutions have been observed 
in Ethiopia over the past 20 years. However, the banking sector of Ethiopia is still characterized by 
the dominance of public-owned banks and high bank concentration (Kiyota et al., 2007). The 
financial landscape can be characterized as highly bank-based with the absence of a secondary 
market and explicit deposit insurance scheme (Kiyota et al., 2007). Hence, by empirically 
investigating the determinants of the capital structure and the dynamics of capital structure 
adjustment in the banks of Ethiopia, the study contributes to the efforts to fill the gap in the 
literature on the capital structure decisions of firms. To be specific, the study provides evidence for 
the capital structure theoretical models in the context that differs from their originations. Further, 
in light of the deregulation of the banking sector, the capital holdings of banks are under the 
supervision of the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE). Thus, the effectiveness of capital regulation 
entails the need for understanding the determinants of the capital structure and adjustment 
dynamics in banks. 
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1.2. Statement of the Problem 
 
Despite the fact that a preponderance of past studies in corporate finance mainly focused on the 
capital structure decision of firms, the problem of the capital structure decision of firms, 
particularly the question, “What factors determine the capital structure choice of firms and how do 
they adjust their capital structure dynamically?,” is still baffling (Myers, 1984). Lack of a compelling 
validation of theoretical models in the past empirical studies clearly indicates the conundrums in 
the capital structure decisions of firms (Harris & Raviv, 1991; Marques & Santos, 2003; Iwarere & 
Akinley, 2010).  
Specifically, as pointed out earlier, past studies on the determinants of capital structure (Titman & 
Wessels, 1988; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001; Frank & Goyal, 2004; Abor, 2008) 
examined the factors for the cross-sectional variations in the capital structure of firms.  Given the 
documented inconsistencies and contradictions of evidences, these studies also examined the 
determinants for the cross-sectional variations in observed capital structure of firms rather than the 
variations in the optimal capital structure predicted in theoretical models (Heshimite, 2001; 
Drobetz & Wanzenried, 2006). Besides, these studies failed to investigate the possible dynamism 
in the capital structure that may be inherent in the possible adjustment costs that induce lags in the 
target capital structure adjustments (Marcus, 1983; Sharp, 1995; Banjeree et al., 2000; Drobetz & 
Wanzenried, 2006; Berger et al, 2008). Hence, past studies (DeMiguel & Pindado, 2001; 
Hovakimian et al., 2001; Ozkan, 2001; Leary & Roberts, 2005; Flannery & Rangan, 2006) also 
examined the capital structure decision of firms in a dynamic framework. However, given the 
inconclusive evidences, these studies also assumed only the symmetrical and firm or invariant 
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capital structure adjustment. As a result, these studies didn’t test the possible asymmetric and/or 
bank variant or heterogeneous capital structure adjustment processes (Berger et al., 2008; Byoun, 
2008; Dang et al., 2008). Further, as mentioned earlier, those past studies that were conducted 
both in static and dynamic frameworks merely used available accounting data and regression 
methods (Beattie et al., 2006; Nor et al., 2012). Hence, unless complemented with a cross-
sectional survey, these studies couldn’t fully test the validities of theoretical models. Specifically, 
different factors that are predicted in theoretical models may not be either easily quantifiable or 
available in accounting secondary data (De Jong & van Dijk, 2001). Besides, as these studies dealt 
with the outcomes, the processes of capital structure decision-making would be far-fetched in a 
dynamic perspective (Beattie et al., 2006; Nor et al., 2012). On the top of lack of surefire 
evidences, most importantly, past studies in the capital structure decision of firms  that tested 
theories of capital structure both in a static framework (Titman & Wessels, 1988; Rajan & Zingales, 
1995; Booth et al., 2001; Frank & Goyal, 2004; Abor, 2008) and in a dynamic framework (De 
Miguel & Pindado, 2001; Hovakimian et al, 2001; Ozkan, 2001; Leary & Roberts, 2005; Drobetz 
& Wanzenried ,2006; Flannery & Rangan, 2006; Serrasqueiro & Nunes, 2010) focused mainly on 
nonfinancial firms and incessantly neglected or excluded data of  banking firms (Baranoff et al., 
2008; Gropp & Heider, 2009). On the other hand, past studies in bank capital structure―for 
example, in Switzerland (Rime, 2000), in US (Furfine, 2000), in UK (Ediz et al., 1998), in India 
(Nachane et al., 2001)―mainly focused on regulatory factors (Kuo & Lee, 2003). Thus, empirical 
evidences on the validities of the capital structure theoretical models in banking firms are very 
limited. Moreover, the documented evidences on the capital regulation of banking firms have been 
made based on the data of banks that operate in a regulatory environment with explicit deposit 
  
9 
 
insurance schemes (Sharp, 1995). In such a regulatory environment, capital regulation may be 
expected to be binding on the incentives that would be provided to the banks to hold low capital in 
their moral hazard tendency (Sharp, 1995; Wall & Peterson, 1996). Hence, these types of evidence 
on regulation may not hold in the capital structure decisions of banks that operate in the absence 
of explicit deposit insurance (Sharp, 1995). Recently, few empirical studies have also investigated 
the determinants of the banks’ capital structure―for example in US and EU countries (Gropp & 
Heider, 2009), in Ghana (Amidu, 2007), in Turkey (Çağlayan & Sak, 2010), in Nigeria (Iwarere & 
Akinley, 2010)―based on standard firm level determinants that are deemed to be important in 
nonfinancial firms (Titman & Wessels, 1988; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001; Frank & 
Goyal, 2004; Abor, 2008). Similarly, the recently available few empirical studies (Usman, 2014; 
Mohammed et al., 2015) that were conducted using the data of Ethiopian firms also examined 
capital structure using standard firm level determinants2. However, as indicated earlier, these 
studies failed to examine the determinants of cross-sectional variations in the optimal capital 
structure predicted in theoretical models (Heshimite, 2001; Drobetz & Wanzenried, 2006). These 
studies neglected the possible adjustment costs that may induce lags in the target capital structure 
adjustment dynamics (Marcus, 1983; Sharp, 1995; Banjeree et al., 2000; Drobetz & Wanzenried, 
2006; Berger et al., 2008). Besides, these studies mainly focused on the factors predicted in the 
corporate finance theoretical models. Thus, these studies neglected the effects of regulatory factors 
on the capital structure of banks (Brewer et al., 2008). Further, albeit scant, those past empirical 
                                                          
2
 As to the best knowledge of the researcher, the recent few studies that were conducted using data of Ethiopian firms 
include both published works (Usman, 2014; Mohammed et al., 2015) and unpublished works (Amanuel, 2011; 
W/Michael, 2012). However, these studies failed to test theoretical models in the dynamics. Besides, Usman (2014) 
primarily examined the capital structure of large taxpayer share companies.  Further, Mohammed et al. (2015) 
considered only factors that are found to be relevant to explain the cross-sectional variations in the leverage of 
nonfinancial firms and neglected regulatory factors in examining the capital structure decision of banks. 
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studies had also examined the capital structure decisions of banks in a dynamic framework, for 
example in US (Marcus, 1983), in Australia (Sharp, 1995), and in selected industrialized countries 
(Brewer et al., 2008). These studies considered both the factors predicted in theoretical models 
and regulatory forces. However, similar to past studies in nonfinancial firms (DeMiguel & Pindado, 
2001; Hovakimian et al., 2001; Ozkan, 2001; Leary & Roberts, 2005; Flannery & Rangan, 2006), 
these studies assumed only symmetrical and/or homogenous capital structure adjustment dynamics 
to test the predictions of theoretical models in a dynamic perspective. Hence, these studies didn’t 
address the possible asymmetric and/or bank variant or heterogeneous capital structure adjustment 
processes (Berger et al., 2008; Byoun, 2008; Dang et al., 2008). Furthermore, these studies were 
conducted in the banks of developed countries that operate in the presence of explicit deposit 
insurance (Sharp, 1995). Due to this, the documented evidences on regulatory forces may not hold 
in the banks of developing countries that operate in its absence (Sharp, 1995). 
Thus, given the existing gaps in the literature and the unique features of the Ethiopian financial 
landscape, there is an acute need for examining the determinants and dynamics of the capital 
structure of Ethiopian banks. Over the past two decades or so, banks in Ethiopia have shown 
cross-sectional and time series variations in their capital structure (see Annex 1). Banks can be 
characterized as any other corporate firms and regulated entities in their capital structure (Berger et 
al., 1995; Wall & Peterson, 1996; Brewer et al., 2008). The capital holdings of banks received high 
attentions from regulators as the failure of banks may tempt the ruin of the entire economy 
(Marcus, 1983; Santos, 2001). However, banks may hold capital above the regulatory minimum 
that may be related to different factors predicted in the theoretical models. In the capital structure 
choice and adjustment dynamics, these factors may provide a number of benefits and, at the same 
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time, entail different costs for shareholders (Wall & Peterson, 1996; Nachane et al., 2001). Hence, 
the capital structure decisions of Ethiopian banks may be explained based on factors predicted in 
the tradeoff and pecking order theoretical models3 and pertinent regulatory forces. 
The central research question of the present study is: What factors determine the capital structure 
choices of banks in Ethiopia and how do banks adjust their capital structure dynamically in 
Ethiopia? 
Sub-questions of the study are: 
 To what extent do the corporate finance determinants relate to the capital structure choices 
of banks in Ethiopia?  
 To what extent do pertinent regulatory factors relate to the capital structure of banks? 
 Do banks adjust their capital structure towards the target? And if so, how fast?  
 Are the dynamics of the capital structure adjustment of banks asymmetrical? 
 Are the dynamics of the capital structure adjustment of banks heterogeneous? If so, what 
factors determine the heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment?  
                                                          
3
 Market Timing and Signaling are also other theories of capital structure. Market Timing(or Windows of 
Opportunity) Theory states that the choice of debt or equity depends on managers’ exploitation of information 
asymmetries to assess which option better benefits shareholders (Baker & Wurgler, 2002). Signaling Theory postulates 
that manager-insiders have information about their own firms not possessed by outsiders, and hence investors look for 
two types of signals from the managers: the amounts of (a) debt and (b) dividends issued (Ross, 1977). However, given 
the absence of secondary market and oligopolistic financial landscape of Ethiopia, these theoretical models are not the 
focus of the study. 
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 Are the banks’ capital structure choices providing empirical support to extant theories 
(particularly a tradeoff theory, or a pecking order theory, or both)?  
1.3. Aim and Objectives 
 
The general aim of the present study is to examine the determinants of the capital structure 
choices and dynamics of the capital structure adjustments of Ethiopian banks. To this end, the 
following specific objectives have been formulated: 
 To examine how the corporate finance determinants relate to the capital structure choices 
of banks in Ethiopia. 
 To identify the extent to which pertinent regulatory factors relate to the capital structure of 
banks in Ethiopia. 
 To examine the dynamic or the partial capital structure adjustment process of banks 
towards the target and thereby to estimate the speed of adjustment.  
 To investigate the asymmetric target capital structure adjustment of banks in question.  
 To examine the heterogeneity in the capital structure adjustment dynamics and thereby to 
identify factors determining the heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment. 
 To examine the validities of the tradeoff and pecking order theories in the capital structure 
of banks in the context of the financial sector in Ethiopia.   
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 To develop a model of the determinants of capital structure and capital structure 
adjustment dynamics of banks in Ethiopia.  
1.4. Rationales and/or Importance of the Study 
 
The study investigates the determinants and dynamics of banks’ capital structure in Ethiopia with 
different justifications: 
Firstly, despite the fact that the capital structure decisions of firms are found to be a central issue in 
the past inquiries into corporate finance, the “puzzles” of the capital structure of firms are not yet 
resolved (Myers, 1984). As pointed out earlier, past studies failed to provide unequivocal validation 
of the theoretical models. The documented evidences are found to be context- and methodology-
dependent (Harris & Raviv, 1991; DeMiguel & Pindado, 2001; Ozkan, 2001; Flannery & Rangan, 
2006). Besides, theories of capital structure have been developed and mostly tested in developed 
economies (Booth et al., 2001) or in developing countries with less developed financial markets 
(Ignacio, 2000; Buferna et al., 2005). Scanty studies are available that have tested the capital 
structure theories by empirically examining the determinants and dynamics of capital structure 
based on the data of firms operating in the  least developing countries, particularly in Ethiopia, in 
absence of secondary markets (Kiyota et al.,  2007)4. Then, the existing puzzles in capital structure 
and lack of empirical studies in the least developing countries, particularly in Ethiopia, have 
motivated the present researcher to conduct this study. In doing so, the study contributes to the 
                                                          
4 As to the best knowledge of the researcher, there is no prior study in Ethiopia that examines banks’ capital structure 
determinants and adjustment dynamics based on static and dynamic panel data models and data of a cross-sectional 
survey. As discussed earlier, the available few studies (Usman, 2014; Mohammed et al., 2015) on Ethiopian firms have 
investigated the determinants of capital structure of the firms merely in a static framework. 
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extant literature on the subject, by providing empirical evidences on the explanatory power of 
theoretical models in the context that differs from their originations (Rajan & Zinglas, 1995). 
Secondly, empirical studies in the capital structure of firms that have tested the tradeoff and 
pecking order theories often neglect banks and other financial firms (Baranoff et al., 2008; Gropp 
& Heider, 2009). The basic reason for such exclusion is that funding sources of banking firms 
differ from that of other corporate firms and that banking firms are relatively highly leveraged 
(Rajan & Zinglas, 1995). In addition, the capital holdings of banks face relatively higher regulatory 
forces than nonfinancial firms (Baranoff et al., 2008). On the other hand, past studies on the 
capital structure of banks have focused mainly on the regulatory factors for examining their 
possible differences rather than similarities with other corporate firms, with respect to their capital 
structure decisions (Kuo & Lee, 2002).  The exclusions of banking firms in past empirical studies 
seem reasonable (Baranoff et al., 2008) and it is hardly justifiable to neglect regulatory forces in 
examining financing decision of banks (Brewer et al., 2008). However, it also motivates the present 
researcher to examine the capital structure decisions of banks, by integrating factors predicted in 
the theoretical models and possible regulatory forces on capital holdings (Baranoff et al., 2008). 
Hence, the present study would fill the gap in the extant empirical literature on the subject by 
testing the validities of theoretical models, which are developed and mostly tested in nonfinancial 
firms, in the specific context of banking firms in Ethiopia. Besides, unlike previous evidences on 
regulatory forces documented in banks which operate in the presence of explicit deposit insurance, 
the present study would also fill a gap in the literature, by providing empirical evidence for 
pertinent regulatory factors on banks operating in its absence (Sharp, 1995). 
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Thirdly, despite the fact that considerable evidence of past studies in developed countries generally 
suggest the presence of target capital structure adjustment; this issue has barely been examined by 
the empirical literature in the developing countries (Prasad et al., 2001). Available few recent 
studies (Amidu, 2007; Octovia & Brown, 2008; Çağlayan & Sak, 2010) that have investigated the 
capital structure of banks in developing countries were conducted based on a static framework and 
ignored the possible lags in the capital structure adjustment (Heshimite, 2001). Further, the 
documented evidences revealed inconsistencies in the speed of adjustment, whereby the rate of 
adjustment is context-dependent. Specifically, both the costs of deviations from the target and costs 
of adjustments are highly affected by the firms’ institutional, legal and financial environment 
(Antoniou et al., 2008). This is particularly true in banking firms operating in the least developing 
countries like Ethiopia. So, investigating the determinants of bank capital structure, by allowing 
possible lags in the capital structure adjustment dynamics, would be valuable in order to fill the 
gaps in the literature on capital structure adjustment dynamics.  
Fourthly, past studies that investigated the capital structure adjustment dynamics of firms had been 
mainly conducted based on a symmetrical or partial adjustment model. This model assumes that 
all firms adjust at a constant speed of adjustment. Therefore, these studies have mainly neglected 
the possible asymmetry and/or heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment for banks with varying 
characteristics (Berger et al., 2008; Byoun, 2008). This would be the rationale for the need to 
investigate the possible asymmetrical and heterogeneous target capital adjustment dynamics of 
banks. Thus, by investigating the possible asymmetry in the speed of adjustment towards the target, 
for overleveraged and underleveraged banks, and the factors for the possible heterogeneity in the 
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rate of adjustment, the study would provide further evidence for the dynamic tradeoff or target 
capital structure adjustment theory of capital structure (Byoun, 2008). 
Finally, the study would have practical and policy relevance. Specifically, the study would have 
paramount importance in the improvising effort of management practices in the areas of capital 
structure decision. By examining the financing behavior of commercial banks, the findings would 
have a practical relevance for its valuable insights into the capital structure choice that maximizes 
values. In other words, an identification of the determinants of capital structure and the dynamics 
would have a contribution to the capital structure policy formulation that maximizes the value of 
banks (Marques & Santos, 2003). Besides, in light of the deregulation of the banking sector, the 
capital holdings of banks are under the supervision of the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE). Thus, 
the effectiveness of capital regulation entails the need for understanding the determinants of capital 
structure and its adjustment dynamics. It is useful to understand how the market forces interact 
with the regulatory forces (Berlin, 2001). Thus, the study would provide valuable input into the 
government’s efforts to design and revise banks’ regulatory instruments with a view to achieving the 
desired solvency and financial stability of banks and thereby maintaining the active role of banks to 
fuel the economic growth of Ethiopia. 
1.5. Delimitation/Scope of the Study  
 
As pointed out in preceding sections, the main purpose of the study is to examine the 
determinants and dynamics of the capital structure of banks. Accordingly, the study has been 
delimited to an investigation of the determinants of capital structure, given the equilibrium 
condition and adjustment towards the equilibrium or target capital structure. More specifically, the 
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study has been delimited to examining ―the corporate finance set of determinants of capital 
structure (including effective tax rate, profitability and/or size of free cash flows, growth 
opportunities, collateral values of assets, size and risk), pertinent regulatory factors and capital 
structure adjustment dynamics of banks. In doing so, empirical data were collected from the 
selected sample of fourteen commercial banks with a minimum three years of operation, and/or 
from selected CFOs of banks with a minimum one year of tenure, which were registered as 
incorporated banks of Ethiopia under the proclamations of the NBE and have been operational 
over the period between 2000 to 2012. As the study deals with the banking industry, the industry’s 
mean average is not considered as one of the determinants of the capital structure and capital 
structure adjustment dynamics (Frank & Goyal, 2008). Moreover, macroeconomic factors have not 
been considered. Any macroeconomic shocks and regulatory factors other than capital regulation 
have been addressed using the time dummy variable (Kleff & Weber, 2004). 
1.6. Outline of the Study 
The study is organized in seven chapters, as shown in Figure 1.1 below.  
Figure 1.1 Organization of the study 
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As depicted in Figure 1.1, the first chapter covers the orientation of the study which is intended to 
describe the context of research and the identified problem. The second chapter discusses the 
theoretical underpinnings of the study. This is followed by a review of relevant empirical studies in 
the third chapter. In other words, Chapter Two and Chapter Three would be the foundation for 
the hypotheses formulation of the study in Chapter Four. The fifth chapter discusses the research 
methodology employed in the study. The sixth chapter contains the empirical results and 
discussions with respect to the determinants of capital structure and the dynamics of the capital 
structure adjustment of banks in Ethiopia. The final chapter presents the conclusions of the study 
and recommendations for further research. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF THE STUDY 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The modern theoretical explanation of capital structure decision of firms has begun with the 
foundation work of Modigliani & Miller (1958) irrelevance proposition (Myers, 2001). In this 
irrelevance proposition, Modiglian & Miller (1958) have indicated that the financing decision of 
firms doesn’t matter (Myers, 2001). Specifically, for a given investment, the value of firms is 
independent of its financing decision (Modiglian & Miller, 1958). Hence, any degree of financing 
mix is as good as any other (Frank & Goyal, 2008). No difference exists between internal financing 
and external financing, short-term and long-term debt, risk-or non-risk financial instrument, debt 
or equity (Harris & Reviv, 1991; Myers, 2001; Frank & Goyal, 2008). However, Modigliani & 
Miller (1958) irrelevance proposition proved valid only under perfect market assumptions (Frank 
& Goyal, 2008). Thus, the basic contribution of Modigliani & Miller (1958) irrelevance proposition 
is that it shows conditions under which capital structure decision does matter for value 
maximization (Miller, 1992; Frank & Goyal, 2008).  
In effect, departing from the frictionless world of Modigliani & Miller (1958), other theoretical 
models have been developed to explain how and why the financing decision of firms is relevant. 
Specifically, by introducing market imperfections of taxes, costs of distress, agency costs and 
asymmetric information costs, the tradeoff and the pecking order theoretical models of capital 
structure have been developed. These theoretical models are found to be dominant in the body 
literature that explains the financing decision of corporate firms in general (Brewer et al., 2008). 
However, unlike other corporate firms, banks are also subject to regulation in their capital 
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holdings. Then, bank capital structure may be explained based on the factors predicted in the 
tradeoff and pecking order theories and regulatory forces (Berger et al., 1995).  Thus, this chapter 
has been devoted to outlining the theoretical foundation of the study. To this end, the central ideas 
and explanations underlying the tradeoff theoretical model have been discussed first under section 
2.2. Then, section 2.3 presents the pecking order theoretical model. The theory of bank capital 
regulation is discussed under section 2.4. Finally, section 2.5 provides the summary of theoretical 
foundation of the study. 
2.2. Tradeoff Theory 
 
In a tradeoff theory, firms tend to balance the benefit of debt financing (Modigliani & Miller, 1963; 
Jenson & Meckling, 1976; Miller, 1977; DeAngelio & Masulis, 1980; Jenson, 1986) and the cost of 
debt financing (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973; Jenson & Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Warner, 
1977) in their capital structure decisions. Hence, the tradeoff theory predicts the presence of 
optimal or target capital structure to be obtained at the point where the marginal benefits equal to 
the marginal costs of debt financing (Myers, 1984). However, in the presence of adjustment costs, 
firms may deviate from their target and hence tend to adjust towards it through time (Myers, 1984; 
Frank & Goyal, 2008). The speed of adjustment towards the optimal or target capital structure 
depends on the adjustment costs and the costs of deviation from the target (Flannery & Hankins, 
2007). If adjustment costs are prohibitively high, firms may take long excursions away from their 
target (Myers, 1984). Then, this section of the chapter discusses the explanations of the tradeoff 
theoretical model. As there are different benefits and costs of debt financings to be considered, the 
tradeoff theoretical model takes a variety of forms (Chen & Strang, 2005). Nevertheless, in the 
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specific context of the present study, the tradeoff theory has been presented in its two basic 
variants: Tax-Cost of distress tradeoff model and Agency costs tradeoff model (as shown under 
2.2.1 & 2.2.2 respectively). Then, the third subsection covers the predictions of the dynamic 
tradeoff (target capital structure adjustment) theory. 
2.2.1. Tax Shield and Cost of Financial Distress Tradeoff Theoretical Model 
 
In the tax shield and cost of financial distress tradeoff theoretical model, the optimal capital 
structure is determined when the benefits of tax shield of debt and costs of financial distress are 
balanced (Myers, 1984).  As a result, firms tend to substitute debt for equity financing or vice versa 
up to the point where the marginal tax shield of debt equals the marginal costs of financial distress 
(Myers, 1984; Frank & Goyal, 2008). 
2.2.1.1. Taxation 
 
At the early stage, Modigilian & Miller (1963) recognized the need to alter their perfect market 
assumption that underlies their original irrelevance proposition (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). 
Specifically, Modigilian & Miller (1963) introduced corporate tax and explained why the capital 
structure decision is relevant. In the presence of corporate tax, firms tend to increase their debt 
financing to take the benefits of corporate tax shields from tax-deductible interest payment for debt 
financing (Modigilian & Miller, 1963; Myers, 1984). This tax shield benefit is not available in 
dividend payments for the use of equity financing (Berger et al., 1995).  Hence, the value of 
leveraged firms equals the value of unleveraged firms plus the tax shield of debt from interest 
payment deductions (Modigilian & Miller, 1963; Myers, 1984). This explanation has been 
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considered as the original tradeoff theory or the pure Modigliani & Miller (1963) theory (Myers, 
1984; Frank & Goyal, 2008). The extreme implication of pure Modigliani & Miller (1963) theory 
is that firms continuously increase debt financing to grab the benefits of tax shield on interest 
payments of debt (Miller, 1977; Myers, 1984). However, this extreme implication of the pure 
Modigliani & Miller (1963) theory has been challenged by the famous work of Miller (1977), 
among others. 
In explaining the tax shield of debt, Modigliani & Miller (1963) consider only the corporate tax 
shield. By introducing the personal tax rate, Miller (1977) reclaimed the leverage irrelevance 
proposition (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). In the presence of the marginal personal tax rate of stock 
that is less than the personal tax rate on debt, the gain from tax shield would be less than the gain 
only from corporate tax shield (Miller, 1977). This implies that firms will tend to increase debt 
financing until the marginal corporate tax saving (i.e., corporate tax rate) is equal to the personal 
tax loss (personal tax rate) (Prasad et al., 2001). In this sense, Miller (1977) contends that in the 
presence of both personal tax rate and corporate tax rate, the tax structure determines leverage at 
the aggregate level but is irrelevant for an individual firm (Myers, 1984). Miller (1977) describes the 
observed capital structure decision of firms as “neutral mutation”. Specifically, Miller (1977) 
indicates that firms may fall or be trapped into some kind of financial pattern or habit, which has 
no effect on firms’ value (Myers, 1984).  
Further, DeAngelio & Masulis (1980) examined whether leverage irrelevance theory proposed by 
Miller (1977) holds in a wider definition of corporate tax code. In doing so, they introduced the 
non-debt tax shield of debt from depreciation expenses and investment tax credits. Their analysis 
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overturned Miller’s (1977) leverage irrelevance theory (Myers, 1984). De Angelio & Masulis (1980) 
indicated the existence of a unique interior optimal capital structure for each firm after 
consideration is given to non-debt tax shields. In the presence of firms with a high amount of the 
non-debt tax shied in the form of depreciation and other expenses relative to their cash flows, the 
marginal benefit of corporate tax shield from increasing debt financing declines (De Angelio & 
Masulis, 1980). Thus, we can expect a negative relationship between the non-debt tax shield and 
debt financing in total capital (De Angelio & Masulis, 1980). 
2.2.1.2.  Cost of Financial Distress 
 
To seize the benefits of tax shield of debt, firms may tend to increase the use of debt financing. 
However, the continual increase of debt financing is not without cost. As firms tend to increase 
debt financing, they also face the increased costs of financial distress (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973; 
Warner, 1977). 
In the extant theoretical literature on capital structure, costs of financial distress are characterized 
as having two dimensions: (i) the probability of default and (ii) the monetary impact (size) when the 
default materialized (Myers, 1984). Warner (1977) also classifies the costs of financial distress as 
direct and indirect costs. Direct costs include the bankruptcy and related costs for legal and 
administrative procedures (Warner, 1977; Myers, 1984). Bankruptcies of firms occur when they 
fail to meet obligations or debt commitments (Berger et al., 1995). Indirect costs are those costs 
that results from the perception that the probability of bankruptcy is high (Warner, 1977)5. This 
                                                          
5
 High perception of financial disterss is found to be negatively related to the attitudes towards banks in Nigeria 
(Babalola,2009). 
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holds true even when bankruptcy has not actually materialized (Warner, 1977). Indirect costs 
include the opportunity costs of lost sales due to a low motivation of key management and 
employees. Besides, it may be due to the presence of suppliers, who are not willing to provide the 
necessary inputs, and customers, who are not willing to use the product or service of firms that are 
perceived to be bankrupt.   
As a result, as to the tradeoff between tax shield of debt and bankruptcy costs, Kraus & 
Litzenberger (1973) have indicated the existence of optimal capital structure in state preference 
model. However, Miller (1977) argues that the bankruptcy costs are too small to offset the 
corporate tax shield of debt to reach non-existence of optimal leverage for each firm in the market 
equilibrium. On the contrary, De Angelio & Masulis (1980) have documented the existence of 
optimal capital structure in the presence of bankruptcy costs.  
2.2.2. Agency Costs Tradeoff Theoretical Models 
 
In the agency costs tradeoff theoretical models, the capital structure decision of firms is found to 
be relevant due to the presence of agency cost6. Agency costs become apparent from the agency-
principal relationship inherent in the separation of the ownership and control of modern corporate 
firms (Berle & Means, 1967; Jenson & Meckling, 1976). The agency-principal relationship emerges 
when one party called the principals (or the purveyors of capital) to assign the agent (or 
                                                          
6
 Jenson&Meckling (1976) define agency cost as “the sum of (i) the monitoring expenditures by the principal, (ii) the 
bonding expenditures by agent, and iii) the monetary value of the reduction in welfare experienced by the principal 
due to the divergence between the agent’s  decisions and those decisions which would maximize the welfare of the 
principal”. 
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management) to run activities of the firms in the place of the principals (Jenson & Meckling, 1976). 
In this agency-principal relationship, Jenson & Meckling (1976) identify two major types of conflict 
of interests. First, there is a conflict of interest between managers and shareholders―which 
represents the goal incongruence between the managers, who need to maximize their own 
perquisites, and the shareholders, who need to maximize their own welfare (Jenson & Mekling, 
1976; Harris & Raviv, 1991; Myers, 2000; Frank & Goyal, 2008). Second, there is a conflict of 
interest between debt holders and shareholders―which occurs when shareholders or their 
representatives tend to transfer wealth from debt holders to shareholders (Jenson & Meckling, 
1976; Harris & Raviv, 1991; De Jong & van Dijk, 2001; Myers, 2001; Myers, 2002).  
In short, the optimal capital structure of firms can be explained as balancing the benefits of debt 
financing for reducing the agency cost problems related to the conflict of interests between 
managers and shareholders (Jenson & Meckling, 1976; Jenson, 1986; Harris & Raviv, 1990; Stluz, 
1990) and the agency costs of debt financing that emanate from the conflict of interests between 
debt holders and shareholders (Jenson & Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Harris & Raviv, 1990; 
Stluz, 1990). 
2.2.2.1. Conflict of Interests between Shareholders and Managers 
 
In the agency-principal relationship of corporate firms, the conflict of interests between 
shareholders and managers are manifested in many ways. Firstly, as pointed out earlier by Jenson 
& Meckling (1976), managers prefer to have greater perquisite level and lower effort level. In 
analyzing such agency costs of equity rooted in the conflict of interests between shareholders and 
managers, Jenson & Meckling (1976) compare the behavior of managers in wholly owner-manager 
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firms and managers of firms who have fractional interest in the ownership of firms. In the presence 
of managers who have fractional interest in the ownership of firms and are responsible for directing 
firms’ activities, the agency costs of equity will materialize (Jenson & Meckling, 1976). Specifically, 
managers tend to transfer resources of firms as a perquisite for a self-serving bias, invest less effort 
in searching promising investment projects and in avoiding dealing with the related demands of 
adapting a new product/service (Jenson & Meckling, 1976; Harris & Raviv, 1991). Secondly, 
managers may prefer short-term projects to more profitable long-term projects (Masulis, 1988). In 
such a short-term tendency, managers may need to produce early results and enhance their 
reputation quickly (Prasad et al., 2001). Thirdly, managers may prefer less risky investments and 
lower leverage to lessen the probability of bankruptcy (Hunsaker, 1999; Prasad et al., 2001). 
Fourthly, managers and shareholders may also differ over a firm’s operating decisions (Harris & 
Raviv, 1990; Stulz, 1990). In addressing such a conflict, Harris & Raviv (1990) explain that 
managers need to continue operations while owners look for liquidations (Harris & Raviv, 1991). 
Besides, Stulz (1990) also contends that managers tend to use the free cash flows to finance non-
promising investment projects with a negative net present value (NPV). They deliberately ignore 
the dividend payment though appropriate (Stulz, 1990). Stulz (1990) termed such a managerial 
behavior “overinvestment”. Then, according to Stulz (1990), the cost of overinvestment is defined 
as the expected cost to the shareholders that arises because management invest cash flows in excess 
of that is available to fund positive NPV projects in negative NPV projects. 
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Of the varied menu of solutions proposed to mitigate agency costs related to the conflict of 
interests between managers and shareholders, the use of debt financing may be prominent7. For 
instance, Jenson & Meckling (1976) have point out the benefits of the increased use of debt 
financing to reduce such costs of agency problems. To be specific, Jenson & Meckling (1976) 
argue that, for the constant ownership interest of managers in a firm, increasing the use of debt to 
finance investment opportunities will increase the ownership interest of management and the gain 
from returns of investment. In effect, it reduces agency costs from the conflict of interests between 
shareholders and managers (Harris & Raviv, 1991). 
Jenson (1986) also maintains that these agency costs will be severe in firms with high free cash 
flows. More specifically, Jenson (1986) argues that in the presence of excess cash flows, managers 
will have ample resources at their disposal for using as perquisites and organizational inefficiencies. 
Managers may also tend to use the available free cash flows in value-decreasing projects (Stulz, 
1990). Jenson (1986) and Stulz (1990) explain that the increased use of debt financing helps to 
discipline the managerial behavior. In particular, they commit the use of free cash flows to meet 
maturing debt obligations, at least to show their efficiency (Harris & Raviv, 1991; Roshan, 2009)8. 
Hence, this use of debt financing as the monitoring mechanism (Jenson & Meckling, 1976) to 
reduce the agency costs of free cash flows is taken to be the benefit of borrowing to be tradeoff 
with any agency costs of debt to arrive at the optimal capital structure (Jenson, 1986; Stluz, 1990; 
                                                          
7 Other mechanisms to minimize these conflict of interests include the use of incentive-performance compatible 
managerial contracts (e.g., managerial shareholding), use of internal monitoring (e.g., monitoring by board, large 
shareholders) and external monitoring mechanisms (e.g., corporate takeovers), and government regulation (Jenson & 
Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1989). 
8
 Jenson (1986) defines free cash flows as “the cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that have positive 
net present values when discounted at the relevant cost of capital”. 
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Harris & Raviv, 1991). However, Jenson (1986) indicates that the benefits of debt financing for 
reducing the agency cost problems are not one-size-fits-all. Specifically, the reduction of agency 
costs of cash flows from the increased use of debt financing works well in firms having excess free 
cash flows and low growth opportunities (Jenson, 1986).  
It has been also pointed out in the literature that the increased use of debt financing will force the 
liquidation of a firm and reduce the conflict of interests between the shareholder and manager over 
a firm’s operating decision (Harris & Raviv, 1990; 1991). They argue that the increased use of debt 
financing will increase the probability of default and provide a sound base for the investors to force 
their liquidation needs (Harris & Raviv, 1990; 1991). 
2.2.2.2. Conflict of Interest between Shareholders and Debt Holders 
 
The agency cost of debt that emanates from the conflict of interest between the shareholders and 
debt holders has also been considered in explaining the capital structure decision of firms (Jenson 
& Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977). In the conflicts between the shareholders and debt holders, the 
share holders or their representatives tend to transfer wealth from debt holders to shareholders. As 
a matter of fact, mainly three possible forms of conflicts between shareholders and debt holders 
have been identified in extant literature. These include (i) direct wealth transfer (Smith & Warner, 
1979; De Jong & van Dijk, 2001), (ii) asset substitution (Jenson & Meckling, 1976) and (iii) 
underinvestment (Myers, 1977; Stulz, 1990).  
In a direct wealth transfer, shareholders or managers (as their representatives) tend to pay cash as 
dividend to shareholders and issue debts with high priority (Smith & Warner, 1979; De Jong & van 
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Dijk, 2001). If debts have been priced assuming that the firm will not issue additional debt 
instruments, the value of the existing debt will decline. This is particularly true, if a newly issued 
debt has higher priority (Prasad et al., 2001). In the risk shifting incentive or assets substitution, the 
share holders tend to invest in highly risky projects rather than in the current less risky project 
(Jenson & Meckling, 1976). This tendency of shareholders is to maximize their own returns when 
the investment turns out to be successful (Jenson & Meckling, 1976). On the other hand, they 
transfer loss to debt holders when investment fails (Jenson & Meckling, 1976; Harris & Raviv, 
1991).  This tendency of shareholders is due to the limited liability feature of corporate firms 
(Jenson & Meckling, 1976; Harris & Raviv, 1991). According to Myers (1977), underinvestment 
occurs when shareholders tend to restrain the use of new equity funds to finance promising 
investment opportunities. On the other hand, shareholders may prefer to reject investments with 
low risk and low positive NPV that may favor debt holders (Myers, 1977; Prasad et al., 2001). 
Rather, they may favor investment with high risk and high NPV projects (Myers, 1977; Prasad et al, 
2001). This tendency mainly occurs when firms are highly expected to be bankrupt in the near 
future (Myers, 2001). This tendency is due to the expected higher benefits that debt holders, as 
first claimants, gain from safe positive investment, rather than shareholders, as residual claimants. 
From a different view, Stulz (1990) contends that the excessive use of cash flows to service debt 
commitments to reduce overinvestment would results in underinvestment due to low cash flows 
available for funding of value increasing opportunities. Besides, the information cost incurred to 
ensure a firm is at default and force liquidation conceived to be the cost of debt (Harris & Raviv, 
1990; 1991).  
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However, in the rational expectations, debt holders anticipate possible direct wealth transfer, risk-
shifting incentives of shareholders and underinvestment (Jenson & Meckling, 1976). Hence, debt 
holders react to such a tendency of shareholders or their representatives by adjusting the prices or 
conditions of the firm’s debt instrument (Jenson & Meckling, 1976; Prasad et al., 2001)9. They may 
pay less or demand a higher premium for the firm’s debt instrument (Jenson & Meckling, 1976; 
De Jong & van Dijk, 2001). The possible risk-shifting and underinvestment incentives of 
shareholders will exist as long as the gain from transfer of wealth of debt holders exceeds the 
decline in value from their engagement in risky projects (Harris & Raviv, 1991). As a result, in the 
agency cost tradeoff model, firms tend to balance the benefits of debt for reducing the agency cost 
problems and agency cost of debt (Jenson & Meckling, 1976; Harris & Raviv, 1991). 
Then, in the static tradeoff theoretical models, the target capital structure of firms would be 
determined by balancing the benefits of debt financing with costs of debt financing (Myers, 1984). 
Specifically, the target capital structure of firms occurs at the point where the marginal benefits of 
tax shields and reduction of agency cost problems equal the marginal costs of distress and agency 
costs of debt (Brewer et al., 2008). However, at any given point of time, the capital structure of 
firms may not be at the optimum due to the possible adjustment costs. Rather, in a continuous 
time framework, the capital structure of firms may deviate from the target capital structure and 
tend to adjust toward it through time (Myers, 1984). This dynamics of the target capital structure 
                                                          
9 As the remedial for agency costs of debt, different studies proposed some features of debt contract: use of covenant 
(Smith & Warner, 1979), convertible debt and warrant (Jenson & Meckling, 1976; Green, 1984), use of collaterals 
(Stulz & Johnson, 1985, cited in Harris & Raviv, 1991). Besides, Diamond (1989) and Hirshleifer & Thakor (1989) 
also conjectured reputation concern of managers or firms as the moderator of agency costs of debt in the form of asset 
substitution (Harris & Raviv, 1991). 
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adjustment of firms has been explained based on the target capital structure adjustment or the 
dynamic tradeoff theoretical model (Fischer et al., 1989; Leary & Roberts, 2005). 
2.2.3. Costly Adjustment (Dynamic Tradeoff Theory) 
 
Theoretical literature on the dynamic capital structure comes along two main routes.  In the first 
route of theoretical literatures (Brennan & Schwartz, 1984; Kane et al., 1984; Leland, 1994), the 
dynamics of capital structure of firms have been examined in a continuous time framework that 
balances taxation and costs of bankruptcy, allowing uncertainty to address the dynamism (Frank & 
Goyal, 2007). Particularly, considering both corporate and personal tax and bankruptcy costs, 
Kane et al. (1984) argue that unleveraged capital structure is suboptimal. This is because the 
marginal bankruptcy cost of unleveraged is always zero, while the firm has opportunity cost for a 
positive net tax advantage (Kane et al., 1984).  In this regard, Kane et al. (1984) used the flow 
measure of advantage to leverage, in contrast to its static stock measure, and then they specified a 
dynamic model. Hence, in capital structure dynamics, Kane et al. (1984) infer that firms 
periodically rebalance the debt ratios optimally. In a dynamic framework, Brennan & Schwartz 
(1984) also examined the optimal capital structure choice of firms both in the absence and 
presence of corporate tax. In its absence, Brennan & Schwartz (1984) documented that the firms’ 
optimum capital choices depend on profitability. In its presence, they also indicated that the firms’ 
value and growth rate would be below the no-tax situation. Brennan & Schwartz (1984) also 
revealed debt indentures as the boundary conditions for the values of the debts and equity claims. 
However, these explanations did not consider the possible transaction costs which may induce lags 
in the target adjustment (Frank & Goyal, 2007; Halling et al., 2011).  
  
32 
 
In the second route, theoretical models of the dynamics of capital structure are said to have begun 
by Fischer et al. (1989). They considered the transaction costs in their systematic explanation of 
the possible dynamism of the capital structure decision of firms (Frank & Goyal, 2007). In the 
existence of a recapitalization costs, Fischer et al. (1989) developed the dynamic optimal capital 
structure theoretical model. They pointed out the presence of large swings of optimal capital 
structure over the range of the upper and lower boundaries or “the range of capital structure 
inactivity” (Leary & Roberts, 2005). Firms tend to initiate adjustment to the initial level when 
capital structure reaches either the lower or upper boundary, on a “lumpy” basis (Fischer et al., 
1989; Leary & Roberts, 2005). This prediction has been extended by different scholars (Mauer & 
Triantis, 1994; Goldstein et al, 2001; Morellec, 2001; Hennessy & Whited, 2004; Moyen, 2004; 
Strebulaev, 2007; Titman & Tsyplakov, 2007)10.  
 
Therefore, in the target capital structure adjustment or dynamic tradeoff theory, the capital 
structure decision of firms can be explained, as a-two-steps procedure. Firstly, firms set the optimal 
or target capital structure by balancing the benefits of debt financing and the costs of debt 
financing. Secondly, they tend to adjust or rebalance their capital structure towards the target 
through time (Myers, 1984; Flannery & Hankins, 2007; Frank & Goyal, 2008). The speed of 
adjustment towards the target also depends on the adjustment costs and the costs of deviations 
from the target or benefits of adjustments towards the target (Flannery & Hankins, 2007). If the 
                                                          
10
 Notably, these scholars differ in their treatment of investment and then, cash flows to explain the dynamic tradeoff 
theory.  For example, Goldstein et al. (2001) and Strebulaev (2007) treat investment and then cash flows as being 
strictly exogenous, while Mauer & Triantis (1994), Morellec (2001), Moyen (2004), Hennessy & Whited (2005) and 
Titman & Tsyplakov (2007) treat investment as being endogenous to financing decisions. 
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cost of adjustment by far exceeds the benefit of adjustment, firms may stay long perturbed from the 
optimum (Myers, 1984; Flannery & Hankins, 2007).  
These theoretical predictions would have implications for the capital structure adjustment 
dynamics of firms. Firstly, the capital structure adjustment dynamics may be asymmetrical for 
overleveraged and underleveraged firms11. In adjusting towards the target, overleveraged or 
undercapitalized firms may rebalance their capital structure by issuing equity or debt repayment 
(Flannery & Hankins, 2007). On the other hand, underleveraged or overcapitalized firms may 
rebalance their capital structure by issuing debt or retiring equity (Flannery & Hankins, 2007; 
Byoun, 2008). Then, if the adjustment costs for issuance of equity securities differ from issuance of 
debt securities, the target capital structure adjustment may be asymmetrical for overleveraged and 
underleveraged firms (Byoun, 2008). Besides, the benefits of target adjustment of underleveraged 
firms(in the form of tax shield and reduction of free cash flow problems) of underleveraged firms 
may differ from the benefits of target adjustment of overleveraged firms( in the form reduction of 
cost of financial distress and agency cost of debt)( Flannery & Hankins, 2007; Drobetz et al.,2013). 
For this reason, the capital structure adjustment dynamics of leverage-increasing (underleveraged) 
firms and leverage-decreasing (overleveraged) firms would be asymmetrical (Flannery & Hankins, 
2007).  
Secondly, the target capital structure adjustment dynamics may be heterogeneous across firms. 
Firms may differ in their characteristics and hence face adjustment costs differently. Obviously, 
                                                          
11 In the presence of adjustment costs, at any given time, the actual leverage of a firm may be above the target leverage ( 
for overleveraged or undercapitalized firms) or the actual leverage of a firm may be below the target leverage ( for 
underleveraged or overcapitalized firms). 
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Flannery & Hankins (2007) posited that adjustment cost depends on the firm’s internal financing 
flexibility or constraint and cost of external financing. Thus, the difference of firms in their free 
cash flows or profitability that provides internal financing flexibility (Flannery & Hankins, 2007) 
and investments as the principal constraint (Myers, 1984) would induce heterogeneity in the 
adjustment dynamics (Flannery & Hankins, 2007). Moreover, different firms may have different 
degrees of access to capital market and may face cost of equity issuance resulting from information 
asymmetry differently (Myers, 1984; Flannery & Hankins, 2007). Due to this, in the presence of 
differences in firm characteristics, the target capital structure adjustment dynamics of firms may be 
heterogeneous (Flannery & Hankins, 2007; Dang et al., 2012). 
2.3. Pecking Order Theory 
 
The pecking order theory relies on the market friction of information asymmetry to explain the 
capital structure decision of firms (Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984). The pecking order 
theoretical model predicts a hierarchal financing choice of firms in their capital structure decision. 
More specifically, in the pecking order theory, firms prefer internally generated funds to external 
financing (Myers, 1984). Further, in external financing, firms prefer debt financing to equity 
financing in their capital structure decisions (Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984).  
Even though the predictions of the pecking order theoretical model have drawn attention after the 
seminal contributions of Myers & Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984), the origins of the pecking order 
hypotheses are dated back to the foundation study of Donaldson (1961). Donaldson (1961) 
investigated the financing behavior of large corporations. Donaldson (1961) found out managers’ 
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preference for internal funds rather than for external financing. Firms use external financing only 
in the presence of pressing fund demands (Donaldson, 1961; Myers, 1984). Besides, in generating 
external funds, managers barely issue equity securities (Donaldson, 1961; Myers, 1984). 
Consequently, in explaining this financing behavior of firms, Majluf & Myers (1984) and Myers 
(1984) considered the information asymmetry between managers (“insiders”) and investors 
(“outsiders”) and the resulting adverse selection costs.  In this case, it is assumed that managers or 
“insiders” know best the true investment opportunities or the true value of their firms than 
investors or “outsiders” can do (Majluf & Myers, 1984). Thus, investors may be willing to buy at 
price lower than the true value of securities of firms (Harris & Raviv, 1991). This under-pricing of 
securities will be severe if firms issue securities to finance new investment projects (Myers, 1984; 
Majluf & Myers, 1984; Harris & Raviv, 1991). If this under-pricing of securities is higher, the 
transfer of wealth from the existing shareholders to new investors may be higher than the net 
present value (NPV) of investment projects (Myers, 1984). Managers, being assumed to act in the 
best interest of the existing shareholders, will reject investment projects (Majluf & Myers, 1984). 
This tendency of managers is also expected to hold even when the investment opportunity is 
promising with a positive NPV (Myers, 1984).   
Therefore, to deal with problems of asymmetric information in the form of under-pricing and then 
underinvestment, firms may use financing instruments that incur lowest costs (Myers, 1984; Majluf 
& Myers, 1984). In this regard, the internally generated funds will incur lowest costs compared to 
external financing (Majluf & Myers, 1984). Compared to internal financing, costs of external 
financing include costs of under-pricing and costs of rejecting promising investment projects 
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(Majluf & Myers, 1984)12. Thus, the use of internal financing minimizes all these costs that result 
from external financing (Myers, 1984). In addition, in need of external financing, firms may issue 
riskless debt and then less risky debt securities rather than equity issuance (Majluf & Myers, 1984). 
Compared to equity financing, debt financings are relatively safe and incur lower costs of under-
pricing (Majluf & Myers, 1984). Owing to this, firms may use hierarchical financing to minimize 
information asymmetry related costs (Majluf & Myers, 1984). 
Myers (1984) coined the term “pecking order” for these hierarchical financing choices of firms. 
Specifically, Myers (1984) identified the following four important explanations of the pecking order 
theoretical model. First, to finance new investment opportunities, firms prefer internal financing to 
external financing (Myers, 1984). Second, despite the downward rigidity of dividends, firms tend to 
adjust their target dividend ratio to their investment plan (Myers, 1984; Prasad et al., 2001). Third, 
in the presence of the unpredictable fluctuation of profitability or investment opportunities, the 
internally generated funds may exceed or fall below the desired investment outlay (Myers, 1984). 
Hence, in the presence of financial surpluses or when the internal cash flows exceed investment 
outlays, firms tend to pay off debt or invest in cash/marketable securities rather than retiring equity 
(Myers, 1984; 2000). In contrast, in the presence of financial deficit or when the desired 
investment outlay exceeds the internal cash flows, firms firstly tend to deplete the financial slack or 
its cash/marketable securities (Myers, 1984). Fourth, if the financial slack is fully depleted and the 
investment opportunities of firms are found to be promising, firms may use external financing 
(Prasad et al., 2001). Then, in external financing, firms first prefer riskless debt, which is then 
followed by less risky debt and, finally, new equity securities (Myers, 1984). Unlike in the tradeoff 
                                                          
12
 It also includes costs of underwriting and administration (Majluf  & Myers, 1984). 
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theory, there is no as such a target debt to equity ratio in the pecking order theoretical model 
(Myers, 1984). Rather, the observed leverage of firms reflects their cumulative requirement for 
external financing (Myers, 1984).   
2.4. Theory of Bank Capital Regulation 
 
Due to their pivotal role in an economy, unlike other corporate firms, the banking firms are the 
most regulated firms (Santos, 2001; Brewer et al., 2008). Of the different regulatory tools on 
banking firms, the regulatory pressure on capital adequacy of banks is an importantly additional 
friction to explain the capital structure decision of banks (Marcus, 1983; Berger et al., 1995). 
The two main theories that are found to explain the rationale for the capital requirement of banks 
are the “moral hazard” and “safety net” theories (Morrison & White, 2005). The “moral hazard” 
theory focuses on the incentives of shareholders or banks managers, who are assumed to act in the 
interest of shareholders,   to invest in risky assets, in the absence of sufficient equity capital, so as to 
maximize their return at the expense of the depositors and other debt holders (Santos, 2001; 
Morrison & White, 2005). Though such an investment decision is optimal from the viewpoint of 
the shareholders, it is suboptimal from the social perspective (Morrison & White, 2005). This 
theoretical explanation is related to the rationale for regulation to deal with the corporate 
governance problems (Dewatripont & Tirole, 1993; Morrison & White, 2005) emanating from the 
separation of management and providers of funds, as well as to represent the uninformed, 
unsophisticated and largely dispersed depositors in the monitoring of banks (Wall & Peterson, 
1996; Santos, 2001). The “safety net” theory indicates that the capital holdings of banks provide 
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cushion and solvency for depositors and other debt holders when loss occurs in banks due to a 
decline in the value of assets, as long as the claims of depositors and other debt holders do not 
exceed the capital of banks (Marcus, 1983; Morrison & White, 2005). This theory is also related to 
the view that the regulatory capital requirement helps to protect the soundness of the financial 
system and the real economy from the destructive effects of the contagious bank runs (Diamond & 
Dybvig, 1983; Berger et al., 1995; Diamond & Rajan, 2000). 
 
Thus, in light of these justifications, as part of the Bank for Internal Settlement (BIS), the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision published the Basel I “capital accord” in 1988. To be specific, 
the Basel I capital accord specifies the three-step procedures for regulating the capital adequacy of 
banks. Firstly, the Basel I capital accord specifies the minimum capital requirement to be held by 
the banks in order to minimize the costs to depositors if a bank goes bankrupt (Asarkayan & 
Ozcan, 2007). Specifically, this capital accord stipulates the minimum capital ratio requirement of 
8%, which is computed as the “regulatory capital to risk weighted assets ratio”.  Secondly, the Basel 
I capital accord has clarified the definition of regulatory capital (Tier I and Tier 2). Finally, it lays 
down the standard to compute the regulatory capital ratio. In doing so, the accord groups assets 
into categories based on their risk, with the corresponding risk weights of 0% to least risky assets 
(e.g., Treasury bills) to 100% to most risky assets (e.g., commercial loans) (Park, 1994; Asarkayan 
& Ozcan, 2007). Because of its simplicity, the Basel I capital accord is mainly employed in 
developing countries, including Ethiopia. However, the Basel I accord has been criticized by 
different academicians and practitioners. As to the flaws of the Basel I capital accord, it has been 
argued, for example, that a cosmetic change in the capital ratio is possible to satisfy the regulatory 
standard without safeguarding losses to thee depositors (Wall & Peterson, 1994; Berger et al., 
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1995). Thus, the Basel committee introduced the new capital accord, Basel II, in 2006. The Basel 
II capital accord has been proposed based on three pillars, encompassing the minimum capital 
requirement, the supervisory review process and adequate disclosure (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2005). The Basel I and the Basel II capital accords can be compared as 
shown in Figure 2.1 below.  
 
Figure 2.1. Comparison of Basel I and Basel II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As shown in Figure 2.1, the first pillar of the Basel II capital accord relates to the minimum capital 
requirement. Compared to the Basel I capital accord, the minimum capital ratio requirement of 
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However, unlike the Basel I capital accord that focused solely on a credit risk13, the minimum 
capital requirement in the Basel II capital accord is proposed to cover the credit risk, market risk 
and operational risk (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2005). In addition, the 
computation of the credit risk in the Basel II capital accord had been extended. This second 
accord specifies the credit risk to be computed based on standard and internal rating methods 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2005). Further, in computing the operational risk for 
capital requirement, three alternative approaches, including the basic indicator, standardized and 
advanced measurement approaches, have been proposed (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2005). Hence, in comparing the first pillar of the Basel II and the Basel I capital 
accords, the regulatory capital remains unchanged but the measure of risk-weighted assets would 
be revised.  
 
The second pillar of the Basel II capital accord relates to the supervisory review process (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2005). It demands the banks’ management of risk and capital, 
as stated in pillar I. It also defines the roles and powers of bank supervisors (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2005). Its purpose is to promote the risk-monitoring process of the banks. 
The third pillar of the Basel II capital accord relates to market discipline (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2005).  It sets out the demand of banks for public disclosure. This pillar 
expects to provide enough information for market participants to evaluate the risk profile and 
capital holdings of banks (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2005). 
                                                          
13 Though later, the accord considered market risk that is expected to address interest rate risk and foreign exchange 
risk (Santos, 2001). 
  
41 
 
In light of the 2007 financial crises, the Basel II capital accord was found to be ineffective. This is 
because banks were found to be not well-capitalized. Owing to this, the Basel III capital accord has 
been introduced. This third accord includes some enhancements compared to the Basel II accord. 
The first of these enhancements is that the third accord demands more capital levels (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010). Second, the accord introduced more stringent 
guidelines for risk-weighted asset assessments (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010). 
Third, unlike the Basel I and the Basel II accords that focus on the risk of individual banks, the 
Basel III accord introduces standards to address systematic risk. In doing so, the Basel III accord 
introduces standards which include countercyclical buffers (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2010).  
2.5. Summary 
 
To sum up the review of theoretical literature on the capital structure decision of firms, the 
following points can be drawn. The modern theoretical explanation of the capital structure 
decision of firms dates back to the irrelevance proposition (Modigilani & Miller, 1958). However, 
the irrelevance proposition held only in the existence of perfect market assumptions. Hence, by 
relaxing the frictionless world of the irrelevance proposition, the two dominant theories of capital 
structure―tradeoff and pecking order theoretical models―have been developed.  
Specifically, in the tradeoff theoretical models, the optimal or target capital structure of firms would 
be determined by balancing the cost of equity or benefits of debt financing (tax shields and 
reduction of agency costs problems) with the benefit of equity or costs of debt financing (costs of 
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distress and agency costs of debt) (Myers, 1984; Brewer et al.,  2008). However, at any given point 
in time, the capital structure of firms may not be at the optimum. Rather, in a continuous time 
framework, the capital structure of firms may deviate from the target capital structure and tend to 
adjust toward it through time (Myers, 1984). These dynamics of the target capital structure 
adjustment of firms have been explained based on the target capital structure adjustment or 
dynamic tradeoff theoretical model (Myers, 1984; Fischer et al., 1989; Leary & Roberts, 2005; 
Flannery & Hankins, 2007; Frank & Goyal, 2008). The speed of adjustment towards the target is, 
in turn, predicted to be dependent on the adjustment costs and costs of deviations from the target 
or benefits of adjustment towards the target (Flannery & Hankins, 2007). In contrast, unlike the 
tradeoff theory, the pecking order theory explains the capital structure decision of firms as the 
cumulative result of hierarchical financing. The tradeoff and pecking order theoretical models 
explain why the capital structure decisions of firms are relevant in any corporate firms. However, 
unlike other corporate firms, banking firms are also regulated in their capital holdings. Hence, the 
capital structure decisions of banks may be explained based on the factors predicted in the tradeoff 
and pecking order theories and additional factors of capital regulation (Berger et al., 1995; Brewer 
et al., 2008), as shown in Figure 2.2 below. 
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Figure 2.2. Theoretical/Conceptual Framework 
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CHAPTER THREE: EMPIRICAL LITERATURE   
3.1. Introduction 
 
Following the predictions of theoretical models, voluminous empirical studies on capital structure 
decision of firms have been documented for the past periods. These empirical studies have come 
along two main strands. That is, empirical studies which emphasize on the determinants of cross 
sectional variations of capital structure across firms in static framework and which focus on the 
dynamics of capital structure adjustment. However, these studies have been conducted focusing 
mainly on nonfinancial firms, excluding banks and other financial firms. The argument for their 
exclusion is that, as indicated earlier in Chapter 1, banking firms differ from other corporate firms 
in source of funds, relatively highly leveraged and regulated (Baranoff et al., 2008). Banking 
literatures primarily focus on regulatory forces rather than factors in corporate capital structure 
theoretical models (Gropp & Heider, 2009). However, despite these limitations, empirical studies 
are conducted to investigate determinants and dynamics of capital structure of banking and other 
financial firms. 
Thus, this chapter constitutes the reviewed empirical literatures organized into three sections. The 
next section (3.2) presents empirical literatures reviewed on determinants of capital structure.  
Section 3.3 encompasses studies reviewed on dynamics of capital structure documented in both 
nonfinancial firms and banking firms operating in both developed and developing countries. 
Finally, section 3.4 concludes by reviewing the empirical studies and by pointing out gaps identified 
in the literatures reviewed. 
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3.2. Evidences on Determinants of Capital Structure  
 
Different empirical studies on determinants of capital structure examined cross-sectional variations 
of leverage (or capital ratio) across firms based on the factors such as tax shield, cost of financial 
distress, agency costs and information asymmetry costs predicted in tradeoff and pecking order 
theoretical models. As different costs and benefits of debt and equity financing predicted in 
theoretical models are expected to differ in characteristics across firms, empirical studies use 
different firm characteristics as proxy for factors predicted in theoretical models (Frank & Goyal, 
2004; Tan, 2010). However, regulatory pressure factors have also been considered in studies which 
focus on capital structure decision of banking firms. This section constitutes the review of existing 
evidences on determinants of capital structure documented in nonfinancial and banking firms. 
 
 Taxation 
In tax shield-cost of distress theoretical model, firms tend to increase debt financing to take benefit 
of tax shield of interest payment (Modigilani & Miller, 1963). Hence, past empirical studies on 
capital structure determinants of non-financial firms examined the effect of tax shield of debt on 
leverage. Past studies on non-financial firms of developed countries (MacKie-Mason, 1990; Shum, 
1996) examined the relationship between tax rate and leverage; consequently, they found a 
significant effect of marginal tax on capital structure decision of firms (Abor, 2008). Survey studies 
done on non-financial firms in US (Graham & Harvey, 2001), UK (Brounen et al., 2006; Beattie et 
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al., 2006; Archbold & Lazirdis, 2010), and selected European countries14 (Bancel & Mitto, 2004) 
found tax shield of debt as one of the important or very important factor to be considered in their 
capital structure decision. These documented evidences are consistent with empirical studies 
conducted on banking firms of developed countries. Marcus (1983) examined the relations 
between tax shield disadvantage of equity and desired capital ratio of banks in US, and the result, 
in estimations, depicted that tax shield is significantly negatively related with capital ratio. Similarly, 
Hortuland (2005) provided evidence that corporate tax rate is negatively related with capital ratio 
of Swedish banks. Studying on Portuguese banking firms, Marques & Santos (2003) also predicted 
and found that tax economies of debt, rather than equity financing, as one of the important or very 
important internal factors to be considered in their capital structure decisions. However, Osterberg 
& Thomson (1996) confirmed a statistically significant negative coefficient of corporate tax rate on 
US banks. This finding contradicts the theoretical prediction and finding of Marcus (1983). Sharp 
(1995) revealed a statistically insignificant coefficient of effective tax shield in regressing against 
capital ratio of Australian trading banks. 
 
In cross border transition of determinants, past studies also examined the effect of tax shield on 
capital structure decision of firms in developing countries. Focusing on non-financial firms in ten 
selected developing countries15, Booth et al. (2001) investigated the relationship between average 
tax rate and leverage. Accordingly, they found a negative coefficient of average tax rate. This 
                                                          
14
 These European countries include Austria, Belgium, Greece, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden and U.K. 
 
15
 Selected developing countries include Brazil, Mexico, India, South Korea, Jordan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand, 
Turkey and Zimbabwe. 
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contradicts the theoretical prediction. However, this finding was positive for three countries (Booth 
et al., 2001). Similarly, Abor (2008) investigated the impact of tax shield of debt on capital 
structure decision of three groups of non-financial firms in Ghana. Consistent to the prediction, 
Abor (2008) found a positive relationship between effective tax rate and short term debt ratio of 
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). Similarly, Amidu (2007) found statistically significant 
positive relations between corporate tax shield and leverage of Ghanaian banks. A survey study on 
banking firms in Nigeria, by Iwarere & Akinley (2010), also predicted and found that tax 
economies of debt, rather than equity financing, as one of the important or very important internal 
factors to be considered in their capital structure decisions. However, in contrast to the prediction, 
Abor (2008) found effective tax rate significantly negatively related to long term debt ratio of the 
quoted firms. Abor (2008) attributed this negative coefficient to the general tendency of the quoted 
firms to increase their equity financing to get listed and grab the special benefit of tax rebate (Abor, 
2008). However, Chen & Strange (2006) found insignificant coefficient of corporate tax advantage 
in regressing against leverage of non-financial firms in China. 
 
Based on the prediction of DeAngelo & Masulis (1980), different studies also examined non-debt 
tax shield as determinants. As a result, past studies on non financial firms of developed countries 
(MacKie-Mason, 1990; Wald, 1999; Ozkan, 2001; Song, 2005; Brinkhuis & Maeseneire, 2009) 
revealed significant relationship between non-debt tax shield and leverage. Similar studies 
(Céspedes et al., 2009; Vasiliou & Daskalakis, 2009; Usman, 2014) also identified that non-debt tax 
shield is significantly related to leverage of non-financial firms in developing countries. However, 
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there are also empirical studies that found, in estimations, insignificant coefficient of non-debt tax 
shield (Titman & Wessels, 1988; Chen, 2004; Shah & Khan, 2007; Ramall, 2009).  
 Profitability 
In tradeoff model, highly profitable firms imply low probability of distress (Myers, 1984) and high 
free cash flow available for management expropriations (Jenson & Meckling, 1976; Jenson, 1986). 
Hence, they tend to increase debt financing to minimize tax payments from interest tax 
deductibility (Modigilani & Miller, 1963) and to discipline managerial behavior (Jenson, 1986) .  In 
pecking order theory, however, highly profitable firms choose to finance investment opportunities 
through internally generated funds to minimize information asymmetry related costs (Myers & 
Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984). 
 
Thus, past empirical studies on determinants of capital structure of non-financial firms also 
identified profitability as determinant of their capital structure decision.  Such studies examined the 
relationship between profitability and leverage of non-financial firms in developed countries (Fried 
& Lang, 1988; Titman & Wessels, 1988; Van der Wijst & Thurik, 1993; Ozkan, 2001; Bevan & 
Danbolt, 2002; Frank & Goyal, 2004; Song, 2005), and identified a negative relationship between 
profitability and leverage (Prasad et al., 2001). Similarly, Rajan & Zinglas (1995) investigated the 
relationship between profitability and leverage of non-financial firms in G-7 countries16, and found 
a negative relationship between profitability and leverage of non-financial firms, except in 
Germany, in all G-7 countries. Kester (1986) and Hirota (1999) also documented similar negative 
result in non-financial firms of Japan. These evidences are generally consistent with the findings of 
                                                          
16
 The countries include USA, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, France, Canada and Japan 
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survey studies of conducted on non-financial firms of developed countries. Survey studies 
performed on non-financial firms in US (Graham & Harvey, 2001), UK (Brounen et al., 2006; 
Beattie et al., 2006) and selected European countries (Bancel & Mitto, 2004) also identified 
financial flexibility or profitability as one of the important or very important factors to be 
considered in their capital structure decision. These evidences are also consistent with the 
documented evidences on capital structure decision of banking firms in developed countries 
(Sharp, 1995; Schaeuck & Cihak, 2007; Berger et al., 2008; Flannery & Rangan, 2008; Brewer et 
al., 2008; Gropp & Heider, 2009). Gropp & Heider (2009), for example, found a significant 
negative relationship between profitability and leverage of large banks in US and 15 European 
countries17. Studies conducted on the same large US banks over the same period (Berger et al., 
2008; Flannery & Rangan, 2008), banks of ten European countries (Schaeuck&Cihak,2007), 
Australian trading banks (Sharp, 1995), Germany banks (Kleff & Weber, 2004) and banks from 
twelve selected developed countries18( Brewer et al., 2008) also documented, in estimations, a 
positive relationship between profitability and capital ratio. Further, A survey study done on 
Portuguese banks (Marques & Santos, 2003) proved that profitability or financial flexibility and size 
of free cash flows are two of the most important factors that influence their capital structure 
decisions. However, Boucihina & Robeiro (2007) found profitability negatively related with capital 
ratio of banks in Portugal. Focusing on non-financial firms of Central and Eastern Europe, 
Cornelli et al. (1996) documented a positive relationship between profitability and leverage. 
                                                          
17 European countries include Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden 
18 The twelve developed countries include Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and United States 
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Past empirical studies on capital structure decision of firms also investigated the relationship 
between profitability and leverage of non-financial firms in developing countries (Booth et al., 
2001; Ignacio, 2002; Chen, 2004; Haung & Song, 2005; Abor, 2008; Céspedes et al., 2009). Some 
of these empirical studies conducted in selected developing countries (Booth et al., 2001), Uruguay 
(Ignacio, 2002), Ghana (Abor, 2008), China (Chen, 2004; Haung & Song, 2005), Pakistan (Shan & 
Khan, 2007) and on Ethiopian share companies (Usman, 2014) also found a negative relationship 
between profitability and leverage of non-financial firms. Generally, these studies provide 
evidences consistent with the predictions of pecking order theoretical model (Majluf & Myers, 
1984; Myers, 1984). Similar evidences have also been documented by studies done on banks of 
developing countries (Kuo, 2000; Amidu, 2007; Octavia & Brown, 2008; Çağlayan & Sak, 2010; 
Mohammed et al., 2015). Octavia & Brown (2008), focusing on banks of ten selected developing 
countries19, found out a negative relationship between profitability and leverage. Similarly, 
significant negative relationship between profitability and leverage also documented by studies 
carried out on banks of Turkey (Çağlayan & Sak, 2010), Ghana (Amidu, 2007), Taiwan (Kuo, 
2000) and Ethiopia (Mohammed et al., 2015). Further, surveying financial managers of Nigerian 
banks, Iwarere & Akinley (2010) also disclosed profitability or financial flexibility and size of free 
cash flows as two of the most important factors that influence their capital structure decisions.  
However, other studies done on firms found in Libya (Buferna et al., 2005) and Morocco (Achy, 
2009) depicted profitability as positively related to leverage of firms. Further, Ramall (2009) found 
insignificant effect of profitability on capital structure decision of Mauritius firms. 
                                                          
19
 Selected developing countries include Brazil, Mexico, India, South Korea, Jordan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand, Turkey 
and Zimbabwe 
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 Growth Opportunities 
In tradeoff theoretical model, high growth opportunities of firms imply high probability of 
bankruptcy and agency cost in the form of asset substitution (Jenson&Meckling,1976) and 
underinvestment (Myers, 1977). In pecking order theory, however, high growth opportunities of 
firms imply high fund requirements that exceed internally generated funds (Majluf & Myers, 1984; 
Myers, 1984). 
Various empirical studies examined growth opportunities as one of the factors to be heeded for 
capital structure decision of non-financial firms in developed countries (Kester, 1986; Titman & 
Wessels, 1988; Rajan & Zinglas, 1995; Jordan et al., 1998; Hirota, 1999; Bevan & Danbolt, 2004; 
Frank & Goyal, 2004). However, the documented evidences are found to be inconclusive. The 
studies conducted in US (Frank & Goyal, 2004), G-7 countries (Rajan & Zinglas, 1995 and Japan 
(Hirota, 1999) found a negative relationship between growth and leverage of non-financial firms. 
Bevan & Danbolt (2004) also found growth opportunities as negatively related with short term debt 
ratio of UK firms.  Similar studies done on banks of US and 15 EU countries showed a negative 
relation between growth and bank leverage (Gropp & Heider, 2007). Survey studies carried out on 
capital structure decision of banks found in Portugal (Marques & Santo, 2003) and UK (Alfon et 
al., 2004) also documented that investment policy or growth opportunity of banks is one of the 
important or very important internal determinants. Banks also tend to use equity financing in 
funding growth opportunities (Marques & Santos, 2003; Alfon et al., 2004). Similar studies which 
have been done in US (Titman & Wessels, 1988), Japan (Kester, 1986) and UK (Jordan et al., 
1998), however, depicted a positive relationship between growth and leverage of non-financial 
firms. These findings are also consistent with the findings observed in US banks (Berger et al., 
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2008) and in Australian trading banks (Sharp, 1995). Berger et al. (2008) and Sharp (1995) also 
found that growth is negatively related with capital ratio of banks. 
In the same fashion, some empirical studies (such as Booth et al., 2001; Chen, 2004; Huang & 
Song, 2005; Chen & Strange, 2006; Abor, 2008; Ramalla, 2009; Usman, 2014) also investigated the 
relationship between growth and capital structure choice of non-financial firms in developing 
countries. Consequently, the evidences identified are inconclusive. The studies carried out in ten 
selected developing countries (Booth et al., 2001), Pakistan (Shah & Khan, 2007) and Libya 
(Buferna et al., 2005) revealed the existing negative relationship between growth opportunities and 
leverage of non-financial firms. These evidences are also consistent with the results of the survey 
studies on banking firms (Wong et al., 2004; Iwarere & Akinley, 2010). The survey studies 
conducted on banks of Honk Kong (Wong et al, 2004) and Nigeria (Iwarere & Akinley, 2010) 
found that growth is one of the important determinants of financing decision. Moreover, banks 
choose to issue equity financing to finance growth opportunities (Wong et al., 2004; Iwarere & 
Akinley, 2010).  
However, studies carried out on non-financial firms of Ghana (Abor, 2008), Moroccan non-listed 
manufacturing firms (Achy, 2009), and Chinese listed companies (Chen, 2004) found that growth 
opportunities of firms are significantly positively related to debt ratio. In the same market, Huang 
& Song (2005) and Chen & Strange (2006), consistent with the finding of Chen (2004), found a 
positive relationship between growth and leverage of Chinese firms. Similar studies conducted on 
Turkish banks (Çağlayan & Sak, 2010) and Ghanian banks (Amidu, 2007) witnessed a positive 
relationship between growth and leverage. But, there are still some empirical studies that proved 
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insignificant effect of growth opportunities on capital structure decision of firms. Of these studies, 
Ramlall (2009) and Usman (2014), focusing on non-listed nonfinancial firms of Mauritius and large 
tax payer share companies of Ethiopia, respectively, documented insignificant effect of growth 
opportunities on leverage. Octavia & Brown (2008) and Mohammed and his colleagues (2015), on 
banks of selected developing countries  and Ethiopian banks, respectively, also found insignificant 
coefficient of growth in regressing against book leverage. 
 Tangibility/Collateral Value of Assets 
According to Rajan & Zinglas (1995), tangibility of assets represents the effect of collateral value of 
assets on capital structure decision of firms (Prasad et al, 2001). From available theoretical 
literature, the expected relationship between tangibility/collateral value of assets and leverage is 
debatable (Prasad et al., 2001). In tradeoff theoretical model,  high tangibility of assets of firms 
imply high liquidation value at the time of distress (Harris & Raviv, 1991) and low agency costs of 
debt in the form of asset substitution (Jenson & Meckling, 1976) and underinvestment (Myers, 
1977). Grossman & Hart (1982), however, argued that agency cost of equity from conflict of 
interest between managers and shareholders will be higher for firms which have low level of assets 
to be used as collateral (Titman & Wessels, 1988; Prasad et al., 2001). Hence, in tradeoff 
theoretical model, the relationship between collateral value of assets and leverage could be either 
positive or negative. In pecking order theory, high tangibility of assets of firms entail low 
information asymmetry related costs in external financing (Majluf & Myers, 1984; Myers, 1984). 
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Hence, past studies on determinants of cross-sectional variations in capital structure (for example, 
Fried & Lang, 1988; Titman & Wessels, 1988; van der Wijst & Thurik, 1993; Rajan & Zinglas, 
1995; Jordan et al., 1998; Hirota, 1999; Bevan & Danbolt, 2004; Frank & Goyal, 2004) also 
examined the relation between leverage and tangibility or collateral values of assets of non-financial 
firms in developed countries. However, these studies provide mixed evidences. Studies carried out 
in US (Fried & Lang, 1988; Frank & Goyal, 2004) and Japan (Hirota, 1999) found tangibility/ 
collateral value of assets as positively related to leverage of non-financial firms. Similar studies 
conducted on non-financial firms of G-7 countries (Rajan & Zinglas, 1995) and on UK firms 
(Jordan et al., 1998; Bevan & Danbolt, 2004) found a significant positive relationship between 
collateral values of assets and leverage. These evidences are also consistent with the results of 
studies conducted on capital structure of large US and European banks (Gropp & Heider, 2009). 
For both book and market leverages, Gropp & Heider (2009) found similar sign of coefficient of 
collateral value of assets and comparable magnitude to the finding of Rajan & Zinglas (1995). 
However, Cornelli and his colleagues (1996) in Central and Eastern Europe and Barton & Gordon 
(1988) in US confirmed a negative relationship between tangibility of assets and leverage of firms. 
Studies carried out by Titman & Wessels (1988) and Lowe and his associates (1994) on US non-
financial firms and on Australian companies, respectively, in estimations, showed insignificant 
coefficient of collateral values of assets. Sharp (1995) also corroborated insignificant coefficient of 
collateral value of assets on Australian trading banks. 
 
Past studies (such as Booth et al., 2001; Ignacio, 2002; Chen, 2004; Buferna et al., 2005; Shah & 
Khan, 2007; Abor, 2008; Céspedes et al., 2009; Usman, 2014) also investigated the relationship 
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between collateral values of assets and leverage of non-financial firms in developing countries.  
Accordingly, the findings of the studies carried out on non-financial firms of the ten selected 
developing countries (Booth et al., 2001), Libya (Buferna et al., 2005), Mauritius (Ramlall, 2009), 
Uruguay (Ignacio, 2002), China (Chen, 2004), Ghana (Abor, 2008), Pakistan (Shah & Khan, 
2007), as well as on Ethiopian large share companies (Usman, 2014) revealed the existence of a 
positive relationship between collateral values of assets and leverage. These empirical studies are 
also found to be consistent with the evidences documented in empirical studies on banking firms 
of selected developing countries (Octavia & Brown, 2008). Octavia & Brown (2008) found a 
positive relationship between collateral values of assets and bank leverage20. Amidu (2007) also 
showed a positive relationship between asset structure and leverage of banks in Ghana. However, 
Kuo (2000) documented that collateral values of assets are negatively related to financial leverage 
of domestic public banks, domestic private banks and local branches of foreign banks in Taiwan. 
Similarly, Çağlayan & Sak (2010) and Mohammed et al. (2015) involving banks in Turkey and in 
Ethiopia, respectively, found tangibility as negatively related to bank leverage.  
 Size 
In tradeoff theoretical model, larger firms are expected to be relatively more diversified than 
smaller firms, which are expected to be less exposed to cost of bankruptcy and agency cost of debt 
(Titman & Wessels, 1988). Hence, size of firms is expected to be positively related with leverage or 
negatively with equity capital ratio. On the contrary, the larger the firm, the lesser the information 
                                                          
20 Gropp & Hedier (2007) and Octavia & Brown (2008) define collateral values of assets as the ratio of tangible assets 
to total asset ratio under which tangible assets include total securities, investments in other entities, cash and due from 
banks (consisting of  cash, interest and non-interest bearing interbank deposits, and interest and non-interest bearing 
balances with the central bank), and land and buildings. Thus, it is a better definition that reflects banking operations 
and asset holdings than definition employed by Kuo (2000) and Amidu (2007). 
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asymmetry costs will be (Frank & Hankins, 2007). Thus, in pecking order theory, larger firms can 
raise more external equity financing than their smaller counter parts.  
 
To test these theoretical predictions, past empirical studies looked into the relationship between 
size and capital structure decisions of firms in developed countries (Barton & Gordon, 1988; Fried 
& Lang, 1988; Titman & Wessels, 1988; van der Wijst & Thurik, 1993; Lowe et al., 1994; Rajan & 
Zinglas, 1995; Cornelli et al., 1996; Jordan et al., 1998; Hirota, 1999; Bevan & Danbolt, 2004; 
Frank & Goyal, 2004). Fried & Lang (1988) and Frank & Goyal (2004) revealed a significant 
positive relationship between size and leverage of non-financial firms in US. These evidences are 
also consistent with empirical evidences documented in US banks.  Size is found to be significantly 
negatively related with equity capital ratio of largest banks in US over the same period (Berger et 
al., 2008; Flannery & Rangan, 2008). However, Marcus (1983) found unstable sign and 
insignificant coefficient of size in regressing against capital ratio of US banks21. Comparative studies 
which have been done on non-financial firms of G-7 countries (Rajan & Zinglas, 1995), and UK 
(Jordan et al., 1998; Bevan & Danbolt, 2002; 2004) found a significant positive relationship 
between size and leverage. Similar studies done by Cornelli et al. (1996) and Hirota (1999) on 
nonfinancial firms of Central and Eastern Europe and of Japan, respectively, also revealed a 
positive relationship between size and leverage. These empirical evidences on nonfinancial firms of 
developed countries are also consistent with the documented evidences on capital structure 
decision of banks in developed countries. Focusing on larger banks found in US and EU 
countries, Gropp & Heider (2007) predicted and found a positive relation between bank size and 
                                                          
21 But Marcus (1983) conduct the study based on the observed dramatic decline of capital ratio of US banks over the 
period of 1961(11.7%) to 1978(5.7%), 
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bank leverage. Besides, different studies carried out on banks of selected twelve developed 
countries (Brewer et al., 2008), of European countries (Schaeuck & Cihak, 2007), of Spain (Ayuso 
et al., 2004) and of Norwey (Lindquest, 2004) also found that size of banks, in estimations, is 
negatively related to capital ratio. However, Barton & Gordon (1988) found a negative relationship 
between size and leverage on US firms. Studies conducted on US firms (Titman & Wessels, 
1998)22 and on Australian firms (Lowe et al., 1994) revealed an insignificant relationship between 
size and leverage.  
 
Similar empirical studies also examined the relationship between size and leverage of non-financial 
firms in developing countries. Examining determinants of cross-sectional variations of capital 
structure of non-financial firms in selected developing countries (Booth et al., 2001), in Uruguay 
(Ignacio, 2002), in Libya (Buferna et al., 2005), in China (Huang & Song, 2005), in Ghana (Abor, 
2008) and in Ethiopia (Usman, 2014), they found a positive relation between firm size and 
leverage. These findings are comparable and consistent with some recent studies conducted on 
capital structure of banks in developing countries. Octavia & Brown (2008), using fixed effect 
estimations, found that size is positively related to leverage of banks in selected developing 
countries. Similarly, in Taiwan, Kuo (2000) documented the existing significant positive 
relationship between size and financial leverage of domestic public banks, domestic private banks 
and local branches of foreign banks. Similar studies conducted on Ghanaian banks (Amidu, 2007), 
on Turkish banks (Çağlayan & Sak, 2010) and on Ethiopian banks (Mohammed et al., 2016), in 
                                                          
22 Titman&Wessels(1988) documented insignificant coefficient of size in estimations, except positively related with 
short term debt ratio of nonfinancial firms in US. 
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estimations, consistently found out that size of banks is positively related with leverage of banks. 
Wong et al. (2005) documented similar evidences that size of banks is negatively related with 
capital ratio of Hong Kong banks. However, in contrast to these empirical studies, studies carried 
out on Moroccan non-listed manufacturing firms (Achy, 2009) and on non-listed non-financial 
firms of Mauritius (Ramlall, 2009) found a negative relation between size and leverage. Involving 
non-financial firms of Pakistan and using fixed effect estimation, Shah & Khan (2007) found 
insignificant coefficient of size.   
 
 Risk 
In theoretical prediction, high variability in earnings of firms implies high probability of bankruptcy 
(Booth et al., 2001). Besides, in the presence of high variability of earnings or risk of firms, it will 
be difficult for the investors to evaluate future prospects of firms. As a result, they may demand 
high premium which drives up the cost of debt (Prasad et al., 2001). 
Past empirical studies (such as Kester,1986; Barton & Gordon, 1988; Fried & Lang, 1988; Titman 
& Wessels, 1988; Kale et al., 1991; Lowe et al., 1994; Jordan et al., 1998; Hirota, 1999) also 
investigated firm risk or earnings volatility as one of the determinants of capital structure of non-
financial firms in developed countries; however, the studies provided contradictory results. Past 
studies that were done in US firms (Barton & Gordon, 1988; Fried & Lang, 1988; MacKie-Mason, 
1990) and in Japan firms (Hirota, 1999) proved existing relationship between risk and leverage to 
be negative.  These findings are consistent with results of empirical studies that were done on 
banking firms of developed countries. Among these, studies conducted on banks found in US 
(Marcus, 1983; Brewer et al., 2008), selected European countries (Schaeuck & Cihak, 2007) and 
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Portugal (Boucihina & Robeiro, 2007) found that volatility of earnings or risk is positively related 
to capital ratio. Consistent with these findings, other empirical studies on banks in Spain (Ayuso et 
al., 2004), in Norway (Lindquest, 2004) and in Central and Eastern Europe countries (Avack & 
Levasseur, 2007) documented that risk of banks is positively related with capital ratio. On the 
contrary, studies done on firms in Australia (Lowe et al., 1994), US (Kim & Sorensen, 1986; Kale 
et al., 1991) and UK (Jordan et al., 1998) revealed a positive dependence between firm risk and 
leverage. In factor analytic of capital structure of US firms (Titman & Wessels, 1988) and in 
comparing US and Japan firms (Kester, 1986), they found, in estimation, insignificant negative 
coefficient of risk. But, survey studies done on non-financial firms in US (Graham & Harvey, 
2001), UK (Beattie et al., 2006), selected European countries (Bancel & Mitto, 2004), Portugal 
(Marques  & Santo, 2003) and on banks in UK (Alfon et al., 2004) documented volatility of 
earnings and cash flows as the important factor to be considered in their capital structure decision.  
Moreover, empirical studies were conducted to investigate the relationship between earnings 
volatility or risk and leverage of firms in developing countries. In this regard, the study performed 
on Ghanaian non-financial firms (Abor, 2008) and on large tax payers of Ethiopian share 
companies (Usman, 2014) confirmed a negative relationship between risk or earnings volatility and 
debt ratio. In consistent with these results, other empirical studies conducted on banks found in 
Hong Kong (Wong et al., 2005), Taiwan (Kuo, 2000) and on banking sectors in Turkey 
(Asarkayan & Ozcan, 2007) witnessed that risk of banks is either positively related with capital ratio 
or negatively related to financial leverage. However, contrary to the predictions, studies done on 
non-financial firms in selecting developing countries (Booth et al., 2001) and in China (Chen & 
Strange, 2006) found significant positive coefficient of earnings volatility or risk. Further, similar 
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studies conducted in Pakistan (Shan & Khan, 2007), China (Chen, 2004) and Nepal (Baral, 2004) 
found insignificant coefficient of earnings volatility in regressing against leverage of non-financial 
firms. Similarly, Amidu (2007) and Mohammed et al. (2015), focusing on Ghanian banks and on 
banks of Ethiopia, respectively, found statistically insignificant positive risk coefficient in regressing 
against leverage in static framework. However, these findings contradicted the results of survey 
studies done on banks of Hong Kong (Wong et al., 2005) and Nigeria (Iwarere & Akinley, 2010). 
These survey studies revealed volatility of earnings and/or risk and costs of distress as important 
factor in financing decision of banks (Wong et al., 2005). Besides, they found high tendency of 
banks to use equity financing to complement risk management and to cushion unexpected losses 
or risks (Wong et al., 2005). 
 Regulatory Pressure 
Due to their pivotal role in any economy, banking firms capital holdings are relatively more 
regulated than any other corporate firms (Santos, 2001). Hence, unlike studies on determinants of 
capital structure of non-financial firms, past studies on capital structure decision of banks (such as 
Marcus, 1983; Osterberg & Thomson, 1996; Lindquest, 2004; Hortuland, 2005; Berger et al., 
2008; Flannery & Rangan, 2008) examined the effect of regulatory pressure on their financing 
behavior. However, the studies found mixed results. The studies done on US banks (Marcus, 
1983; Osterberg & Thomson, 1996) examined the relationship between regulatory pressure and 
capital ratio of banks. Osterberg & Thomson (1996) found that regulatory penalty for violating 
regulatory minimum was found to be a significant factor in capital structure decision of US banks.  
However, Marcus (1983) witnessed, in estimation, the insignificant positive coefficient of regulatory 
pressure. Similar evidences have also been documented by studies done on US banks (Berger et 
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al., 2008; Flannery & Rangan, 2008; Gropp & Heider, 2009). These empirical studies found no 
significant importance of regulatory factors for capital structure decision of banks in US, except for 
banks close to the minimum. Similarly, Hortuland (2005) found insignificant effect of regulation 
on leverage of Swedish banks. On the contrary, Lindquest (2004) revealed capital holdings of 
Norwegian banks as highly dependent on the need for avoiding falling below the regulatory 
minimum capital ratio and the presence of increased monitoring of regulators. On studies 
conducted on Australian trading banks, Sharp (1995) also found that regulatory factors including 
the deregulation and introduction of capital requirement are positively related to capital ratio. The 
survey studies performed by Marques & Santo (2003) and Alfon and his associates (2004) on 
banks found in Portugal and UK also confirmed the importance and/or very importance of 
regulatory factors in their capital structure decision. 
 
Hence, past studies on capital structure decision of banks operating in developed countries 
examined regulatory factors though the results showed mixed evidences. However, the available 
few studies on banking firms of developing countries (such as Amidu, 2007; Çağlayan & Sak, 2010; 
Mohammed et al., 2015) gave little attention mainly to the regulatory forces. But Octavia & Brown 
(2008) revealed the predominant role of regulatory capital requirement in determining capital 
structure of banks in selected developing countries. Similarly, Wong et al. (2005) found that capital 
requirement is positively related with capital levels of banks in Hong Kong.  
 
Thus, evidences obtained from the past studies on determinants of capital structure of firms are 
summarized using the following points. With US origin, empirical studies conducted on 
  
62 
 
determinants of capital structure of firms in developed countries (Fried & Lang, 1988; Titman & 
Wessels, 1988; van der Wijst & Thurik, 1993; Rajan & Zinglas, 1995; Jordan et al., 1998; Hirota, 
1999; Graham  & Harvey, 2001; Bevan & Danbolt, 2004; Frank & Goyal, 2004; Beattie et al., 
2006; Brounen et al., 2006) seemed to converge on factors considered vital to examine capital 
structure decision of firms. These factors include tax shield of debt, profitability, growth 
opportunities, assets collateral value, firm size and earnings volatility/risk, among others. Besides, 
to examine the cross border transitions of determinants identified in firms of developed countries, 
past empirical studies focused on determinants of capital structure of firms in developing countries 
(Booth et al., 2001; Ignacio, 2002; Chen, 2004; Buferna et al., 2005; Huang & Song, 2005; Abor, 
2008; Céspedes et al., 2009). However, the findings are inconclusive. Mixed evidences, 
inconsistencies and contradictions have been documented. These inconsistencies could be 
attributed to the differences among institutional and legal framework of the countries considered 
(Booth et al., 2001) and in methodologies applied (Marques & Santos, 2003). Besides, these 
studies gave little or no attention to heed banking and other financial firms in their study. Hence, 
there are scanty evidences to validate theoretical predictions in banking firms (Gropp & Heider, 
2009). But, the available few recent studies on bank capital structure (Amidu, 2007; Çağlayan & 
Sak, 2010; Mohammed et al., 2015) focus mainly on similar factors that are found to be relevant to 
explain the cross sectional variation of leverage of other corporate firms. Thus, these studies 
seemed to have neglected regulatory forces.  
 
Further, these empirical studies on determinants of capital structure are mainly conducted in static 
framework. That is, these studies examined factors behind the cross sectional variations of the 
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observed leverage or capital ratio within static framework (Heishemti, 2001). Hence, these studies 
contradict the theoretical predictions of optimal leverage or capital ratio (Heishemti, 2001). This is 
particularly true in the presence of adjustment costs that could induce lags to adjust towards target 
leverage or capital ratio (Drobetz & Wanzedrid, 2006). Thus, the next section covers past 
empirical studies that examined capital structure decision of firms within dynamic framework. 
3.3. Evidences on the Dynamics of Capital Structure Adjustment 
 
In the absence of adjustment cost, target capital structure adjustment of firms would be 
instantaneous (Myers, 1984). In the presence of high adjustment cost, firms may experience long 
excursion from their target debt to equity ratio; however, in the presence of low adjustment costs, 
firms may tend to obtain their target in narrow interval (Myers, 1984). Such possible tendencies of 
firms have been theoretically explained by the pioneer work of Fischer et al. (1984). Besides, these 
theoretical predictions have also been the subject of past empirical studies. Thus, this section 
encompasses the review of major and relevant empirical studies on symmetrical and asymmetrical 
capital structure adjustment dynamics conducted on non-financial and banking firms. 
3.3.1. Evidences on the Symmetrical Target Capital Structure Adjustment 
There are sizeable numbers of empirical studies (such as Jalilivand & Harris, 1984; Ozkan, 2001; 
De Miguel & Pindado, 2001; Hovakimian et al., 2001, 2004; Leary & Roberts, 2005; Flannery & 
Rangan, 2006; Lemmon et al., 2008; Antoniou et al., 2008; Huang & Ritter, 2009) proved the 
presence of target capital structure adjustment behavior of non-financial firms of developed 
countries. 
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Jalilivand & Harris (1984) investigated the target capital structure adjustment focusing on non-
financial firms of US. They found significant speed of adjustment whereby firms adjust towards 
their target leverage around 56% per year. Hovakimian et al. (2001; 2004) and Leary & Roberts 
(2005) also documented empirical evidences that support the target capital structure adjustment of 
US firms in the long run and still prefer internal over external funds in the short run. Using the 
estimation of the partial adjustment model, Flannery & Rangan (2006) also found that US firms 
tend to revert towards long run target leverage at average speed of 35 % per year. Further, 
Lemmon et al. (2008) and Huang & Ritter (2009) also looked into dynamic capital structure 
adjustment of US firms using System GMM and long differentiating techniques, respectively. They 
subsequently found firms tend to adjust towards target capital structure at the average speed of 25% 
and 17% per year, respectively. These evidences suggest that the costs of deviation from the target 
or the benefits of reverting towards the target are significantly important for the US firms (Flannery 
& Hankins, 2007). These evidences are comparably equal to the documented evidences of target 
capital structure adjustment dynamics of banks in US (Marcus, 1983). Using random effect 
instrument variable estimator, Marcus (1983) revealed the speed of adjustment to be about 20% to 
23.9% per year. However, during the observed high capital ratio of US banks in the 1990s, 
Flannery & Rangan (2008), using Instrumental Variable Estimator, found varied speed of 
adjustment of banks in sub periods that ranges from 29% to 74% per year. Similarly, Gropp & 
Heider (2009), using fixed effect estimator, revealed target capital structure adjustment of US and 
European banks at the average of 46.8% per year. These speeds of adjustments are even higher 
when compared to the evidences of the studies conducted on Australian trading banks (Sharp, 
1995) and on twelve selected banks of developed countries (Brewer et al., 2008). Sharp (1995) 
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found that Australian banks adjust slowly towards desired or optimal ratio at the rate of about 14.6 
% to close the gap between actual capital ratio and the desired capital ratio in a given year. This 
rate of adjustment is even lower when compared to the findings of the study (Marcus, 1983) on US 
banks. Similarly, by examining dynamics of capital ratio of banks in twelve selected developed 
countries, Brewer et al. (2008) also proved low speed of adjustment towards target capital ratio in 
which average banking firms move 12% of their way towards the target or desired capital ratio on 
average in a given year. 
 
Besides, Ozkan (2001) examined the target capital structure adjustment of UK firms. Using GMM 
estimator, Ozkan (2001) found target leverage adjustment of firms to be at an average speed of 
44.3% per year. This evidence confirmed the findings of Panno (1996). Based on the Logit model 
estimation, Panno (1996) investigated target capital structure adjustment behavior of UK and 
Italian firms. Panoo (1996) then found the target capital structure adjustment tendency of UK 
firms. In such behavior, under-leveraged firms tend to increase leverage to attain the optimal 
capital structure (Panno, 1996). On the contrary, Italian firms failed to confirm the dynamic or 
target capital structure adjustment theoretical model (Panno, 1996). These evidences imply that 
UK firms at least equally considered both adjustment costs and costs of target deviation (Panno, 
1996; Ozkan, 2001). In contrast to this, the cost of adjustment could be prohibitively high in Italian 
firms (Panno, 1996). However, the documented speed of adjustment in UK firms is low when 
compared to the results found on Spanish firms (DeMiguel & Pindado, 2001). Using the 
Difference GMM estimator, DeMiguel & Pindado (2001) found that firms in Spain have target 
leverage and revert towards it at speed of 79% per year. This high speed of adjustment, thus, 
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implies that the cost of adjustment is far lower than the benefit of adjustment or the costs of target 
deviation of firms in Spain.  The cost of adjustment in Spanish firms is even lower when compared 
to firms in US. Similarly, Ayuso et al. (2004) found persistence in the capital buffers of Spanish 
banks due to short term adjustment costs. In GMM estimation, Ayuso et al. (2004) found Spanish 
banks adjust towards the target ranging between the rates of 57% to 73% per year. Once again, this 
evidence confirmed the documented high speed of adjustment in non-financial firms of Spain (De 
Miguel & Pindado, 2001). In the international setting, Antoniou et al. (2008) also examined the 
capital structure decision of firms in the five industrialized countries (G-5 countries). From these 
industrialized countries, Antoniou et al. (2008) choose US and UK with capital market based 
financial system and France, Germany and Japan with bank based financial system. In system 
GMM estimation, they found target capital structure adjustment behavior firms in all G-5 
countries. However, Antoniou et al. (2008) documented mixed results regarding the speed of 
adjustment that ranges from 11% per year in Japan to 59.3% per year in France.  Besides, the 
speed of adjustment of firms in Germany (23.6% per year) is comparably lower than the speed of 
adjustment of firms both in US (33.2% per year) and in UK (31.8% per year) (Antoniou et al., 
2008).   
 
Hence, these past empirical studies generally support the target capital structure adjustment 
hypotheses; however they mainly focus on firms of developed countries. With regard to studies in 
developing countries, De Haas & Peeters (2004) investigated dynamic target capital structure 
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adjustment of firms in ten selected Central and Eastern European Countries23. Using non-linear 
square econometric technique, De Haas & Peeters (2004) found firms adjust towards their target at 
the average speed of adjustment 13% per year. It would then take around five years to close the 
gap between the observed and the target leverage of average firm. Similarly, Avack & Levasseur 
(2007) also witnessed target capital structure adjustment of banks in eleven selected Central and 
Eastern Europe countries. Studies conducted by Wong et al. (2005) and Asarkayan & Ozcan 
(2007) on banks of Hong Kong and Turkey banks showed the presence of lags in target capital 
ratio adjustment dynamics. Wong et al. (2005), using GMM estimation, revealed that target capital 
ratio adjustment of banks was, on average speed, 13.57% per year to close the gap.  
Using system GMM estimator, Getsmann et al. (2010) also confirmed that Asian firms adjust 
towards their target leverage at the speed that ranges from 27% to 39%. This evidence may imply 
that adjustment costs of Asian firms outweigh benefit of adjustment or cost of deviating from the 
target. This speed of adjustment is lower when compared to the findings of the studies done on 
firms of Gulf of Cooperation Countries (Sbeiti, 2010). Sbeiti investigated dynamics of capital 
structure adjustment of firms in the Gulf of cooperation countries including Kuwait, Saudi Arabia 
and Oman, and the result showed target capital structure adjustment of firms. However, Sbeiti 
(2010) revealed mixed evidences, the rate of adjustment towards target book leverage ranges from 
40% per year (lowest) in Saudi Arabia to 74% per year (highest) in Oman. Sbeiti (2010) further 
noted that the speed of adjustment towards target market leverage varies across these three 
countries, 65% per year in Kuwait to 79% per year in Oman. From the available few studies on 
                                                          
23
 The countries include Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovak Republic, 
Bulgaria, and Slovenia. 
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African market, Konan (2008) and Ngugi (2008) on Ivorian and Kenyan firms, respectively and 
Ezeoha & Botha (2012) on South African non-financial firms revealed the presence of the target 
capital structure adjustment behavior of firms. 
In general, past studies on target capital structure adjustment dynamics of firms provide empirical 
support to the prediction of dynamic tradeoff theoretical model. However, these extant empirical 
literatures can be criticized by three perspectives. Firstly, these studies provide evidences mainly 
based on firms in developed countries. Thus, there are only few available evidences that try to 
address target capital structure adjustment of firms in developing countries. Secondly, the existing 
studies on target capital structure adjustment provide mixed evidences on the speed of adjustment. 
The findings differ from one country to the others. This may imply that both adjustment costs and 
benefits of target adjustment (or costs of target deviations) could be dependent on firms’ financial, 
legal and institutional environment (Antoniou et al., 2008; Öztekin & Flannery, 2011; Drobetz et 
al., 2013). Thirdly, in testing the validity of target capital structure adjustment theoretical model, 
these past studies implicitly assume symmetrical target adjustment behavior or firm invariant. That 
is, they assume that all firms adjust towards the target with constant speed of adjustment. However, 
both adjustment cost and costs from target deviations may not be symmetrical for leverage 
increasing (under leveraged) and leverage decreasing (over leveraged) firms to re-balancing their 
capital structure (Flannery & Hankins, 2007; Byoun, 2008). Besides, adjustment costs during re-
balancing may differ across firms with different characteristics (Cotei & Farhat, 2008). The pace of 
adjustment may be heterogeneous due to firms’ heterogeneities (Drobetz & Wanzedrid, 2006).   
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Thus, the next sub-section covers the recent few empirical studies done on possible asymmetric 
target capital structure adjustment of firms (Byoun, 2008) and/or on heterogeneities in target 
adjustment of firms that differ in their characteristics (Drobetz & Wanzedrid, 2006; Flannery & 
Hankins, 2007; Elsas & Florysiak, 2011; Dang et al., 2012; Faulkender et al., 2012; Drobetz et al., 
2013). 
3.3.2. Evidences on the Asymmetrical Target Capital Structure Adjustment 
 
Unlike empirical studies on symmetrical target capital structure adjustment, few studies address 
cross-sectional heterogeneity on adjustment speeds of firms in developed countries (Drobetz & 
Wanzedrid, 2006; Byoun, 2008; Flannery & Hankins, 2007; Elsas & Florysiak, 2011; Dang et al., 
2012; Faulkender et al., 2012; Drobetz et al., 2013).  
Byoun (2008) investigated the asymmetric capital structure adjustment of non-financial firms in 
US. The result showed that asymmetrical speed of adjustment was 33% per year for over leveraged 
firms, but 20% per year for under leveraged firms. Faulkender et al. (2012) also examined firm 
level heterogeneities in the form of target leverage deviation, cash flows, financial constraints, and 
market timing on the speed of adjustment (Elsas & Florysiak, 2011). The result documented that 
overleveraged firms generally adjust faster than underleveraged firms. Besides, Faulkender et al. 
(2012) also found that firm’s costs of adjustment and costs of deviating from target (or benefits of 
adjustment) differ with its operating cash flow, investment opportunities and access to capital 
markets. In other words, firms with large operating cash flows adjust their leverage ratio more 
aggressively than the opposite (Faulkender et al., 2012). This effect of operating cash flow is 
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particularly true for over-leveraged firms when compared to under-leveraged firms (Drobetz et al., 
2013). Further, Faulkender et al. (2012) documented that constrained firms adjust more slowly 
when they are under-leveraged, but more quickly when they are over-leveraged. Using dynamic 
paned data with fractional dependent variable (DPF) estimator, Elsas & Florysiak (2011) also 
examined possible cross-sectional heterogeneity on speed of adjustment of firms. The result 
confirmed that heterogeneity on the speed of adjustment is depending on the extent of financial 
deficits, firm size, growth opportunities, and industry classification. Berger et al. (2008) also 
examined possible heterogeneities on speed of adjustment toward target capital ratio of large banks 
in US. Using System GMM estimations, they documented that the speed of adjustment for poorly 
capitalized banks is about 20% to 45% higher than highly capitalized banks. 
Besides, Dang et al. (2012) use a dynamic threshold panel data model of leverage to examine 
possible asymmetric adjustment speeds in UK firms. Accordingly, they found that the speed of 
adjustment of firms is dependent on financing imbalance, firm investment or earnings volatility but 
not on profitability and firm size. That is, firms with large financing imbalance (or a deficit), large 
investment or low earnings volatility have a significantly faster adjustment speed than those with the 
opposite characteristics (Dang et al., 2012). By simultaneously endogenizing determinants of speed 
of adjustment and target leverage, Drobetz & Wanzedrid (2006) also examined possible cross-
sectional heterogeneity of speed of adjustment in Swiss firms. Using GMM estimation, Drobetz & 
Wanzedrid (2006) proved high speed of adjustment in high growth firms and in firms that are 
highly deviated from target leverage. Using a wide range of different dynamic panel methodologies, 
Drobetz et al. (2013) also examined possible heterogeneities on target capital structure adjustment 
speeds on sample firms from the G-7 countries. They then revealed that highly over-leveraged 
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firms, firms with a higher financing deficit, and constrained firms adjust rapidly towards the desired 
capital structure. Further, Memal & Raupach (2007) and Lepetit et al. (2012) examined possible 
asymmetry and heterogeneities in speed of adjustment of banks in Germany and in selected 
Western European countries, respectively. Focusing on banks from seventeen selected Western 
European countries, Lepetit et al. (2012) examined possible asymmetry of bank’s capital 
adjustment depending on ownership structure. They, then, in estimation, found that banks 
controlled by shareholders with equal voting and cash flow rights adjust their capital upward and 
downward at the same rate. However, with regard to banks controlled by shareholders with a gap 
between voting and cash flow rights, downward rate of adjustment is found to be higher than 
upward rate of adjustment (Lepetit et al., 2012). Using discrete time series version of partial 
adjustment model, Memmal & Raupach (2007) investigated how banks in Germany adjust their 
capital ratio by allowing heterogeneous adjustment rate of each bank. They subsequently found 
that the general tendency of banks seeks to adjust towards target capital ratio. However, Memmal 
& Raupach (2007) confirmed more rapid speed of adjustment by relatively highly liquid banks and 
privately owned banks than by relatively illiquid banks and publicly owned banks.  
Thus, the available few studies conducted so far to examine possible cross-sectional heterogeneities 
on speed of adjustment provide empirical support to dynamic tradeoff theory. Due to firm-specific 
adjustment costs, dynamic capital structure theory predicts heterogeneity on adjustment speed 
(Elsas & Florysiak, 2011). Firms facing different adjustment costs may take different paths towards 
their optimal capital structures (Fischer et al., 1989; Leland, 1994; Dang et al., 2012). However, 
these studies failed to refute context relevance of adjustment dynamics of capital structure of firms. 
But to the best of the researchers’ knowledge, there is nearly no empirical studies so far that 
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explicitly examined possible asymmetrical and/or heterogeneous of capital structure adjustment of 
corporate firms in general and banking firms in particular operating in developing countries. 
3.4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter reviews the documented empirical literatures on determinants and dynamics capital 
structure of firms.  The first sub-section mainly focuses on empirical literatures on determinants of 
capital structure of both non-financial firms and banking firms operating in both developed and 
developing countries. The second section mainly covers the reviewed documented evidences on 
capital structure adjustment dynamics. Thus, based on the reviewed empirical literature, the 
following five gaps in the literature have been identified: 
 
Firstly, there are nearly no studies that explicitly test the possible heterogeneous adjustment 
towards target leverage or capital ratio of banking firms. Banking firms may differ in their 
characteristics and regulatory pressure for capital adequacy. In theoretical literatures, it is predicted 
that the capital structure adjustment dynamics depends on the cost of deviating from the target/ 
equilibrium capital structure and adjustment cost. Hence, firms having different characteristics may 
face adjustment cost differently and then, may tend to adjust heterogeneously.  
Secondly, despite few studies on non-financial firms of developed countries, there are virtually no 
studies conducted to test hypothesis of asymmetric adjustment toward target leverage ratio of firms 
in developing countries. Extant empirical studies examined trade-off theory on the basis of 
symmetric adjustment costs and benefits; however, as indicated earlier, adjustment costs of 
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increasing and reducing leverage ratio may not necessarily be symmetric. Benefits of increasing 
leverage when firms are under-leveraged or over-capitalized may differ from that of reducing 
leverage when they are over-leveraged or under-capitalized.   
Thirdly, equally important, this review has revealed symmetrical target capital structure adjustment 
as the major omissions from extant literatures of capital structure of firms in developing countries. 
There is considerable evidence to suggest that many firms have a target capital structure. In so far 
as this target may not be reached instantly, an adjustment mechanism which must be included 
within any capital structure model is applied. But, this issue has barely been tackled by the 
empirical literature on developing countries (Prasad et al., 2001). Besides, the documented 
evidences revealed the inconsistencies in the speed of adjustment as the rate of adjustment is 
context dependant. The cost of deviating from target and cost of adjustments are highly affected by 
firms’ institutional, legal and financial environment (Antoniou et al., 2008). Hence, there is no 
evidence of symmetrical target capital structure adjustment of banking firms in Ethiopia which 
operate within institutional, legal and financial landscape that differs from other developing 
countries. 
Fourth, despite the capacious past empirical studies on corporate finance centers regarding capital 
structure decision of firms, conundrum of capital structure decision of firms are still unresolved 
(Myers, 1984). That is, the question, ‘what factors determine the capital structure decision of 
firms?’, is still a mystery (Myers, 1984). This mystery on capital structure decision of firms clearly 
manifests lack of unequivocal evidences on determinants of capital structure of firms in developing 
countries. Further, on the top of this lack of indubitable evidences (Harris & Raviv, 1991), 
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prominent past studies on determinants of capital structure decision of banks mainly focused 
either on factors related to theoretical model (Gropp & Heider, 2009; Amidu, 2007; Mohammed 
et al., 2015) or on regulatory factors (Ediz et al., 1998; Rime, 2000; Furfine, 2000; Nachane et al., 
2001; Kuo & Lee, 2003). It is clear that, past studies that emphasize on capital regulation of banks 
contribute to our understanding of the relationship between capital regulation and banks’ financing 
behavior. However, these studies conducted on banks that operate in regulatory environment are 
characterized by the presence of explicit deposit insurance (Sharp, 1995; Wall & Peterson, 1996).  
Hence, there is also lack of evidence on regulatory pressure regarding capital adequacy on capital 
structure of banks in developing countries operating in absence of secondary market and explicit 
deposit insurance.  
Finally, there is a gap in the evidence on the validities of the theoretical models. As in the reviewed 
empirical literatures, tradeoff and pecking order theoretical models are primarily tested on firms 
operating in the context of developed countries, while little evidence is available in developing 
countries. This is particularly true for Ethiopian firms operating in financial system which are 
characterized as least developed and highly regulated. Hence, the current study tries to fill these 
gaps in literature by testing pecking order and tradeoff theories such firms found in one of the least 
developed countries context. 
In order to fill the gaps identified in literature, the central question: “What factors determine the 
capital structure choice of banks and how do they adjust dynamically?” should be answered. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: HYPOTHESES FORMULATION 
 
Based on the review of theoretical and empirical literatures, the study formulated six testable 
hypotheses. Like other corporate firms, banking firms use different financial instruments, which 
can be broadly categorized as debt and equity financing, to fund its operations. However, unlike 
other corporate firms, capital structure of banking firms is under the pressure of regulatory forces. 
Banks can then be characterized as any non-financial firms and regulated entities in their capital 
structure (Berger et al, 1995; Wall & Peterson, 1996; Brewer et al, 2008). The capital structure 
decision of banks in Ethiopia over the past periods (see Annex 1) may be related to the different 
factors predicted in tradeoff and pecking order theoretical models and the pertinent of regulatory 
pressures (Sharp, 1995; Wall & Peterson, 1996). In this regard, the first and the second testable 
hypotheses (null and alternative) of the study are formulated as follows: 
Hypothesis 1:  
 
 Ho1: The corporate finance determinants of capital structure, including effective tax rate, 
profitability and/or size of free cash flows, growth opportunities, collateral values of assets, 
size, earnings volatility, and risk and costs of distress and insolvency, have no relationship 
with capital structure of banks. 
 
 Ha1: The corporate finance determinants of capital structure, including effective tax rate, 
profitability and/or size of free cash flows, growth opportunities, collateral values of assets, 
size, earnings volatility, and risk and costs of distress and insolvency, have relationship with 
capital structure of banks. 
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Hypothesis 2:  
 
 Ho2:  The regulatory pressure on capital standard has no effect on capital structure of banks. 
 
 Ha2:  The regulatory pressure on capital standard has effect on capital structure of banks. 
 
The dynamic tradeoff theory or the target capital structure adjustment theory predicts that firms set 
long run target capital structure and tend to adjust towards it through time (Fischer et al., 1989; 
Myers, 1984). In other words,  firms set target capital structure at a point which balances benefits of 
debt financing (tax shield and reducing agency problems of free cash flows) and costs of debt 
financing (costs of financial distress and agency costs of debt) (Myers, 1984). In banking firms, 
possible regulatory costs are considered as additional cost to be tradeoff with the benefits of 
leveraging to obtain the optimal capital structure (Marcus, 1983; Osterberg & Thomson, 1996). 
However, at a given point in time, banks may not be at their target capital structure that balances 
marginal benefit with marginal costs of leverage due to possible lags in re-balancing towards the 
target in the presence of adjustment costs (Myers, 1984; Majluf & Myers, 1984; Marcus, 1984; 
Wall & Peterson, 1996; Wong et al., 2005).  In target adjustment, banking firms will substitute debt 
for equity financing or vice versa to obtain optimal capital structure. But, in the presence of 
adjustment costs, target re-balancing may not be instantaneous. Thus, if evidences on target capital 
structure adjustments further are to be corroborated, the predictions of target capital structure 
theory on the dynamics perspective or target capital structure adjustment theory need to be tested. 
This is particularly true for banks that operate in Ethiopian financial landscape. The possible target 
capital structure adjustment behavior of banks and the rate of adjustment (if any) also need to be 
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investigated. To this end, the study examined the possible symmetrical dynamics of the target 
capital structure adjustment, by testing the third null or alternative hypothesis formulated as read 
below: 
Hypothesis 3: 
 Ho3: Banks do not have target capital structure to which they adjust dynamically.   
 
 Ha3: Banks do have target capital structure to which they adjust dynamically.   
 
Besides, the target capital structure adjustment may be asymmetrical for overleveraged and 
underleveraged firms. In target re-balancing, over-leveraged (under-capitalized) firms will reduce 
their debt financing or increase their equity capital financing (Flannery & Hankins, 2007); however, 
underleveraged (overcapitalized) firms will increase their debt financing or decrease their equity 
capital financing (Flannery & Hankins, 2007). Thus, if the benefits of adjustment and costs of 
adjustment differ in reducing debt financing (or increase equity financing) and in increasing debt 
financing (or decrease equity financing), the dynamics of target adjustment is asymmetrical in 
overleveraged and underleveraged firms (Byoun, 2008). Further, due to firm-specific adjustment 
costs, target capital structure adjustment may be heterogeneous across firms that differ in 
characteristics (Drobetz & Wanzedrid, 2006). Given the gaps in the extant literature and in the 
institutional and regulatory frameworks of banks in Ethiopia, it is typical to examine the possible 
asymmetrical and/or heterogeneous target capital structure adjustment dynamics. In doing so, the 
fourth and fifth testable hypotheses (both null and alternative) are formulated as follows: 
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Hypothesis 4: 
 Ho4: Dynamics of capital structure adjustment is not asymmetrical in overleveraged and 
underleveraged banks in Ethiopia. 
 
 Ha4: Dynamics of capital structure adjustment is asymmetrical in overleveraged and 
underleveraged banks in Ethiopia. 
Hypothesis 5: 
 Ho5:  Dynamics of target capital structure adjustment is not heterogeneous across banks in 
Ethiopia which differ in their characteristics (deviations from target, size, growth, liquidity 
and ownership) and regulatory pressure. 
 
 Ha5:  Dynamics of target capital structure adjustment is heterogeneous across banks in 
Ethiopia which differ in their characteristics (deviations from target, size, growth, liquidity 
and ownership) and regulatory pressure. 
Finally, based on the comparisons of the test results for the predictions of the tradeoff and pecking 
order theoretical models, the study tests the sixth hypothesis formulated as: 
Hypothesis 6: 
 Ho6: Capital structure decisions of banks in Ethiopia have no empirical support to extant 
theories (tradeoff and/or pecking order theories). 
 
 Ha6: Capital structure decisions of banks in Ethiopia have empirical support to extant 
theories (tradeoff and/or pecking order theories). 
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter describes the research methodology of the study. Specifically, it describes the 
research approach/paradigm, research design, target population, units of analysis and samples, 
operationalization of constructs or measurements, methods of data collection and methods of data 
analysis employed in the study. 
5.1. Research Approach and Paradigm 
 
In examining the determinants of capital structure and the dynamics of the capital structure 
adjustment of banks, the study was conducted based principally on the quantitative research 
approach under the positivist paradigm. By employing the positivist research paradigm, the 
researcher aimed to find objective external realities about the factors or determinants of capital 
structure and the existing dynamics of the capital structure adjustment of banks (Williman, 2006; 
Cresweel, 2009; Bhattacherjee, 2012). On the contrary, the study has excluded the 
constructivist/interpretivist view that claims the world is socially constructed and subjective (Muijs, 
2004; Cresweel, 2009; Bhattacherjee, 2012). This constructivist view implies that individual’s 
choice of capital structure decisions is highly subjective (Cresweel, 2009; Saunders et al., 2009).  
Understandably, in the positivist paradigm, the world is external and objective (Cresweel, 2009). 
Reality is real and it exists out there (Creswell, 2009). Hence, the chosen positivist research 
paradigm is in line with the aim of the study. Specifically, by examining relations, the researcher 
intended to explain why the capital structure choice and adjustment dynamics of banks is the way it 
is (Saunders et al., 2009). In this regard, the study focused on deterministic relationships and looks 
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for factors determining or affecting the capital structure decision of the banking firms (Muijs, 2004; 
Williman, 2006; Cresweel, 2009). Besides, during the process, the study was primarily conducted 
in an objective and value-free manner (Muijs, 2004; Cresweel, 2009; Bhattacherjee, 2012).  
Moreover, the study basically employed a quantitative research approach. A quantitative research 
approach is grounded in the positivist research paradigm (Muijs, 2004; Cresweel, 2009). Most 
specifically, the quantitative research approach is consistent with the ontological and 
epistemological orientation of the researcher for choosing the positivist paradigm (Muijs, 2004; 
Lancaster, 2005; Cresweel, 2009; Saunders et al., 2009). On the basis of the chosen positivist 
paradigm/quantitative research approach, the researcher adopted the deductive reasoning to the 
research process (Lancaster, 2005; Saunders et al., 2009). In doing so, the study has been guided 
by the theoretical/conceptual framework (as presented in the preceding two chapters) and 
numerical data were gathered and statistically analyzed so as to accept or reject the formulated 
hypotheses (Muijs, 2004; Cresweel, 2009; Saunders et al., 2009; Bhattacherjee, 2012). The well-
planned and-implemented quantitative research approach has the merit of being able to make 
generalizations for a broader population (Balnaves & Caputi, 2001; Saunders et al., 2009; 
Vanderstoep & Johnston, 2009). However, a quantitative approach fails to provide the researcher 
with the information on the context of the situation, among other shortcomings. Hence, to 
enhance the generalizability and reliability of the findings of a quantitative approach, the study 
followed standardized procedures in sample selection, instrument designing, data collection and 
analysis (Balnaves & Caputi, 2001; Muijs, 2004; Lancaster, 2005; Saunders et al., 2009).  
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5.2. Research Design 
 
The study used the combinations of secondary data-based panel and cross-sectional field survey 
research designs.  
The panel research design of the study is particularly imperative to investigate the determinants 
and dynamics of capital structure adjustment based on the panel data to be collected across banks 
over different time periods (Green, 2003; Gujariti, 2003; Gropp & Heider, 2009). Nowadays, a 
panel data set approach received more attentions from researchers (Heshimite, 2001). One 
compelling reason is that, unlike the cross-sectional or time series data, it allows to follow the same 
observational units repeatedly over time (Heshimite, 2001; Green, 2003; Gujariti, 2003). Hence, 
the availability of repeated observations on the same cross-sectional units ensures the viability of 
relatively more realistic models (Bjron & Friss, 2013). In addition, the panel data allow for 
controlling individual unobserved heterogeneity, which gives more variability and informative data 
(Green, 2003; Bjron & Friss, 2013). Further, unlike the cross-sectional survey design that collects 
data at a single point in time, the available panel data would capture the dynamic nature of a capital 
structure problem (Heshimite, 2001). However, there are also disadvantages induced by these 
panel data sets (Bjron & Friss, 2013). Firstly, observations may not be independently distributed 
across time (Verbeek, 2009; Bjron & Friss, 2013). Secondly, the panel survey design would be 
based on secondary accounting data analysis. Thus, this design may be criticized for the possible 
low quality of data, which may be collected unscientifically or unsystematically (Bhattacherjee, 
2012). Moreover, the panel study could be limited to the variables available in secondary 
accounting data (Beattie et al., 2006). Hence, it is difficult to passably test theoretical models from 
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different perspectives (DeJong &van Dijk, 2001; DeJong et al., 2003; Beattie et al., 2006; 
Bhattacherjee, 2012). 
On the other hand, the cross-sectional field survey design would be useful to investigate the 
determinants of capital structure and dynamics of capital structure of banks based on the firsthand 
information to be retrieved through the survey instrument (Balnaves & Caputi, 2001). The use of 
the cross-sectional survey design would enhance the possibility to capture and control different 
factors predicted in the theoretical models, which will be, nevertheless, neglected in panel study 
(Bhattacherjee, 2012). However, unlike the panel research design, the cross-sectional field survey 
design may be criticized for lack of data to address the dynamic aspects of the capital structure 
problem (Heshimite, 2001). Moreover, in the cross-sectional survey design, low degree internal 
validities from the absence of temporal precedence and the possible respondent bias would be 
expected (Saunders et al., 2009; Bhattacherjee, 2012). 
Therefore, a combination of the panel and cross-sectional survey research designs would be highly 
useful. Specifically, these research designs would be complementary to each other and helpful to 
substantiate the possible findings (De Jong & van Dijk, 2001; De Jong et al., 2003; Beattie et al., 
2006; Bhattacherjee, 2012).  To that end, the following two subsections (5.2.1 & 5.2.2) describe the 
details of the secondary data-based panel and cross-sectional survey research designs of the study, 
respectively. 
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    5.2.1. Secondary Data-Based Panel Research Design 
 
The study uses the secondary data-based panel/longitudinal research design.  Hence, this section 
describes the sampling design, measurements/operationalization, methods of data collection and 
methods of data analysis used for the secondary data-based panel research design of the study. 
        5.2.1.1. Target Population, Unit of Analysis and Sample 
 
The unit of analysis of the study has been banks for longitudinal or panel design. The population 
of banks in Ethiopia constitutes three publicly owned banks and fifteen privately owned banks 
(Annual Report of NBE, 2012). The publicly owned banks include Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, 
Construction and Business Bank and Development Bank of Ethiopia. As per the report of NBE 
(2012), the privately owned banks comprise Awash International Bank, Dashen Bank, Bank of 
Abyssina, Wegagan Bank, United International Bank, Nib International Bank, Cooperative Bank 
of Oromia, Lion International Bank, Oromia International Bank, Zemen Bank, Buna 
International Bank, Birhan International Bank, Abay Bank, Enat Bank, and Debub Global Bank 
(Annual Report of NBE, 2012). Then, the target population of the study is defined as being 
comprised of all these eighteen banks which are registered as incorporated banks under the 
proclamations of NBE.  
To obtain the sample of the study, three exclusion criteria have been used in line with the aim and 
objectives of the study. Firstly, from the publicly owned banks, both Commercial Bank of Ethiopia 
and Construction and Business Bank are deposit-taking banks and provide services in different 
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commercial activities. However, Development Bank of Ethiopia is the specialized government-
owned bank in Ethiopia, which differs in the means of financing and mainly focuses on financing 
long-term public projects. Hence, as there are missing observations on specified variables, 
Development Bank of Ethiopia has been excluded from the sample. Secondly, unlike the long 
records of the public-owned banks in the history of banking in Ethiopia, private banks joined the 
banking industry in the post-deregulation at different points in time. Thus, due to the lag nature of 
the analysis of the study, private banks having less than three consecutive years of observations 
have been excluded. In this criterion, privately owned banks, including Abay Bank, Enat Bank and 
Debub Global Bank, have been excluded from the sample of study. Thirdly, due to the 
unavailability of panel data of banks during the period of before the year 2000 and due to the fact 
that most of private banks became fully operational after the year 1999, the sample constitutes 
banks operational in the post-1999 period 24.  
As a result, the sample constitutes all selected fourteen commercial banks with a minimum three 
consecutive years of operations. All the selected banks are the registered incorporated banks under 
the proclamations of NBE and operational during the period between the years 2000 to 2012. 
Thus, there is the unbalanced panel data set of 124 observations. 
 
 
                                                          
24
 Though the requirement of full disclosure of banks and periodic reports of banks to the National Bank of Ethiopia 
(NBE) was proclaimed in year 1994, formal audited financial statements reporting to the NBE have been documented 
in the post-2000 period (Kiyota et al., 2007). 
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       5.2.1.2. Operationalization-Measurements of Variables in Panel Study 
 
The study examined the determinants of the capital structure and capital structure adjustment 
dynamics of banks based on the factors predicted in the theoretical models of capital structure and 
the pertinent regulatory pressure on capital adequacy standards. Thus, this describes the 
operationalization of constructs or measurement of variables employed in panel design. 
            5.2.1.2.1. Dependent Variable: Leverage 
 
The dependent variable in the panel design of the study is the leverage of banks. A clear definition 
of leverage has been debatable (Rajan & Zinglas, 1995). The choice of its definition depends on 
the purpose of the study (Rajan & Zinglas, 1995; Drobetz & Wanzedrid, 2006). In this study, 
Leverage (Lit) is defined as one minus the ratio of equity capital to total assets of banks in book 
values (Gropp & Heider, 2009; Çağlayan & Sak, 2010). Unlike the stochastic deposits, the capital 
ratio of banks is considered to be relatively controllable and subjected to regulatory forces (Santos, 
2001).  Besides, past studies on the capital structure of banks have usually used equity capital ratio 
as the proxy for capital structure (Marcus, 1983; Sharp, 1995; Brewer et al., 2008). Thus, this 
definition of leverage will treat equity capital ratio in inverse relations. Higher equity capital ratio 
implies lesser leverage and vice versa. In addition, it enables to investigate the effect of regulation, 
while being consistent with the existing literature on nonfinancial firms that use leverage as the 
proxy for capital structure. In this definition of leverage, equity capital is the sum of paid up capital, 
reserves and retained earnings of a bank in period t, in book values. The use of book value of 
equity capital helps to deal with the problem of market value data unavailability in banks of 
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Ethiopia. Moreover, it is also suitable to use book value to be consistent with the regulatory 
requirement (Gropp & Heider, 2009).  
           5.2.1.2. 2. Determinants of Capital Structure 
 
The determinants of capital structure are the expalanatory variables of the study. These include 
different bank characteristics (Gropp & Heider, 2009) and pertinent regulatory pressure for the  
capital adequacy of banks (Berger et al., 1995; Sharp, 1995; Brewer et al., 2008). The chosen bank 
characteristics used as the proxies for different factors predicted in the tradeoff and pecking order 
theoretical models include tax shield, costs of financial distress, agency costs and information 
asymmetry costs (Titman & Wessels, 1988; Rajan & Zinglas, 1995; Gropp & Heider, 2009). 
Moreover, the minimum capital requirement and peer-based regulatory pressure for capital 
adequacy were also selected as two pertinent regulatory factors for banks in Ethiopia (Marcus, 
1983). 
 
 Taxation 
 
In line with the prediction of the tradeoff theoretical model, the study investigated the effect of 
taxation on the capital structure decision of banks (Modigilian & Miller, 1963). In so doing, the 
study used effective tax rate (Marcus, 1983; Sharpe, 1995; Abor, 2008) as one of the explanatory 
variables of the study. 
 
Effective Tax Rate - In tax cum-costs of financial distress tradeoff model, the increased use of debt 
financing rather than equity financing is expected to lower effective marginal tax rate on interest 
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deductions (Abor, 2008)25. Hence, effective tax rate is predicted to be positively related to leverage 
or negatively related to equity capital ratio. Effective Tax rate (Txit-1) is defined as the lagged values 
of the ratio of tax paid to net income before tax (Sharp, 1995; Abor, 2008).  Besides, if this ratio is 
found to be negative in value and value greater than 1, following previous studies (Fischer et al., 
1989; Sharp, 1995), effective tax rate is constrained to be zero. This helps to conform only to the 
economic relevance of the variable (Sharp, 1995; Gatward & Sharpe, 1996).  
 
 Costs of Distress, Agency Costs and Information Asymmetry 
 
In testing the factors predicted in the tradeoff and pecking order theoretical models, including 
costs of financial distress, agency costs and information asymmetry, the study also used bank 
characteristics, including profitability, growth opportunities, collateral values of assets, size and risk 
of banks, as the proxies for constructs predicted in the theoretical models (Titman & Wessels, 
1988).  
 
Profitability – The tradeoff theoretical model predicts a positive relationship between profitability 
and leverage or, equivalently, profitability is negatively related to equity capital ratio. Specifically, in 
the tax-cost of distress tradeoff theoretical model, high profitability of firms implies low probability 
of distress (Myers, 1984). Similarly, in the agency cost tradeoff model, high profitability leads to 
high agency problems of free cash flows (Jenson, 1986). Hence, highly profitable firms tend to 
increase leverage to tap the benefits of interest tax shield with low expected distress cost (Myers, 
                                                          
25
  Miller (1977) indicated that the tax advantage of debt rather than equity financing depends on the marginal personal 
tax rate, tax rate on capital gains and corporate tax rates. However, data on personal tax rate and capital gains are not 
available in banks of Ethiopia.  
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1984) and the disciplinary role of leverage in resolving free cash flow problem (Jenson & Meckling, 
1976; Jenson, 1986). On the contrary, the pecking order theoretical model predicts a negative 
relationship between profitability and leverage. This prediction is based on the premise that 
profitable firms would prefer internal funds in the form of retained earnings to external financing 
through issuance of debt or equity securities to minimize information asymmetry-related costs 
(Myers, 1984; Majluf & Myers, 1984; Frank & Goyal, 2008). The prediction of the pecking order 
model is also reinforced by the legal reserve requirement that requires the transfer of 25% of the 
profitability of banks in Ethiopia to capital reserve (Directive No SBB /4/ 95 of NBE). Profitability 
(Pfit-1) is defined as the lagged ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total book values of assets 
(Titman & Wessels, 1988; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Gropp & Heider, 2009).  
 
Growth Opportunities - Succinctly, Frank & Goyal (2009) stated that high growth opportunities 
would imply high loss of values of firms at the time of distress, being highly prone to the agency 
costs of asset substitution (Jenson & Meckling, 1976) and underinvestment (Myers,1977) and 
facing  low agency costs of free cash flows (Jenson, 1986). Hence, in the tradeoff theoretical model, 
high growth firms tend to hold less debt or high equity financing (Titman & Wessels, 1988). On 
the contrary, the pecking order theory predicts a positive relationship between growth and leverage 
or, it’s being negatively related to equity capital ratio (Majluf & Myers, 1984; Myers, 1984). In this 
prediction, high growth opportunities of firms imply high demand of funds more than to be 
covered by internal sources (Myers, 1984). As a result, highly growing firms prefer debt over equity 
in external financing (Myers, 1984). Growth (Grit-1) is defined as the lagged values of percentage 
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change in total assets of banks, in book values (Titman & Wessels, 1988; Sharp, 1995; Shan & 
Khan, 2007).  
 
Collateral Values of Assets - In the tradeoff theoretical models, the relation between collateral 
values of assets and leverage can be positive or negative. In the positive prediction, high collateral 
values of assets of firms entail the expected low decline in the values of assets at the time of distress 
(Myers, 1984; Frank & Goyal, 2008; Cotie & Faraht, 2009). Furthermore, high collateral value of 
assets implies the increase in the difficulties of asset substitution or risk-shifting incentives of 
shareholders (Jenson & Meckling, 1976; Cotie & Faraht, 2009). Hence, in the presence of high 
collateral values of assets, firms expected to increase debt financing or decrease equity financing 
(Jenson & Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1984; Cotie & Faraht, 2009). On the contrary, in the presence 
of low collateral value of assets, shareholders may incur high monitoring costs to deal with the 
possible conflict of interest between managers and shareholders (Grossman & Hart, 1982; Titman 
& Wessels, 1988). In this respect, low collateral values of assets of firms imply a high level of 
gearing or leverage ratio (Grossman & Hart, 1982; Titman & Wessels, 1988; Prasad et al., 2001). 
On the other hand, due to the expected low information asymmetry costs related with high 
collateral values of assets, firms can easily raise external financing in the form of debt (Titman & 
Wessels, 1988). By implication, the positive relationship between collateral values of assets and 
leverage would be expected in the pecking order theoretical models (Myers, 1984; Majluf & Myers, 
1984; Titman & Wessels, 1988; Harris & Raviv, 1991; Frank & Goyal, 2008). Collateral values of 
  
90 
 
assets (Colit-1) is defined as the lagged values of the ratio of tangible assets to total assets in book 
values (Octavia & Brown, 2008; Gropp & Heider, 2009)26.  
 
Bank Size - In a tradeoff theoretical model, bank size is predicted to be positively related to debt 
financing or negatively related to equity capital ratio. In the tax cost of distress model, larger firms 
are considered to be more diversified and less exposed to the probability of bankruptcy (Titman & 
Wessels, 1988; Rajan & Zinglas, 1995). In the agency cost tradeoff theoretical model, larger firms 
are expected to be matured and build reputations and hence face low agency costs of debt 
(Hirshleifer & Thakor, 1989). These lower costs of distress and agency costs of debt encourage the 
larger firms to use more debt than equity in their financing choices (Titman & Wessels, 1988). 
Further, due to diversification possibilities and their being better known in the market, larger firms 
imply lower information asymmetry problems (Myers, 1984). In effect, large firms can raise debt 
financing more easily than their smaller counterparts (Titman & Wessels, 1988). Bank Size 
(Ln(Szit-1) is  defined as the lagged natural logarithm of book value of assets (Titman & Wessels, 
1988; Gropp & Heider, 2009).  
 
Risk - In both the tradeoff and pecking order theoretical models, the relationship between firm risk 
and leverage is predicted to be negative. In the tradeoff model, higher earnings volatility implies 
                                                          
26
 Even though banks are not supposed to pledge collaterals to raise debt financing from deposits, they need collaterals 
to raise debt financing from central banks and/or interbank borrowing. Hence, there is a need to include the variable if 
it truly affects their capital structure decision. However, to better capture the banking operations, the study also 
alternatively tested by defining collateral values of assets as the ratio of tangible assets to total asset ratio under which 
tangible assets consist of fixed assets (land &building) and  liquid securities that will be used as collateral with NBE, 
including total securities, investments in other entities, cash and due from banks (consisting of  cash, interest and non-
interest bearing interbank deposits, and interest and non-interest bearing balances with the central bank)(Gropp & 
Heider, 2009). But it doesn’t make any difference to the finding. Hence, for comparing it with the documented 
evidences in nonfinancial firms, the reported result is based on fixed asset to total asset ratio. 
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greater chance of financial distress (Booth et al., 2001). Besides, the expected high cost of distress 
in turn aggravates the agency problem of underinvestment (Myers, 2000; Baral, 2004). Similarly, in 
pecking order theory, investors would demand high risk premium for the perceived cost of distress 
in external financing (Shan & Khan, 2007). Thus, firms tend to prefer internal financing (Shan & 
Khan, 2007). Then, in both the tradeoff and pecking order theoretical models, earning volatility is 
predicted to be negatively related with leverage or positively related with equity capital ratio. Risk 
(Riskit-1) is defined as the lagged standard deviation of return on assets of banks over the last 3 
consecutive years (Berger et al., 2008; Awdeh & Hamadi, 2011). 
 
 Regulatory Pressure  
 
After the deregulation of banking industry in Ethiopia, the adequacy of capital holdings of banks 
has been supervised by the National Bank of Ethiopia. Then, in order to investigate the effect of 
regulatory pressure on the capital structure decision of banks, two pertinent regulatory factors have 
been considered: namely, a minimum paid up capital regulation and a regulatory pressure for 
capital adequacy, as explained respectively below. 
 
Minimum Paid Up Capital Regulation – To enhance solvency and stability, the existing banks 
operational prior to year 1999 have been required to increase their capital and attain the minimum 
capital of Br 75 million by the end of 2002 (Directive No SBB/24/99 of NBE). Besides, banks that 
were established after the year 1999 have been required to maintain the minimum paid up capital 
amount of Br 75 million to get a license (Directive No SBB/24/99 of NBE). To capture the effect 
of this regulation, the study used the minimum capital regulation dummy variable. By definition, 
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the minimum capital regulation dummy variable (McRit) is the dummy variable that takes a value of 
1 for observations between the years 2000 to 2002 (for the existing banks operational prior to the 
year 1999) and for observations after the year 1999 (for banks that were established after the year 
1999) and a value of zero, otherwise.   
 
Regulatory Pressure for Capital Adequacy – In offsite surveillance of the National Bank of 
Ethiopia, the capital adequacy of banks would be examined based on the peer group comparison 
(Addison & Geda, 2003). The peer-based regulatory pressure on capital adequacy would be 
captured by comparing the capital adequacy ratio of bank i in period t and the average capital 
adequacy ratio of all banks in period t (Marcus, 1983). The regulatory pressure may occur in low 
capitalized banks, i.e., in banks capitalized below the average capital adequacy ratio, but not in 
overcapitalized banks. Thus, the study employed the regulatory pressure for the capital adequacy 
dummy variable. The regulatory pressure for the capital adequacy dummy variable (RgPit) is the 
dummy variable that equals 1, if the capital adequacy ratio of bank i in period t is less than the 
average capital adequacy of all banks in period t, and that equals zero, if the capital adequacy ratio 
of bank i in period t is greater than or equal to an average capital adequacy of all banks in period t 
(Marcus, 1983).  
            5.2.1.2. 3. Determinants of the Speed of Adjustment towards the Target 
 
The study also investigated the possible asymmetric target capital structure adjustment or the 
heterogeneity of firms in their speed of adjustment towards the target capital structure. This helps 
to test the validities of the tradeoff theoretical model in a dynamic perspective. To this end, as the 
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determinants of the speed of adjustment, the study examined the deviations from the target capital 
structure, bank size, growth opportunities (Heishemti, 2001; Drobetz & Wanzedrid, 2006), 
liquidity (Memmal & Raupach, 2007), regulatory pressure on capital adequacy (Berger et al., 2008) 
and ownership (Memmal & Raupach, 2007; Lepetit et al., 2012).  
 
5.2.1.2.3.1. Deviation from Target Capital Structure 
 
The deviation of firms from their target capital structure may affect their speed of adjustment 
towards the target. If costs of rebalancing mainly constitute fixed costs, firms will adjust faster when 
they highly deviate or go far-off the target (Heshimite, 2001; Drobetz & Wanzedrid, 2006; Dang et 
al., 2012). On the contrary, costs of rebalancing may increase with the increase in the deviation 
from the target, particularly in the presence of exorbitant fixed costs adjustment (Heshimite, 2001; 
Drobetz & Wanzedrid, 2006; Dang et al., 2012). In this respect, firms tend to adjust slowly 
(Heshimite, 2001; Drobetz & Wanzedrid, 2006; Dang et al., 2012).   
 
However, the target capital structure adjustment dynamics may not be symmetrical for 
overleveraged and underleveraged firms (Byoun, 2008; Elsas & Florysiak, 2011; Faulkender et al., 
2012).  In the dynamics, the actual leverage may be above the desired leverage (i.e., overleveraged) 
or the actual leverage may be below the desired leverage (i.e., underleveraged). In rebalancing the 
target, overleveraged banks may decrease debt or increase equity capital ratio, while 
underleveraged banks may increase debt financing or decrease equity capital ratio (Flannery & 
Hankins, 2007). Therefore, if there are different adjustment costs related to the paying off debt or 
equity issuance vis-à-vis the reduction of equity or debt issuance, the speed of adjustment may be 
  
94 
 
asymmetric for overleveraged and underleveraged banks (Byoun, 2008).  Besides, the benefits of 
adjustment towards the target may also be asymmetrical for overleveraged and underleveraged 
firms (Faulkender et al., 2012). 
 
In line with the above theoretical explanation, the present the study examined the effect of 
deviation from target on the rate of adjustment from two perspectives. Firstly, the relative deviation 
of firms from the target―defined as the dummy variables―allowing the possible asymmetric 
capital structure adjustment for overleveraged and underleveraged banks (Byoun, 2008). 
Specifically, the overleveraged dummy variable equals 1, if the actual leverage is above the target 
leverage, and equals zero, otherwise (Byoun, 2008).  The underleveraged dummy variable equals 
1, if the actual leverage is below the target leverage, and equals zero, otherwise (Byoun, 2008). 
Then, the absolute deviation from the target leverage is defined as the absolute value of the 
difference between the target and the actual leverage of banks to examine its effect on the speed of 
adjustment (Drobetz & Wanzedrid, 2006). 
 
5.2.1.2.3.2. Bank Size 
 
If the costs of rebalancing entail high fixed costs, larger firms will incur low costs of adjustment 
from economies of scale as compared to smaller firms (Heshimitie, 2001). On top of this, in the 
too-big, too-fail hypothesis and possibilities of diversification, larger banks can also easily access 
external funding with less costs of information asymmetry (Aysuo et al., 2004; Drobetz & 
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Wanzedrid, 2006). Hence, a positive relationship would be expected to exist between bank 
size―defined as the logarithm of bank assets―and the speed of adjustment. 
 
5.2.1.2.3.3. Growth Opportunities  
 
High-growth firms are expected to be relatively young firms, and hence they tend to hold low debt 
financing or high equity financing due to the agency cost of debt (Myers, 1977; Dang et al., 2012). 
Further, higher growth opportunities of firms imply a frequent need of external equity financing 
(Dang et al., 2012). By implication high-growth banks can adjust their capital structure more readily 
by choosing among alternative sources of funds (Drobetz & Wanzedrid, 2006; Dang et al., 2012). 
On the other hand, low-growth prospects of banks imply less reliance on external financing, and 
hence such banks would experience a low rate of internal adjustment (Dang et al., 2012).  In other 
words, high-growth banks are expected to adjust more rapidly than low-growth banks (Dang et al., 
2012). On the contrary, as the low-growth prospects of banks imply less reliance on external equity 
financing, they face low costs of asymmetric information, and thus incur low adjustment costs than 
high-growth prospect of banks (Dang et al., 2012). As a result, the effect of growth opportunities, 
defined as the percentage of change in the total assets of banks, on the speed of adjustment may be 
positive or negative.  
 
5.2.1.2.3.4. Liquidity of Banks 
 
High liquidity of banks implies high holding of cash and relatively less risky assets that may affect 
the capital structure adjustment dynamics (Memmal & Raupach, 2007). Banks that hold less risky, 
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highly liquid assets will be expected to adjust their capital structure faster than banks with relatively 
high risky, illiquid loans (Memmal & Raupach, 2007). On the other hand, banks with high liquidity 
will be able to meet short-term obligations when they have dues (Panno, 2003). Nevertheless, these 
cash holdings and other liquid assets may be subjected to high expropriations (Jenson, 1986). Due 
to this, highly liquid banks may adjust slowly. So, the effect of liquidity, defined as the ratio of 
liquid assets to total assets of banks, on the speed of capital structure adjustment may be positive or 
negative. 
 
5.2.1.2.4. Regulatory Pressure for Capital Adequacy 
 
 Following Berger et al. (2008), the effect of the regulatory pressure for a capital adequacy on the 
speed of the capital structure adjustment of banks will be examined. If the regulatory pressure for 
capital adequacy influences the adjustment process, banks that hold a low capital ratio relative to 
the average capital ratio of banks are expected to adjust faster (Berger et al., 2008). The regulatory 
pressure for capital adequacy will be a dummy variable that takes a value of 1, if the actual capital 
ratio is less than the average capital ratio, and a value of zero, otherwise. 
5.2.1.2.5. Ownership of Banks 
  
In examining the possible heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment, the ownership of banks has 
also been considered as the determinant of the speed of adjustment (Memmal & Raupach, 2007). 
From the very objectives of shareholders’ wealth maximization, private banks are expected to hold 
leverage or capital ratio within a narrow interval and thereby to adjust faster than public banks 
(Memmal & Raupach, 2007). Compared to private banks, public banks may have objectives other 
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than value maximization (Memmal & Raupach, 2007). Besides, from the perspective of the agency 
problems, managers in public-owned banks may face low pressure and control from the ultimate 
principals, or from the citizens represented by government, as compared to private banks which 
are continuously monitored by the investors (La Porta et al., 2002; Memmal & Raupach, 2007). 
Hence, the managers of public-owned banks may have high discretion in their capital structure 
decisions (Majumdar & Chhipper, 1999) and thus adjust slower than private banks (Memmal & 
Raupach, 2007). The ownership of banks will be the dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for 
private banks and a value of zero, otherwise (La Porta et al., 2002; Memmal & Raupach, 2007; 
Brewer et al., 2008). 
 
In short, the operationalization/measurements of the variables used for the panel study can be 
summarized as shown in Table 5.1 below. 
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 Table 5.1. Measurement of Variables in Panel or Longitudinal Study 
Variable  Definition  
Dependent 
Variable 
Leverage  One minus Equity capital/Total  asset ratio  in book values  
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Effective Tax Rate  Ratio of tax paid to net income before tax  
Profitability   EBIT/Total Assets 
Growth   Percentage of change in assets 
Collateral values of assets   Tangible assets/ Total assets 
Size   Ln (Total assets) 
Earning volatility   Standard deviations of return on assets over the past 3 years  
Minimum capital regulation  Dummy variable that equals 1,  for observation between 2000 to 2002 (in the existing 
banks prior to 1999),  for post -2000 observations (in post -1999 bank entrants)  and 
zero, otherwise.  
Regulatory pressure for risk-
weighted capital adequacy  
Dummy variable that equals 1, if average capital ratio of all banks in period t(ACt ) 
exceeds capital ratio of bank i in period t (Cit), and zero, if ACt <= Cit.   
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    Deviation from target 
         Relative Deviation 
               - Overleveraged 
               - Underleveraged 
          Absolute Deviation 
 
 
-Dummy variable equals 1, if actual lev. is above target lev. and zero, otherwise 
-Dummy variable equals 1, if actual lev is below target lev.and zero, otherwise 
The absolute  value of the difference b/n actual leverage and target leverage 
Size  Ln (Total assets) 
Growth  Percentage of change in assets 
Liquidity  Ratio of liquid asset to total asset  
Regulatory pressure for risk-
weighted capital adequacy  
Dummy variable equals 1, if average capital ratio of all banks in period t (ACt ) exceeds 
capital ratio of bank i in period t (Cit),and zero, if ACt <= Cit.   
Ownership  Dummy variable equals 1, if a bank is privately owned and zero, otherwise 
 
 
 
  
99 
 
5.2.1.3. Methods of Data Collection 
 
In the panel or longitudinal research design, the study used secondary data. These secondary data 
have been collected through document review of audited annual financial reports consisting of 
balance sheet, income statements, cash flow statements and the related supporting materials, of 
selected commercial banks. To check data consistency, annual reports of commercial banks to the 
National Bank of Ethiopia that are available for public use have been also collected. This type of 
data collection provides unbalanced panel data set of observations across banks over the period 
ranging from 2000 to 2012. 
5.2.1.4. Methods of Data Analysis/Econometric Panel Data Model Specification 
 
The study employed the quantitative methods of data analysis. Specifically, the researcher used 
both the static and dynamic panel data regression models. These panel data models are expected 
to address the different aspects of the problem under study and to be complementary to each 
other (Wooldridge, 2002; Konan, 2008). Obviously, to investigate the determinants of capital 
structure, the study estimates the econometric static panel data regression model. Besides, the 
dynamic panel data models that help to investigate the capital structure adjustment dynamics of 
banks have also been estimated.  
5.2.1.4.1.  Static Panel Model 
 
In this study, the static panel model has been used to investigate the determinants of the capital 
structure of banks in a static framework (Drobetz & Wanzenried, 2006). In this model, the capital 
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structure of banks is assumed to be dependent linearly on observable determinants and 
unobservable effects (Frank & Goyal, 2004; Lemmon et al., 2008). If any of these factors is found 
to be significant in estimations, it confirms the relevance of the capital structure decisions in the 
banks of Ethiopia. On the other hand, it rejects the randomness or the leverage irrelevance 
proposition propounded by Modigliani & Miller (1958)(Gaud et al., 2003). Following previous 
empirical studies (Gropp & Heider, 2009; Çağlayan & Sak, 2010), the static panel model equation 
to be estimated has been specified as in equation (1): 
                        Lit =   β0 + Σ βjXjit-1 + υi + γt + vit                                    (1)        
 
where, Lit is leverage of bank i in period t. β0 is the constant term.βj is the coefficient of the j
th set 
of explanatory variables. Xjit-1 is the jth set of explanatory variables of bank i at time t-1. These 
explanatory variables (Xjit-1) include effective tax rate, profitability, growth, collateral values of 
assets, size, earnings volatility, minimum paid up capital regulation and regulatory pressure for 
capital adequacy dummy variables, as defined in Table 5.1. Besides, all these explanatory variables 
(Xjit-1), except the regulatory pressure variables, lagged one year to reduce simultaneity bias 
(Wooldridge, 2002; Gropp &  Heider, 2009). υi is the unobservable time-invariant bank-specific 
effect. γt is the unobserved firm-invariant time-specific effect. vit is the disturbance term. 
 
In estimating model equation (1), the three commonly used estimators in the literature include 
pooled OLS, fixed effect and random effect model estimators (Wooldridge, 2002). The pooled 
OLS estimator implicitly assumes the homogeneity of firms (Green, 2003). Hence, Pooled OLS 
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estimates will be inefficient in the presence of unobservable firm-specific effect (Lemmon et al., 
2008). The static panel model equation (1) would control the possible unobservable bank-specific 
effect (υi). Besides, it controls the unobservable time-specific effect (γt) from changes in the 
macroeconomic factors and regulatory forces other than capital regulation (Kleff & Weber, 2004; 
Lemmon et al., 2008; Gropp & Heider, 2009). However, in the presence of unobservable bank-
specific effect, either fixed effect or random effect static panel model estimator may be appropriate 
for estimating equation (1) (Wooldridge, 2002).  
Then, in estimating model equation (1), firstly, testing would be conducted for the presence of an 
unobserved bank-specific effect, and then, in its presence, the fixed effect and the random effect 
panel data estimators would be compared. In testing the presence of unobserved fixed effect, the 
Lagrange Multiplier test (LM test) would be used. In LM test, the null hypothesis is the 
unobservable firm-specific effect is not relevant to explain the dependent variable. If the null 
hypothesis is rejected, the fixed effect or random effect panel model estimators would be more 
appropriate than pooled OLS and vice versa (Park, 2009). In the presence of unobserved bank-
specific effect, the Hausman test would be conducted in order to compare and choose either the 
fixed effect or the random effect estimator (Green, 2003; Wooldrige, 2002). In Hausman test, the 
null hypothesis is that no correlation exists between unobserved effect and explanatory variables 
(Green, 2003; Wooldrige, 2002). If the null hypothesis is rejected, the fixed effect estimator would 
be chosen rather than random effect and vice versa27 (Wooldridge, 2002). 
                                                          
27 In fixed effect model, the unobserved effect will be captured by intercepts that will vary across individual banks 
and/or time and estimation would be made using least square dummy variable or within FE estimator (Green, 2003; 
Park, 2009). In contrast, in the random effect model, the unobserved effect will be the part of the error term, assuming 
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Furthermore, the panel data set may be susceptible to problems of heteroskedasticty and serial 
correlations. Thus, in testing for the possible presence of heteroskedasticty, the modified Wald test 
for group-wise or panel heteroskedasticiy with the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity would be 
used. Moreover, in testing serial correlation, the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
for the null hypothesis of no-first-order autocorrelation would be conducted (Cameron & Trivedi, 
2009). Thus, in estimating model equation(1), whether there is the  fixed effect or the random 
effect model estimator, standard errors will be clustered at the bank level to have unbiased 
standard errors due to the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlations of errors 
(Peterson, 2007; Gropp & Heider, 2009). Further, to test the presence of unobserved time-specific 
effect, the joint test will also be carried out with the null hypothesis that all year dummy coefficients 
equal to zero.   
 
5.2.1.4.2. Dynamic Panel Model-Capital Structure Adjustment Dynamics 
 
The study employed the dynamic panel model to investigate the capital structure adjustment 
dynamics of banks. Due to the possible presence of adjustment costs, banking firms may not 
rebalance their capital structure instantaneously to attain the target capital structure. Rather, they 
may tend to adjust partially to revert towards the target through time (Myers, 1984). Likewise, 
banks having different characteristics may face adjustment costs differently. As a result, there may 
be an asymmetric target adjustment or a heterogeneous speed of adjustment. Thus, this subsection 
specifies the dynamic panel models to be estimated in examining the adjustment dynamics. In 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the same slopes across individual banks and /or time, and the generalized least square (GLS) random effect estimator 
will have efficient estimates.  
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doing so, the symmetrical target capital structure adjustment model has been firstly specified. 
Then, it is followed by the asymmetrical target capital structure adjustment and heterogeneous 
target adjustments model specifications. 
5.2.1.4.2.1. Symmetrical -Partial Target Capital Structure Adjustment Model 
 
In the absence of adjustment costs, capital structure adjustment is assumed to be instantaneous. 
This implies that, at a given point in time, the observed capital structure equals the optimal or 
target capital structure. In the dynamic perspective, this instantaneous adjustment would occur only 
if the actual change in capital ratio or leverage in a given period equals the change in capital ratio or 
leverage needed to be at the desired or target level (Heishemti, 2001).  
 
However, due to the possible presence of adjustment costs, there may not be a complete 
adjustment; rather, firms may tend to adjust partially towards the long-run target capital structure 
through time (Myers, 1984; Heishemti, 2001). This target capital structure adjustment dynamics is 
predicted in the tradeoff (dynamic) theory of capital structure (Myers, 1984; Fischer et al., 1989).  
 
Therefore, to examine the partial target capital structure adjustment dynamics of banks, the partial 
capital structure adjustment model (Marcus ,1983; Flannery & Rangan ,2006; Brewer et al., 2008) 
can be stated as in equation(2): 
                     Lit -  Lit-1 =  λ (L*it   -  Lit-1) +  εit                                      (2) 
Rearranging equation (2), the partial adjustment model to be estimated can be specified as in 
equation (3): 
               Lit =   (1- λ) Li,t-1  +  λ L
*
it   +  εit                                        (3)  
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where, Lit is the actual leverage of bank i in period t and Lit-1   is the lagged actual leverage in 
period t-1. Lit
*   is target leverage of bank i in period t.  λ is the partial adjustment coefficient that 
shows the speed of adjustment towards the target. In equation (3), the speed of adjustment (λ) will 
be one minus coefficient of lagged leverage (Flannery & Hankins, 2007).  εit   is the error term.   
 
The partial adjustment coefficient λ, is inversely related with adjustment costs. Further, it is 
expected that 0 ≤ λ ≤1. If λ = 0, there is no observed adjustment towards target capital structure 
due to prohibitive adjustment costs. If λ = 1, it implies the absence of adjustment costs and 
adjustment towards the desired capital structure is instantaneous. If λ is close to 1, there is a high 
speed of adjustment of banks towards the target due to low adjustment costs. On the contrary, λ 
close to zero implies the presence of high costs of adjustment and hence a slow speed of 
adjustment towards the target.  It is also possible that λ > 1, which may imply that firms adjust 
more than needed and hence, it is not at its target leverage (Drobetz & Wanzedrid, 2006).  
 
In estimating equation (3), we need to know the target leverage (Lit
* ).  However, Lit
* is not directly 
observable. Following previous studies (Marcus ,1983; Sharp ,1995; De Miguel & Pindado ,2001; 
Ozkan, 2001; Flannery & Rangan, 2006;  Brewer et al., 2008), the target  capital structure (Lit
*) of 
banks will be a linear function of a set of exogenous observable factors and unobservable effects in 
equation (1)(Lemmon et al.,2008)28. However, given the factors in equation (1), we may use a two-
                                                          
28  Lit
* can also be represented by the historical mean or the moving average of observed leverage (Jalilivand & Harris, 
1984; Shyam & Myers, 1999). However, this approach has been criticized as there is no reason to assume that target 
leverage should remain constant over a period of time (Shyam & Myers, 1999; Heishemti, 2001; Dang et al., 2008).  
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stages or a one-step procedure to estimate equation (3). In the two-stages procedure, firstly, we 
estimate equation (1) to compute the fitted values for the target, and then we use the fitted values 
obtained in the first regression as the proxy for the target in the estimation of equation (4) (Shyam 
& Myers, 1999; Fama & French, 2002). On the other hand, in the one-step procedure, we 
substitute the variables in equation (1) directly into equation (4) to investigate the partial capital 
structure adjustment process in a single equation (Ozkan , 2001; De Miguel & Pindado ,2001; 
Flannery & Rangan, 2006). Therefore, the study investigated the partial capital structure 
adjustment process of banks, by substituting the factors in equation (1) for Lit* into equation (3) 
(Marcus, 1983; Sharp, 1995; De Miguel & Pindado ,2001; Ozkan,2001; Flannery & Rangan, 2006;  
Brewer et al., 2008) and, estimating a single partial adjustment model equation (4) : 
        Lit     =   α0 + αkLi,t-1  +   Σ αjXj,i,t-1 + ηi  + θt +  εit                                    (4)      
  
 Where, α0=   λβ0, αk=   1- λ, αj=   λβj, ηi =   λυi, and, θt =   λγt 
 
In estimating the dynamic panel model specified in equation (4), the presences of a lagged 
explained variable, as one of the explanatory variables, and the unobserved bank-specific fixed 
effect are worthy of consideration. In the presence of the  lagged dependent variable that may be 
endogenous to the unobserved effect contained in the error term, estimating equation(4)  based on 
the ordinary least square method (OLS) will be inconsistent and biased up ward (Roodman, 2007; 
Wooldrige, 2002). One way to deal with the problem of an unobserved bank-specific effect is to 
transform the lagged dependent variable and to remove the fixed effect based on the fixed effect 
estimators (Wooldridge, 2002; Roodman, 2007). However, because of the correlations between 
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the transformed lagged dependent variable and the transformed error tern, the fixed effect 
estimator coefficients may also be biased (Wooldridge, 2002). 
 
Then, to deal with the problems of the OLS and fixed effect estimators, the study  used the 
Arellano and Bond (1991) Difference GMM estimator to estimate the dynamic panel model 
equation(4).  Arellano and Bond (1991) developed efficient estimate in Generalized Methods of 
Momentum (GMM) based on the first difference and instrument variables. In this estimator, we 
will use the first difference to eliminate the unobserved effect, and then the first differenced 
endogenous variables will be instrumented with its past levels (Gaud et al., 2003). However, the 
Difference GMM estimator will be consistent, if there is no second-order serial correlation 
between the error term and the first differenced equation (Green, 2003; Flannery & Hankins, 
2007; Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). Thus, the present researcher chose to use Arellano and Bond 
(AR2) test for the second-order serial correlation. Besides, the use of too many instruments relative 
to the number of cross-sectional observations is known to over-fit endogenous variable, and hence 
it will create biased estimate (Roodman, 2007). Due to this, the Sargan test would be used to test 
the over-identifying restrictions (Roodman, 2007). 
 
However, the Difference GMM estimator may provide biased estimates, especially when there is a 
persistent data series in a bank’s leverage (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Roodman, 2007). More 
specifically, lagged levels will produce weak instruments for the first differenced endogenous 
variables (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Roodman, 2007). For this reason, the study also employed the 
System GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). System GMM provides efficient 
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estimate in the presence of a persistent data series (Huang & Ritter, 2009). Particularly, in the 
system GMM estimator, we take the first difference of equation (4). Then, we will estimate 
simultaneously the systems of level equation (4), by using lagged differences as instruments and the 
difference equation, by using the lagged levels as instruments (Roodman, 2007; Huang & Ritter, 
2009). But the system GMM is also valid only in the absence of second-order autocorrelation in 
the differenced error term. Hence, the study would use the Arellano and Bond (AR2) test for 
second-order serial correlation. To test the validity of the instrument, the Sargan test for the over-
identifying restriction is also employed in this estimation. 
5.2.1.4.2.2.  Asymmetrical Target Capital Structure Adjustment Model 
 
The specified partial target capital structure adjustment model equations (2) to (4)( Marcus ,1983; 
Sharp, 1995; De Miguel & Pindado, 2001; Ozkan, 2001; Flannery & Rangan, 2006;  Brewer et al., 
2008) are based on the implicit assumptions of a symmetrical target capital structure adjustment 
(Farhat,2003). All banks are assumed to adjust toward the target at a homogeneous speed of 
adjustment (Dang et al., 2012). However, the target capital structure adjustment may be 
asymmetrical for leverage-decreasing (overleveraged) and leverage-increasing (underleveraged) 
banks in rebalancing (Flannery & Hankins, 2007; Byoun, 2008; Faulkender et al., 2012). 
 
Thus, the present study investigates the possible asymmetric speed of the target capital structure 
adjustment of banks that differ in their relative deviations from the target (overleveraged and 
underleveraged). To this end, following Byoun (2008), the study explored the target capital 
structure adjustment, allowing for the possible asymmetric speed of adjustment for both 
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overleveraged and underleveraged banks by using the dummy variable approach, as in estimating 
equation (5): 
  Lit -Lit-1 =  ∆ Lit  =  φ0   +   φ1 (TDEit )Dit above+  φ2 (TDE it ) Dit below +  εit             (5)    
     
Where, ∆Lit  is changes in the actual leverage of banks (Lit - Lit-1). TDEit is the deviation from 
the target leverage (L*it  -  Lit-1). Dit 
above is the dummy variable that equals1 if overleveraged (if 
the actual leverage is above the target leverage (L*it - Lit-1 <0)), and equals zero, otherwise. Dit 
below is dummy variable that equals one if underleveraged (if actual leverage is below target (L*it - 
Lit-1 >0)) and, zero otherwise. εit is error term.   
In estimating equation (5), the study would use the two-stage procedures (Fama & French, 2002). 
In the first stage, being based the factors in equation (1), estimation is to be made based on the 
static panel model estimators to obtain the fitted value of the target leverage (‘Lit
*). In the second 
stage, the fitted value would be used to investigate the variations in the speed of the capital 
structure adjustment process of the overleveraged and underleveraged banks. As the fitted value is 
computed in the first stage, deviations from the target (TDEit) would be computed as the 
difference between the fitted value (‘Lit
*) and the actual lagged leverage ratio (Lit-1) for each bank 
year. Thus, once the deviations from the target are known, comparisons would be made among 
the pooled OLS, the fixed effect and the random effect models, by using the Hausman 
specification test for the fixed or the random effect, and the Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for the 
presence of the unobservable effect to choose an appropriate technique for estimating equation 
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(5). In the estimations, we can investigate the possible asymmetric adjustment by using φ1 and φ2 
(Byoun, 2008). 
5.2.1.4.2.3.  Model of Capital Structure Adjustment with a Heterogeneous Speed of Adjustment 
 
The partial target capital structure adjustment model equations (2) to (4) also implicitly assume that 
the speed of the adjustment coefficient is time-and bank-invariant that it remains the same across 
banks and over time (Farhat, 2003). Besides, the asymmetrical capital structure adjustment model 
equation (5) only focuses on the relative deviation from the target to examine the possible 
variations in the speed of adjustment. However, due to the firm-specific adjustment costs, the 
dynamic capital structure theory predicts the existence of heterogeneity in the adjustment speed of 
firms (Elsas & Florysiak 2011). As firms may differ in their characteristics, they may face 
adjustment costs differently (Dang et al., 2012). As a result, there may be a cross-sectional 
heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment towards the desired capital structure (Berger et al., 2008; 
Elsas & Florysiak 2011; Dang et al., 2012; Faulkender et al., 2012; Lepetit et al., 2012). 
 
In light of this, the present study also investigates the heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment, 
allowing the rate of adjustment (λ) to be varied across banks and over time as in equation (6): 
                          λit=ΦjZit                                                                                             (6) 
 
Where, λit is the rate of adjustment to be varied (to be heterogeneous) across banks with different 
characteristics and over time. Φj is the vector of the coefficients of the adjustment speed functions. 
Zit is the vector of the determinants of the speed of adjustment variables that vary both across 
banks and over time. As stated in Table 5.1, Zit includes the (absolute) deviations from the target, 
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size, growth opportunities (Heishemti, 2001; Drobetz & Wanzedrid, 2006), liquidity (Memmal & 
Raupach, 2007), ownership (Memmal & Raupach, 2007; Lepetit et al., 2012) and regulatory 
pressure for capital adequacy (Berger et al., 2008). 
 
Substituting equation (6) and equation (1) into equation (3) will provide equation (7): 
      Lit =   (1- Φj Zit) Lit-1   +   Φj Zit (β0 + Σ βjXjit-1 + υi + γt )+  εit                (7) 
 
Rearranging equation (7) will yield the following empirical model equation (8) that would be 
estimated to investigate the possible heterogeneity in the speed of the target capital structure 
adjustment: 
  Lit =Lit-1 - Φj Zit Lit-1 + Φj Zit (β0 + Σ βjXj,it-1 + υi + γt )+  εit                        (8)   
 
In estimating equation (8), past studies (Banjeree et al., 2000; Heishemti, 2001; Loof, 2003; De 
Haas & Peeters, 2006) used the nonlinear least square estimators so as to consider the resulting 
nonlinear equation (8) in both parameters and variables. However, the nonlinear estimator may 
lead to biased estimates for equation (8) due to the correlation between the error term and the 
lagged leverage (Drobetz & Wanzedrid, 2006; Zheka, 2008; Khodjamirian, 2008)29. 
In line with the above explanation, the present study used the GMM dynamic panel data 
estimators (Drobetz & Wanzedrid, 2006; Zheka, 2008; Khodjamirian, 2008; Dang et al., 2012) to 
                                                          
 
29 Among other methodological treatments, some recent past studies (Flannery & Hankins, 2007; Byoun, 2008) use the 
sample splitting or dummy variable approach. However, the sample splitting or dummy variable approach may result 
in smple selection problems (Dang et al., 2012). Besides, the DPF estimator will be efficient in the presence of 
censored outcomes at the points of 0 and 1(Elsas & Florysiak, 2011). However, in the context of the present study, 
there is no need to censor the outcome because the study is based on book leverage. 
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estimate equation (8). In this regard, both the Arellano and Bond (1991) Difference GMM 
estimator and the System GMM estimator (Blundell & Bond, 1998) were used (Drobetz & 
Wanzedrid, 2006; Zheka, 2008). As stated earlier, in Difference GMM estimator, the first 
difference will eliminate the unobserved fixed effect and the first differenced endogenous variables 
will be instrumented with its past level. For the Difference GMM estimator to be consistent and 
unbiased, testing was carried out for the presence of second-order autocorrelation (AR2). In 
addition, the Sargan test would also be carried out to test the over-identifying restrictions 
(Roodman, 2007). However, in the presence of a persistent panel data series, Arellano & Bover 
(1995) pointed out that the Difference GMM estimator is inefficient, and thereby the proposed the 
System GMM estimator as efficient (Blundell & Bond, 1998). Based on thus, the present study 
also re-estimates equation (8) using the System GMM estimator (Khodjamirian, 2008). Once again, 
both the test for the presence of the second-order autocorrelation and the Sargan test for the over-
identifying restrictions have been conducted in the System GMM. 
5.2.2. Cross-Sectional Survey 
 
To complement and substantiate the possible findings based on the panel data model estimations, 
the study also employed a cross-sectional survey design. Hence, this section describes the sampling 
design, measurement instruments, methods of data collection and methods of data analysis used in 
the cross-sectional survey design respectively. 
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5.2.2.1. Target Population, Unit of Analysis and Sample 
 
The unit of analysis of the cross-sectional survey study has been comprised of chief financial 
officers (CFOs)30 of banks.  As stated earlier, the population of banks in Ethiopia is constituted of 
three public banks and fifteen privately owned banks. Then, in our case, the target population of 
the cross-sectional survey research is defined as being comprised of all the CFOs of these eighteen 
banks which are registered as incorporated banks under the proclamations of NBE. To obtain the 
sample of the study, two exclusion criteria have been used.  Firstly, from the public-owned banks, 
Development Bank of Ethiopia is the specialized government-owned bank that mainly focuses on 
financing long-term public projects and that uses different funding sources. Hence, as its financing 
sources differ from that of other commercial banks, the CFO of Development Bank of Ethiopia 
has been excluded from the survey. Secondly, as the capital structure decision is expected to span 
at least a year (Marques & Santos, 2000), the CFOs of banks having less than one year of tenure 
have also been excluded.  In this regard, the CFOs of private banks, including the CFOs of Enat 
Bank and Debub Global Bank, have been excluded from the survey study. 
As a result, the sample constitutes all selected 15 CFOs of fifteen banks with a minimum of one 
year of tenure. In this respect, one questionnaire was distributed to each selected CFOs of the 
banks which are registered as incorporated banks under the proclamations of NBE. 
 
                                                          
30
  It also constitutes Finance Directors/Finance managers, Fund managers, Treasurers and Controllers, depending on 
the organizational structure of banks. 
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5.2.2.2. Measurement Instrument for Cross-Sectional Survey 
 
The survey questionnaire has been first drafted based on the review of factors predicted in the 
theoretical models and the available survey studies on the capital structure decision of firms 
(Pinegar & Wilbricht, 1989; Allen, 1991; Graham & Harvey, 2001; Bancel & Mitto, 2004; Beattie 
et al., 2006; Archbold & Lazirdis, 2010; Nor et al., 2012); and appropriate modifications to the 
questionnaire were made in line with the context of banking firms in Ethiopia (Wong et al., 2004). 
Then, the pilot test was conducted based on the questionnaire drafted and then distributed using 
the convenience sample of academics and research colleagues at Bahir Dar University. Next, the 
formats, wordings and contents of the questionnaire have been revised and/or modified 
accordingly (Beattie et al., 2006; Nor et al., 2012). 
Besides, to facilitate the completion of the questionnaire and to obtain the relevant information, 
the survey questionnaire of the study is structured into three main sections. The first section is an 
introduction, constituting a cover letter (1) that explains the purpose of the research and the 
importance of the responses to be gathered and (2) that assures the anonymity of the respondents 
and the confidentiality of their responses (De Jong & van Dijk, 2001; Beattie et al., 2006). The 
second section consists of substantive questions related to the conceptual framework of the study 
and/or factors determining the capital structure decision and capital structure adjustment dynamics 
of financial firms, as are predicted in the theoretical models. Specifically, this section of the 
questionnaire constitutes specific items/questions related to the respondents’ perceptions about the 
determinants of the capital structure and capital structure adjustment dynamics. Besides, all 
questions about the determinants of the capital structure are formulated using a Likert scale that 
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uses five graded responses to each of the statements (questions), including: Strongly Agree(Strongly 
Important) (5), Agree(Important) (4), Undecided (3), Disagree(Little Important) (2) and Strongly 
Disagree(Not Important) (1) (De Jong et al., 2003; Beattie et al., 2006). Nevertheless, questions 
about the capital structure adjustment dynamics are also stated in the nominal scale‒Yes or No 
question type and/or multiple choice question type (De Jong et al., 2003; Beattie et al., 2006). 
Finally, the third section of the questionnaire contains classifying questions concerned with the 
demographics of the respondents (CFOs) and firmographics (bank characteristics).    
5.2.2.3. Methods of Data Collection 
 
In the cross-sectional field survey design, primary data has been collected from the selected CFOs 
of banks under study. To be precise, the primary data can be collected from the respondents 
(CFOs of banks) using two data collection methods: a face-to-face interview and a self-administered 
questionnaire (Bhattacherjee, 2012). Using the face-to-face interview survey format provides an 
avenue to clarify questions to respondents and is expected to decrease the non-response bias 
(Marques & Santos, 2003; Bhattacherjee, 2012).  However, the face-to-face interview survey format 
may not be welcomed by respondents who, for one reason or another, want to remain anonymous 
(Bhattacherjee, 2012). For this main reason, the present researcher decided to use only a self-
administered questionnaire for collecting the primary data needed for the study. This method of 
data collection helps to deal with the possible problems of respondents seeking their anonymity 
and confidentiality of their responses (Bhattacherjee, 2012). Nevertheless, the self-administered 
questionnaire survey is also criticized for the possible or expected non-response bias. Thus, to 
reduce the non-response bias, all the necessary standard techniques have been employed; 
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particularly, great care was taken to ensure the clarity of each of the questions and instructions in 
the questionnaire (Beattie et al., 2006). Besides, the necessary follow-up and reminders to the 
responses//respondents// have been made (Beattie et al., 2006; Bhattacherjee, 2012).  
5.2.2.4. Methods of Data Analysis for Cross-Sectional Survey 
 
In analyzing the cross-sectional survey data, the study used statistical techniques appropriate to the 
measurement scale. Specifically, for ordered or ranked responses, the mean scores were computed 
by assigning scores ranging from 1 to 5 and  corresponding to rankings from “not important” 
(“strongly disagree” ) to “very important” (“strongly agree”) respectively, and by multiplying each 
score by the fraction of responses within each rank (Pinegar & Wilbricht, 1989). The study also 
analyzed the ranked survey responses conditional on firmographics (bank characteristics) and 
tested the significance of the possible differences in the mean scores of ranked responses based on 
the Mann-Whitney non-parametric test (Field, 2009; Nor et al., 2012). The Mann-Whitney non-
parametric test will be appropriate for ranked responses and is expected to be more robust than 
the parametric t-test (Field, 2009). This is especially true in the presence of outliers and the not 
normally distributed samples that would be inherent in small samples (Field, 2009; Chazi et al., 
2010).  Besides, for the nominal scale items, the percentage of responses to the alternative 
categories has been computed (Muijs, 2004). Further, to test the possible differences in the 
responses to the nominal items conditional on bank characteristics, the study also applied the 
likelihood ratio test (Field, 2009). Despite the fact that the likelihood ratio test statistic has a chi-
square distribution and degrees of freedom similar to a chi-square test, the likelihood ratio test is 
appropriate and preferred to the chi-square test in the presence of small samples (Field, 2009). 
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5.3. Research Ethics 
 
The entire process and procedures of the study are designed in due consideration of the ethical 
principles that social science research should follow. Accordingly, standard procedures of a 
quantitative research approach have been applied to both primary and secondary data collection 
and processing (Balnaves & Caputi, 2001; Muijs, 2004; Williman, 2006; Saunders et al., 2009; 
Vanderstoep & Johnston, 2009).  In doing so, a triangulation of data has been conducted to ensure 
the quality and accuracy of the data, particularly for secondary data. Specifically, secondary data 
have been collected from both the annual reports of each commercial bank and the annual reports 
of banks to National Bank of Ethiopia that are available for public use. Besides, in designing the 
survey instrument and in gathering responses, standard ethical issues, including informed consent, 
privacy, anonymity and confidentiality of the research participants have been applied/respected 
(Muijs, 2004; Williman, 2006; Vanderstoep & Johnston, 2009). 
5.4. Methodological Limitations 
 
Despite the strengths of the methodologies of the study, there are also limitations. Firstly, due to 
market data unavailability in Ethiopia, the measure of the dependent variable of the study, 
leverage, has been limited to the use of book values. Hence, this may limit the interpretations of 
findings and create a difficulty in comparing the findings of the study with the documented 
evidences in other countries. Secondly, both in the theoretical and empirical literature on the 
subject, the interrelationships between the corporate governance of banks and the capital structure 
adjustment dynamics have been documented (Zwiebel, 2006). However, due to the difficulty in 
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accessing data for a wide range of corporate governance variables, the study failed to examine the 
relationship between corporate governance and the capital structure adjustment dynamics of 
banks. Thirdly, the limitation of the study may be related to the proxy variables used for the 
operationalization of constructs. Even if the proxies used in the study are empirically tested, they 
may still imperfectly represent all the dimensions of the unobservable constructs predicted in the 
theoretical model (Titman & Wessels, 1988). Besides, it is often difficult to find measures of a 
particular unobservable attribute or proxies that are unrelated to the other (Titman & Wessels, 
1988). Fourthly, the study focused on the analysis of the capital structure decision of banks 
operating in a single country. Hence, the study does not consider the cross-country differences in 
macroeconomic and regulatory factors. This may limit the implications (robustness) of the findings 
for the determinants and capital structure adjustment dynamics of banks. Finally, due to the 
limited size of the target population and then due to limited sample size, the survey instrument is 
designed to investigate the determinants and the dynamics of the capital structure adjustment based 
on the relations examined. Hence, if the survey instrument has been designed in such a way that it 
directly gathered evidence on the determinants rather than the relations to be examined and other 
methods of data analysis, like structural equation modeling, were applied, the findings of the study 
might be different and provide additional insights (De Jong & van Dijk, 2001; De Jong et al., 
2003)31. 
 
 
                                                          
31 The relationship may be examined by regressing the responses to the determinants and financing decisions using the 
structured equation modeling (De Jong & van Dijk, 2001; De Jong et al., 2003)31. 
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CHAPTER SIX: RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
6.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the results the analysis of the empirical data on the determinants and the 
capital structure adjustment dynamics and it discusses the results in relation to the theoretical and 
prior empirical literature on the subject in question. In so doing, the chapter has been classified 
into two main sections (i.e., sections 6.2 & 6.3, which are further divided into subsections). Of 
these two main sections, the former describes the empirical results of the econometric panel 
model estimations and the results of the cross-sectional survey; and the second section primarily 
constitutes the discussion of the results documented in secondary data-based panel models and 
cross-sectional survey.  
6.2. Results  
 
This section of the chapter, as stated above, reveals the estimation results of the empirical 
investigation into the determinants of the capital structure and the target capital structure 
adjustment dynamics of banks in Ethiopia. Then, the first subsection unveils the documented 
results on the determinants and dynamics of the capital structure adjustment of banks based on 
estimations of the static and dynamic panel models specified in the preceding chapters. Most 
specifically, the results of the determinants of capital structure within a static framework and of the 
capital structure adjustment dynamics―including the symmetrical, asymmetrical and 
heterogeneous capital structure adjustment dynamics―have been described, respectively, under 
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the subsequent subsections. In addition, the findings documented in the panel model estimations 
have been complemented and/or corroborated by the cross-sectional survey results of the 
determinants of capital structure and the target capital structure setting behavior and adjustment 
dynamics of the Ethiopian banks under study.  
6.2.1. Empirical Results of Econometric Panel Model Estimations 
 
To investigate the determinants and the dynamics of the capital structure of banks in question, 
secondary data-based panel study was used in the present research. To this end, panel data were 
collected from the annual reports of selected commercial banks operational in Ethiopia over the 
period ranging from 2000 to 2012. Then, the summary statistics and correlation matrix, and the 
empirical results of both the static panel model and the dynamic panel model estimations have 
been presented, respectively, under the next three subsections. 
6.2.1.1. Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 
Based on the panel data collected from selected commercial banks of Ethiopia over a period of 
time ranging from 2000 to 2012, the descriptive statistics have been reported in Table 6.1 below. 
As pointed out in one of the preceding chapters, the scope of the present study was confined to the 
selected fourteen commercial banks in Ethiopia and the necessary data were collected within a 
period of time stated above32.   
                                                          
32  These selected banks represent around 66.7% of all banks operational in Ethiopia under the proclamation of NBE 
as of the end of the year 2012. 
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In other words, as indicated in the subsection 5.2.1.1, due to the lag nature of the analysis, the data 
were collected only from banks operational for at least three consecutive years during the given 
time frame of the study. These secondary panel data were obtained from bank’s annual report and 
from the annual reports of each bank to the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE)33. Then, based on 
the analysis of the collected data, the descriptive statistics, including mean, median, standard 
deviation, minimum and maximum values for the continuous variables-dependent variable and 
independent variables, have been depicted in Table 6.1 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
33 For most selected banks, these data are also readily available from their websites. Besides, the data were available in 
NBE during a period time from 2000 to 2012 were collected in order to crosscheck the consistency of data and ensure 
the accuracy of data. 
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    Table 6.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable34 Obs35 Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max 
Leverage 124 0.870 0.886 0.066 0.455 0.963 
Panel A Determinants of Capital Structure 
Effective Tax Rate 124 0.288 0.293 0.148 0.000 0.911 
Profitability 124 0.045 0.051 0.020 -0.017 0.100 
Growth 120a 0.389 0.298 0.332 -0.019 2.486 
Collaterals   124 0.019 0.015 0.012 0.006 0.079 
Size 124 21.476 21.312 1.426 18.146 25.462 
Earning Volatility  109b 0.011 0.008 0.010 0.001 0.060 
Panel B Determinants of Rate of Adjustment 
Deviation 109 0.030 0.023 0.031 0.002 0.179 
Growth 120a 0.389 0.298 0.332 -0.019 2.486 
Size 124 21.476 21.312 1.426 18.146 25.462 
Liquidity 124 0.407 0.389 0.134 0.142 1.115 
Notes: Leverage is one minus the ratio of equity capital to total assets of banks, in book values. Effective tax rate is the 
ratio of tax paid to net income before tax. Profitability is earning before interest and taxes over total assets. Growth: the 
percentage of change in total assets of banks. Collateral is the ration of tangible assets to total asset. Size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. Earning Volatility is the standard deviation of return on asset over the past consecutive three 
years. Deviation is the absolute value of the difference between observed leverage and target leverage where target 
leverage is obtained as the fitted value of FE regression of leverage on the selected determinants. Liquidity is the ratio 
of liquid asset to total asset. 
 
As shown in results of descriptive statistics in Table 6.1, the leverage of banks in Ethiopia has a 
mean value of 87% and median value of 88.6%. The leverage of banks ranges from the minimum 
of 45.5% to the maximum of 96.3%, with the standard deviation of 6.6%. The result implies that 
the banking firms are quite leveraged and that the observed leverage relatively clusters around the 
                                                          
34 As the determinants of capital structure, minimum capital requirement and regulatory pressure for capital adequacy 
and, as the determinant of the rate of adjustment, ownership of banks are the dummy variables, and hence, not 
included in the descriptive statistics. 
35 All variables cover the panel data set of 124 observations. However, the loss of some observations on two variables of 
growth (a) and earning volatility (b) can be traced to their measurement and unavailability of past data. To obtain the 
meaningful measures of growth and earnings volatility, at least 2 and at least 3 consecutive years of operation of banks 
are required, respectively. 
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mean (Bhattacherjee, 2012). This result is not surprising as it is natural to the banking business. In 
comparison to the documented past evidences in the banking firms of both developed and 
developing countries, these statistical results of the book leverage of banks in Ethiopia are also  
generally fairly alike. For example, the reported mean value and median value of the book leverage 
of the US and European banks were 92.6% and 92.7%, respectively (Gropp & Heider, 2009). 
Similarly, the documented results of the leverage of banks in Ethiopia are close to the reported 
mean value of 91.7% and median value of 92.7% of the leverage of banks in developing countries 
(Octavia & Brown, 2008). However, the mean book leverage of banks is relatively higher in 
comparison to the reported mean book leverage of nonfinancial firms. For example, the mean 
book leverage of nonfinancial firms in G-7 countries was 66% (Rajan & Zinglas, 1995). Similarly, it 
is relatively higher than the documented mean value of 51% leverage of nonfinancial firms in 
developing countries (Booth et al., 2001).   
 
The evolution of both mean and median leverage of the selected banks in Ethiopia over time has 
been represented in Figure 6.1 below. The median leverage of the banks was observed to be 
generally stable during a period time from 2000 to 2012. However, the mean value of the leverage 
of banks in Ethiopia fluctuates. There seems a sharp decline in the mean value of the leverage of 
banks approximately during the period between the years 2005 and 2008.  
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Figure 6.1. Evolution of Leverage over time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A in Table 6.1 also reveals the summary statistics for the determinants of capital structure.  
In this regard, the summary statistics results show that the effective tax rate in the banks of Ethiopia 
has a mean value of 28.8% and median value of 29.3%. Even if unremarkable, the reported mean 
value is below the corporate tax rate of 30%. But, effective tax rate is found to be relatively widely 
dispersed. Specifically, the observed effective tax rate during the study period ranges from the 
minimum of 0.00 to the maximum of 91.1% with the standard deviation of 14.8%. This statistical 
result of the effective tax rate may reflect two basic reasons. First, in measuring the effective tax 
rate, any possible negative value and values greater than 1 are constrained to be zero (Sharp, 1995). 
Hence, the dispersion of effective tax rate may reflect the documented net loss and/or tax loss 
carried forward on some banking firms observed in different period(s). Second, the tax provision 
of banks also constitutes the tax to be paid on the interest earned on deposits in other banks at the 
fairly low tax rate of 5% (Income Tax Proclamation No 286/2002). Profitability of banks in 
Ethiopia has the mean value of 4.5% and median value of 5.1%. The reported result of the 
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profitability of banks ranges from the minimum of -1.7% to the maximum of 10%, with the 
standard deviation of 2%. In comparison to the documented evidences in the banking firms, the 
profitability of banks in Ethiopia is equally comparable to the reported mean value of 5.1% and 
median value of 4.9% of profitability in the US and European banks (Gropp & Heider, 2009), 
mean value of 6.7% and median value of 5.9% of profitability in the banks of selected developing 
countries (Octavia & Brown, 2008), and mean value of 5.38% and median value of 5.38% of 
profitability in the banks of Ghana (Amidu, 2007). However, the mean and median values of the 
profitability of banks in Ethiopia are far below the reported results for profitability of nonfinancial 
firms in both developed (Frank & Goyal, 2004) and developing countries (Booth et al., 2001).  
 
The growth opportunity of banks in Ethiopia has the mean value of 0.389 and median value 0.298. 
However, the result unveiled high variability of the growth opportunity of banks in Ethiopia. It 
ranges from the minimum value of -0.019 to the maximum value of 2.486, with the standard 
deviation value of 0.332. As it is expected, the documented low mean value of 0.019 and median 
value 0.015 of collateral values of assets, with the standard deviation of 0.012, reflect the relatively 
low fixed asset holding of banks in Ethiopia. It holds a high proportion of assets in the form of 
liquid assets and illiquid loans. The mean and median of sizes of the banks are found to be 21.476 
and 21.312, respectively, with the standard deviation of 1.426. It ranges from the minimum value 
of 18.146 to the maximum value of 25.462.  The earnings volatility of the banks has shown a mean 
value of 0.011, a median of 0.008 and a standard deviation of 0.010.  
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Panel B in Table 2 also shows the summary statistics for the determinants of the rate of 
adjustment. Generally, the deviation from the target has a mean value of 0.030 and a median value 
of 0.023. It ranges from the minimum of 0.002 to the maximum of 0.179, with the standard 
deviation of 3.1%. Besides, the mean and median values of liquidity are found to be 40.7% and 
38.9%, respectively. The result on the liquidity of the banks ranges from the minimum of 0.142 to 
the maximum of 1.115, with the standard deviation of 13.4%. 
 
The correlation matrix presented in Table 6.2 shows the existing correlation between the 
dependent variable and explanatory variables, as well as the correlations among the explanatory 
variables.  
Table 6.2. Correlation Matrix 
Note: 1. Lev: is one minus the ratio of equity capital to total assets of banks, in book values. Tax: is the ratio of tax paid 
to net income before tax. Prof: is earning before interest and taxes on total assets. Gro: is the percentage of change in 
total assets of banks, Coll: the ratio of tangible assets to total asset. Size: is the natural logarithm of total assets. Evol: is 
the standard deviation of return on asset over the past consecutive three years. McR: is the dummy variable for the 
minimum paid up capital regulation. RgP: is the dummy variable for regulatory pressure for capital adequacy.  Dev: is 
the absolute value of the difference between observed leverage and target leverage. Liq: is the ratio of liquid assets to 
total assets. Bo: is the dummy variable for ownership of banks that takes a value of 1 if private and zero, otherwise. 2. 
Correlation coefficients: are statistically *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; and * 
significant at 10% level. 
 
Var Lev    Tax Prof Gro Coll Size     Evol Mcr Rgp Dev Liq Bo 
Lev 1.000             
Tax 0.432** 1.000           
Prof 0.315** 0.486** 1.000          
Gro -0.411** -0.306** -0.187** 1.000         
Coll -0.168 -0.128 -0.284** 0.071 1.000        
Size 0.571** 0.200** 0.316** -0.418** -0.489** 1.000       
Evol  -0.136 -0.177 -0.037 0.495** -0.013 -0.255** 1.000      
McR -0.013 0.415** 0.074 0.030 0.212** -0.323** -0.037  1.000     
Rgp 0.559** 0.350** 0.244** -0.414 -0.034 0.391** -0.379** 0.094 1.000    
Dev -0.437** -0.134 -0.202** 0.201** 0.099 -0.327** 0.227** 0.050 -0.291** 1.000   
Liq -0.401** -0.409** -0.312** 0.267** -0.116 -0.095 0.286** -0.206** -0.414** 0.056 1.000  
Bo -0.421** -0.182** 0.057 0.370** -0.003 -0.475** 0.085 -0.030 -0.303** 0.098 0.213** 1.000 
  
126 
 
As shown in Table 6.2, the effective tax rate is positively correlated with the leverage of banks. 
Further, the variables of profitability, size of banks and the regulatory pressure for capital adequacy 
were found to be statistically significant and positively correlated with the leverage of banks. 
However, the growth opportunities were found to be negatively correlated with leverage. Similarly, 
the leverage of the Ethiopian banks under analysis was found to be negatively correlated with their 
deviation from the target, liquidity and ownership.  
 
Moreover, in the correlation matrix provided in Table 6.2, large banks were also found to be 
enjoying relatively lower growth opportunities and lower collateral value of assets; and  these banks 
were more profitable and less prone to earning volatility,  were facing low regulatory pressure for 
capital adequacy and publicly owned. Further, the growth opportunity of banks is positively 
correlated with the earnings volatility. 
6.2.1.2. Empirical Results of Static Panel Model Estimations 
 
This section covers the statistical analysis in estimations of the specified static panel data model 
equation (1). The specified static panel model relates the leverage of banks, as the dependent 
variable, with a set of explanatory variables―corporate finance set of determinants and pertinent 
regulatory forces. The corporate finance set of determinants are supposed to capture the factors 
predicted in the tradeoff and the pecking order theoretical models of capital structure, including 
effective tax rate, profitability, growth, collateral values of assets, size and earnings volatility. 
Moreover, the pertinent regulatory forces include the minimum paid up capital regulation and the 
regulatory pressure on the capital adequacy dummy variables. Hence, estimation of the static panel 
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model equation (1) provides empirical results for investigating the determinants of the capital 
structure of banks within a static framework. Specifically, the estimation result of the specified static 
panel model is closely linked with the first and the second sub-questions (specific objectives) and 
the formulated first and second hypotheses of the research.  To this end, this subsection describes 
the comparisons in the selection of appropriate estimation techniques for the specified panel 
model and the assumption/specification tests, and then it discloses the estimation results. 
A) Comparison  and Selection of Estimation Techniques 
In estimating the specified static panel model, the study compared three possible estimators, 
including the pooled OLS, random effect and fixed effect estimators, in order to choose the 
appropriate estimator, as shown in Table 6.3. These estimators are valid and efficient under 
specific assumptions. Hence, the study primarily tested the presence of unobserved bank-specific 
effect. In the presence of unobserved effect, the study also tested the presence of correlations 
between unobserved bank-specific effect and explanatory variables specified in the model.  
In testing the presence of unobserved bank-specific effect, the study used the Breusch & Pagan 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test. This test helps to compare the pooled OLS and the panel data 
model estimators (random effect or fixed effect estimators) (Wooldridge, 2002; Green, 2003). The 
test result revealed the LM test statistic of 6.75 (p > χ2 = 0.010). This implies that the test rejects the 
null hypothesis that the unobservable bank-specific effect is not relevant to explain the dependent 
variable at the level of 1% statistical significance. As a result, due to the omitted variable bias in 
neglecting the unobservable effect, the pooled OLS is not an efficient estimator (Wooldridge, 
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2002). This implies that the static panel data model estimator (either the random effect or the fixed 
effect estimator) is preferred to the pooled OLS estimator (Wooldridge, 2002).  
Moreover, in testing the presence of correlations between the unobserved bank-specific effect and 
the explanatory variables, the study employed the Hausman specification test (Wooldridge, 2002; 
Green, 2003). The Hausman test helps to compare the random effect and fixed effect estimators 
(Wooldridge, 2002; Green, 2003). To this end, the test result revealed the Hausman test statistic of 
60.95 (p > χ2 = 0.0000). The result implies that the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that 
the unobservable bank-specific effects are not correlated with the regressors at 1% level of statistical 
significance (Green, 2003). Thus, the fixed effect panel model estimator was chosen as an 
appropriate estimator for the static panel model equation rather than random effect estimator.  
B) Assumption Testing 
In examining the validity of the assumptions of the chosen fixed effect estimator, different tests 
have also been conducted. Firstly, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) has been used to test the 
possible multicollinearity problem. The presence of the possible high correlations among the 
independent variables may imply the presence of the multicollinearity problem. As it is difficult to 
isolate the separate effect of the regressor on the dependent variable, multicollinearity may result in 
inefficient estimates (Gujarati, 2004). Specifically, in the presence of multicollinearity, estimations 
may lead to inflated variance–covariance(Wooldridge, 2002). In addition, it may results in the high 
measure-of-goodness-fit, given few significant coefficients (Gujarati, 2004). Hence, the use of the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is intended to capture the extent to which the variance of 
estimators has been inflated due to the correlations in regressors (Gujarati, 2004). As a rule of 
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thumb, a VIF greater than 10 indicates the presence of the problem of multicollinearity (Gujarati, 
2004). In the light of this, the results of the VIF test showed that the mean VIF for all the variables 
included in the model is 1.51, which confirms the absence of the multicollinearity problem 
(Gujariti, 2004; Ziad, 2009). The study also tested for the possible multicollinearity problem based 
on the scrutiny of the correlation matrix as depicted in Table 6.2 above. In using the correlation 
matrix, the presence of high correlations of the independent variables indicates the presence of the 
problem of multicollinearity (Gujaritie, 2004). As a rule of thumb, if the correlation between 
explanatory variables is found to be more than 0.8, it indicates the presence of a multicollinearity 
problem (Gujariti, 2004; Anderson et al., 1999, cited in Ziad, 2009). Here, the correlation matrix 
presented in Table 6.2 again confirms the absence of the multicollinearity problem as the 
correlation between regressors was found to be lower than 0.6.  
 
Secondly, as the present study uses the panel data set, it may be prone to the problems of 
heteroskedasticity. Hence, suitably to panel data set, testing for the possible presence of 
heteroskedasticity has been conducted based on the Modified Wald test for group-wise or panel 
heteroskedasticity. Then, on the basis of the test result, the Modified Wald test for group-wise or 
panel heteroskedasticity rejects the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity at 1% statistical significance 
level, in favor of the alternative hypothesis for the presence of heteroskedasticity.  Thirdly, the 
panel data set may also face a problem of autocorrelation. Then, based on its appropriateness to 
the panel data set, the study used the Wooldridge Test for autocorrelation. As the result, the 
Wooldridge Test for autocorrelation in panel data rejects the null hypothesis of no-first-order 
autocorrelation at 1% statistical significance level. It implies that there exists a serial correlation. In 
  
130 
 
this respect, following the insights provided by Peterson (2007), it is possible to observe that 
standard errors are robust and clustered at the bank level in estimations to deal with the problems 
of heteroskedasticity and serial correlations (Wooldrdge, 2002; Green, 2003; Gropp & Heider, 
2009). Further, as the regression estimation depends on the normally distributed residuals, the 
study also tested the normality of the residuals (see Annex II).  In doing so, first, residual plots 
have been conducted, and the plot results do not reveal extreme outliers (Cameron & Trevid, 
2009). The same also holds in the normal probability (P-P) plot, where the distribution of residuals 
was found to be normal, though not perfectly. Lastly, despite the fact that the initial test results 
failed to accept the null hypothesis of the Shapiro Wilk test, the second test results failed to reject 
the null hypothesis that residuals (errors) are normally distributed (P value of 0.12946) in 
windorizing the outliers (Field, 2009)36. 
 
C) Estimation Results 
 
Table 6.3 below depicts the chosen fixed effect estimation results of the static panel regression 
model specified to examine the determinants of the capital structure of Ethiopian bank in a static 
framework. However, for the purposes of comparing and checking robustness, the estimation 
results of the pooled OLS and random effect estimators are also shown along with the fixed effect 
estimation results. 
                                                          
36
 The study also tested the linearity of the static panel model based on a scatter plot. Accordingly, the unreported 
scatter plot reveals an acceptable degree of linearity (Field, 2009). 
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Besides, to capture the possible unobserved bank-invariant time-specific effects related to the 
dynamics of macroeconomic factors and regulatory frameworks, other than capital regulation, the 
study also estimates a two-way fixed effect model. A two-way fixed effect model constitutes both the 
unobserved firm effect and unobserved time effect. In this estimation, the possible presence of 
unobservable time effect and the relevance of a time-fixed effect dummy variable have been 
examined using the joint test. The test result disclosed the F statistic of 32.48 (p>F= 0.0000), which 
rejects the null hypothesis that all year dummy coefficients are jointly equal to zero. Hence, the 
unobserved time effects are also considered in the fixed effect estimation. However, for tractable 
comparisons, the estimation results of the pooled OLS, random effect model and fixed effect 
model estimators (for both without and with time effects) are presented in Table 6.3 below.  
Moreover, the null hypothesis for joint insignificance of all coefficients of the estimated parameters 
has been rejected in the Wald and F test at 1% statistical significance level. 
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Table 6.3. Estimation Results of Static Panel Model Equation 
 
Dependent Variable :  Leverage Pooled OLS      Random Effect     Fixed Effect 
Independent Variables OLS_rob RE_rob RE_robT FE_rob FE_robT 
Effective Tax Rate 0.0875*** 0.0875*** 0.0647*** 0.0890** 0.0753*** 
(0.0279) (0.0279) (0.0184) (0.0338) (0.0222) 
Profitability -0.7964*** -0.7964*** -0.1917 -1.0566*** -0.5763** 
(0.2607) (0.2607) (0.2007) (0.3495) (0.2394) 
Growth -0.0225* -0.0225* -0.0042 -0.0143** -0.0123* 
(0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0116) (0.0153) (0.0170) 
Collateral Values 0.2719 0.2719 0.2169 -0.6793 -0.8404 
(0.3472) (0.3472) (0.2936) (1.0011) (0.7023) 
Size 0.0132*** 0.0132*** 0.0174*** 0.0018 0.0154 
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0020) (0.0052) (0.0141) 
Earning  Volatility 0.9671* 0.9671** 1.0148** 0.0293 -0.1828 
(0.4862) (0.4862) (0.4415) (0.4448) (0.3931) 
Minimum Capital Regulation -0.0087 -0.0087 0.0114 -0.0244*** 0.0151 
(0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0186) (0.0069) (0.0425) 
Regulatory pres for cap adequacy 0.0357*** 0.0357*** 0.0481*** 0.0228*** 0.0349*** 
(0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0081) (0.0068) (0.0078) 
Constant 0.5780*** 0.5780*** 0.4248*** 0.8732*** 0.5260 
(0.0733) (0.0733) (0.0565) (0.1167) (0.3185) 
Observation  109 109  109 109 109 
R2 0.5612    0.7554 0.8266 
Adj. R2 0.5261   0.6964 0.7536 
LM (χ2 ) (P> χ2)  6.73***(0.010)    
Hausman (P> χ2)  60.95 (0.000)    
Wald(χ2 ) (P> χ2)  656.79***(0.000) 629.59***(0.000)   
F(P> χ2) 82.10***(0.000)   7.22***(0.001) 4.80***(0.000) 
Root MSE 0.02857   0.0229 0.0206 
Modified Wald test for 
 panel heteroskedasticity χ2  (P> χ2) 
   1.1e+30 
(14)(0.0000) 
 
Wooldridge test for AR F(1,8) (P> χ2)    86.745(0.0000)  
Bank effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year No No Yes No Yes 
Notes: 1. Leverage is one minus the ratio of equity capital to total assets of banks, in book values. Effective tax rate is 
the ratio of tax paid to net income before tax. Profitability is earning before interest and taxes over total assets. Growth: 
the percentage of change in total assets of banks. Collateral is the ration of tangible assets to total asset. Size is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. Earning Volatility is the standard deviation of return on asset over the past consecutive 
three years. Minimum Capital Regulation: is the dummy variable for the minimum paid up capital regulation. 
Regulatory Pressure for cap adequacy: is the dummy variable for regulatory pressure for capital adequacy. 2. The LM (
2χ ) tests the null hypothesis that unobserved firm effects are not relevant in explaining the dependent variable. 3. The 
Hausman ( 2χ ) tests the null hypothesis that unobserved firm effects are not correlated with the explanatory variables. 
4. The Wald ( 2χ ) tests the null hypothesis of non-significance as a whole of the parameters of the explanatory 
variables. 5. The F tests the null hypothesis of non-significance as a whole of the estimated parameters. 6. Clustered 
Robust Standard errors are in brackets. 7. Coefficients: are statistically *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant 
at 5% significance; and * significant at 10% level. 
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The estimation results depicted in Table 6.3 revealed important findings. Firstly, it is noteworthy to 
point out that the model fits the data well, whereby R2 ranges from 75.5% to 82.6%. The 
documented R2 looks reasonable because it is higher than a simple pooled OLS, thereby indicating 
the presence of omitted variable (Wooldridge, 2002; Green, 2003). More specifically, R2 declines 
by 27% in dropping of both the unobserved bank-specific effect and time-specific fixed effect and it 
declines by around 19.3% in dropping unobserved time effect alone. In comparison to the 
previous empirical evidence on the subject, the documented R2 is closely similar to the reported R2 
of 72% in US and European banks (Gropp & Heider, 2009) and R2 of 77.2% in the banks of 
selected developing countries (Octavia & Brown, 2008). Besides, in analyzing the coefficients of 
explanatory variables, the t–value and p-value of the estimation result, significant factors or 
determinants of capital structure can be identified. 
In the chosen fixed effect estimation, the coefficient of effective tax rate was found to positive and 
statistically significant at 5% level (t-value of 2.64 and p-value of 0.021). This operational sign 
supports the prediction of the tradeoff theory. Additionally, the coefficient of the profitability of 
banks was found to be negative and statistically significant at 1% level (t-value of -3.02 and p-value 
of 0.010). Hence, the sign of the coefficient of profitability is in accordance with the prediction of 
the pecking order theoretical model. Similarly, the growth opportunities of banks were found to be 
statistically significant at 5% level (t-value of -2.39   and p–value of 0.020) and negatively related to 
the leverage of banks. This negative coefficient of growth is consistent with the prediction of the 
tradeoff theoretical model. As shown in Table 6.3, these significant coefficients of effective tax rate, 
profitability and growth also hold in regressing against leverage using a fixed effect estimator in the 
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presence of the time dummy variables. Moreover, these results are also consistent with the results 
of the pooled OLS and random effect estimators. 
However, the negative coefficient of the collateral value of assets was found to be statistically 
insignificant (t-value of -0.68 and p-value of 0.509) in regressing against the leverage of banks in 
Ethiopia. This insignificant coefficient of collateral values also holds in estimating a two-way fixed 
effects model and is consistent with the pooled OLS and random effect estimations. Moreover, the 
coefficient of bank size was found to be positive but statistically insignificant in the estimations of 
both a one-way fixed effect model (t-value of 0.34 with p- value of 0.741) and a two-way fixed effect 
model. Similarly, the unexpected positive coefficient of earnings volatility was found to be 
statistically insignificant (t-value of 0.07 and p-value of 0.949) in regressing against the leverage of 
banks using the fixed effect estimations. Hence, the estimation results on the collateral value of 
assets, bank size and earnings volatility, in general, neither support the predictions of the tradeoff 
nor the pecking order theoretical models. 
With respect to the pertinent regulatory factors, the fixed effect estimation result revealed that the 
coefficient of the dummy variable for a minimum capital requirement was found to be negative 
and statistically significant at 1% level (t-value of -3.55 and p-value of 0.004) in the banks of 
Ethiopia. Besides, the coefficient of the dummy variable for a peer-based regulatory pressure for 
risk-weighted capital adequacy was found to be positive and statistical significant at 1% level (t-value 
of 4.45 and p-value of 0.001). This positively significant effect of the regulatory pressure for capital 
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adequacy also holds in the fixed effect estimation with the unobserved time effect (t-value of 4.45 
and p-value of 0.001)37. 
                                                          
37 However, the documented negative coefficient of regulatory pressure on the minimum capital regulation was found 
to be statistically insignificant (t-value of 0.35 and p-value of 0.728) in the fixed effect estimation with the time dummy 
variables. One plausible reason may be that the time dummy variable also captures the change in the minimum paid 
up capital requirement. 
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6.2.1.3. Empirical Results of Dynamic Panel Models Estimations 
 
The previous section 6.2.12 of the study investigates the determinants of the capital structure of 
banks based on the estimation results of the static panel data regression model. In the chosen fixed 
effect estimator of the static panel model, the leverage of banks in Ethiopia was found to be 
negatively related with profitability, growth opportunities and dummy variable for a minimum paid 
up capital requirement. Besides, the effective tax rate and the dummy variable for peer-based 
regulatory pressure for capital adequacy were found to be positively related to the leverage of 
banks. However, these estimations have been conducted with the implicit assumptions that 
observed capital structure of banks is the target capital structure. Further, it assumes negligible 
adjustment costs, which may induce lags in the capital structure adjustment (Myers, 1984). 
Consequently, the predictions of the target capital structure theory within a dynamic perspective, or 
the target capital structure adjustment theory, need to be tested. In the tradeoff theory, firms obtain 
the target capital structure at a point that balances the benefits of tax shield (Modigilani & Miller, 
1963) and that reduces the agency problems of free cash flows (Jenson, 1986) with the costs of 
financial distress and agency costs of debt (Jenson & Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977). In the banking 
firms, the possible regulatory cost is also considered as an additional cost to be tradeoff with the 
benefits of leveraging to maintain the target capital structure (Brewer et al., 2008). Thus, firms will 
substitute debt for equity financing or vice versa to attain the desired capital structure. But target 
rebalancing may not be instantaneous. In the dynamic tradeoff or the target capital structure 
adjustment theory, firms set a long-run target capital structure and tend to adjust towards it through 
time (Myers, 1984; Fischer et al., 1989).  
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The speed of adjustment towards the target depends on the existing adjustment costs and the 
benefits of adjustment towards the target (or the costs of deviations from the target) (Fischer et al., 
1989; Flannery & Hankins, 2007). Thus, if adjustment costs are excessively high, firms may take a 
long excursion from their target (Myers, 1984). They tend to adjust towards the target if the 
benefits of adjusting towards the target outweigh the adjustment costs (Flannery & Hankins, 2007). 
In addition, in target adjustment, overleveraged (undercapitalized) firms will reduce their debt 
financing or increase their equity capital financing (Flannery & Hankins, 2007). On the contrary, 
underleveraged (overcapitalized) firms will increase debt financing or decrease equity financing 
during rebalancing (Flannery & Hankins, 2007). Hence, if adjustment costs and benefits of 
adjustment differ between overleveraged firms that decrease leverage (or increase equity financing) 
and underleveraged firms that increase leverage (or, decrease equity financing), the target capital 
structure adjustment may be asymmetrical (Byoun, 2008). Further, adjustment costs may be firm-
specific (Elsas & Florysiak, 2011). Firms having different characteristics may face adjustment costs 
differently (Flannery & Hankins, 2007). As a result, there may be a cross-sectional heterogeneity in 
the speed of adjustment towards the target (Elsas & Florysiak, 2011; Dang et al., 2012). 
Thus, this subsection constitutes the empirical results with respect to the dynamics of the capital 
structure adjustment of banks. To be more specific, the estimation results of the dynamic panel 
model for the symmetrical target capital structure adjustment have been first described. This 
description is, then, followed by the estimation results of the asymmetrical capital structure 
adjustment and the heterogeneous rate of adjustment model equations, respectively. 
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6.2.1.3.1. Symmetrical Capital Structure Adjustment Model Estimation 
 
This subsection, as earlier, depicts the empirical results of the estimations of the specified 
symmetrical target capital structure adjustment model equation (3). As described earlier in 
subsection 5.2.1.4.2, the specified symmetrical capital structure adjustment model equation (3) 
considers the possible adjustment costs that may hinder the instantaneous target capital structure 
adjustment of firms. More specifically, it assumes that all firms tend to partially fill the gap between 
the observed capital structure and target capital structure at a constant speed of adjustment in a 
given period of time (Flannery & Hankins, 2007). 
Therefore, in the estimation of the symmetrical dynamic panel model, the study uses both the 
Difference GMM and System GMM estimators, as shown in Table 6.6.  In both the Difference 
GMM and System GMM estimations, the study was conducted using a single-stage procedure. 
This implies that all the factors in the static panel model are substituted for the target leverage, and 
the lagged leverage is also considered as an additional explanatory variable.   
Then, unlike the static panel model estimators, the Difference GMM estimator is consistent and 
efficient in the presence of the lagged dependent variable and unobserved firm-specific effect. In 
the Difference GMM estimator, the symmetrical capital structure model equation was first 
differenced to remove unobserved firm-specific effect (Roodman, 2007).  Next, it used the lagged 
past levels of endogenous variables as their instrument (Roodman, 2007; Cameron & Trieved, 
2008).  However, in the possible presence of the persistence of the predicted variable, the lagged 
levels of endogenous variables may produce a weak instrument for the first difference (Arellano & 
Bover, 1995; Boucinha, 2008). Hence, the study also used the System GMM estimator in order to 
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capture the possible problem of persistence in data series (Blundell & Bond, 1998; Boucinha, 
2008). In the System GMM, the study simultaneously estimated the symmetrical capital structure 
adjustment model equation in levels and the first differenced symmetrical capital structure 
adjustment model equation (Blundell & Bond, 1998; Roodman, 2007). To this end, compared to 
the Difference GMM, the System GMM estimator uses additional moment conditions (Blundell & 
Bond, 1998). As a result, the System GMM may provide more efficient estimate than the 
Difference GMM (Blundell & Bond, 1998). 
Furthermore, different specifications with respect to the exogeneity and/or endogeneity of 
regressors have been tested for both the Difference GMM and the System GMM estimations 
(Drobetz & Wanzedrid, 2006). However, the reported results of the Difference GMM and the 
System GMM estimations, as presented in Table 6.6, assume that the regulatory pressure variables 
are strictly exogenous and other regressors are endogenous variables (Drobetz & Wanzedrid, 
2006; Boucinha, 2008). 
Further, the consistency of the coefficient estimates of both the Difference GMM and the System 
GMM estimators depends on the absence of second-order autocorrelation of residuals with 
differenced equations (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Drobetz & Wanzedrid, 2006; Boucinha, 2008). 
Accordingly, the study tested second-order autocorrelation. The test results failed to reject the null 
hypothesis of no-second-order autocorrelation (m2) at 5% significance level for both estimations. 
Similarly, in checking the validities of the instruments used, the Sargan test result failed to reject 
the null hypothesis of the validity of instruments at 5% for the Difference GMM and System GMM 
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estimations. Besides, the Wald test statistic results revealed the rejection of the null hypothesis that 
all coefficients of the explanatory variables are jointly equal to zero at 1% significance level. 
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Table 6.4. Results of Symmetrical Dynamic Panel Model Estimations Using Difference GMM and System GMM estimators 
Dependent Variable : Leverage                            Difference GMM System-GMM 
Independent Variable Coef. Robust  
Std. Err. 
z P>z Coef. Robust  
Std. Err. 
z P>z 
Lagged Leverage 0.584 0.051 11.440 0.000 0.627 0.045 13.920 0.000 
Effective Tax Rate 0.052 0.015 3.510 0.000 0.051 0.015 3.300 0.001 
Profitability -0.448 0.226 -1.980 0.047 -0.615 0.132 -4.670 0.000 
Growth 0.010 0.009 1.140 0.253 0.010 0.010 0.990 0.324 
Collaterals   -0.133 0.421 -0.320 0.753 0.050 0.197 0.250 0.799 
Size -0.006 0.002 -2.450 0.014 0.001 0.002 0.600 0.549 
Earnings volatility  -0.389 0.433 -0.900 0.369 0.019 0.308 0.060 0.951 
Minimum Capital Regulation -0.015 0.006 -2.340 0.019 -0.003 0.008 -0.370 0.712 
Regulatory pressure for cap adequacy 0.005 0.002 2.590 0.010 0.005 0.003 1.620 0.104 
Constant 0.498 0.047 10.510 0.000 0.309 0.055 5.610 0.000 
Observation 91 105 
Wald(χ2) 9571.27 (9) (P> χ2=0.0000) 2968.28 (9) (P> χ2=0.0000) 
Sargan (χ2)  91.29464 (82) (P> χ2= 0.2261) 179.1326 (167) (P> χ2= 0.2468) 
m1 -2.2965 (P> z=0.0216) -2.3281 (P> z=  0.0199) 
m2 -1.7682 (P> z= 0.0770) -1.721 (P> z= 0.0853) 
Notes: 1. Leverage is one minus the ratio of equity capital to total assets of banks, in book values. Effective tax rate is the ratio of tax paid to net income before tax. 
Profitability is earning before interest and taxes over total assets. Growth: the percentage of change in total assets of banks. Collateral is the ration of tangible assets to 
total asset. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Earning Volatility is the standard deviation of return on asset over the past consecutive three years. Minimum 
Capital Regulation: is the dummy variable for the minimum paid up capital regulation. Regulatory Pressure for cap adequacy: is the dummy variable for regulatory 
pressure for capital adequacy. 2. The Wald (χ2) tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the explanatory variables. 3. The Sargan 
(χ2) tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments used. 4. The m1 tests the null hypothesis of the absence of the first-order 
autocorrelation. 5. The m2 tests the null hypothesis of the absence of the second-order autocorrelation. 6. Coefficients: are statistically *** significant at 1% 
significance; ** significant at 5% significance; and * significant at 10% level. 
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As shown in Table 6.4, the estimation results of the symmetrical target capital structure adjustment 
model reveal a positive coefficient of a lagged leverage that is statistically significant at 1% level. 
This holds true in both the Difference GMM and the System GMM estimators. These estimation 
results are closely linked with the third research sub-question/specific objective/hypothesis 
formulated for the study. Specifically, these results reject the null hypothesis that banks do not have 
target capital structure that adjusts towards it dynamically. As depicted in Table 6.4, the coefficient 
of lagged leverage was found to be 0.584 and 0.627 in the Difference GMM and the System GMM 
estimations, respectively. These results imply that the partial speed of adjustment of 41.6% (λ=1-
0.584) documented in the Difference GMM lies closer to the speed of adjustment of 37.3 % (λ=1-
0.627) documented in the System GMM. Hence, the average partial speed of adjustment of banks 
in Ethiopia towards their target was found to be 39.45% per annum (Drobetz et al., 2013). 
The estimation results presented in Table 6.4 also provide evidences for the dynamic analysis of 
the determinants of capital structure. In this regard, both the Difference GMM and System GMM 
estimation results consistently reveal the existence of positively significant coefficient of effective tax 
rate in regressing against leverage in the dynamic framework. These coefficient estimates show the 
short-term impact of the effective tax rate on the leverage of banks (Antoniou et al., 2008; Flannery 
& Rangan, 2008). The long-run coefficient of the effective tax rate equals the estimated coefficients 
of the effective tax rate in the partial adjustment model divided by the speed of adjustment 
coefficient λ.  Specifically, the long-run coefficient of the effective tax rate would be 12.5% and 
13.7% for the Difference and the System GMM estimators, respectively. This result confirms the 
finding documented in the static panel model estimation.  
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Besides, the coefficients of profitability were found to be negative and statistically significant at 5% 
and 1% levels in the Difference GMM and System GMM estimations, respectively. Once again, 
this evidence on profitability is also consistent with the static panel model estimation result. 
However, this coefficient estimate indicates a short-run effect of profitability on the leverage of 
banks in Ethiopia. As pointed out earlier, its long-run effect depends on the documented speed of 
adjustment towards the target. In the Difference and the System GMM estimations, the coefficients 
of profitability of banks were found to be -0.448 and -0.615, respectively. The long-run coefficients 
of profitability would, therefore, be -1.077 and -1.649, respectively. 
However, the coefficients of growth, collateral values of assets and earnings volatility were found to 
be insignificant, consistently in estimating the symmetrical dynamic panel model equation using the 
Difference and the System GMM estimators. Then, although this result is contradiction with 
growth opportunities, these insignificant coefficients of collateral values of assets and earnings 
volatility also corroborate the static panel model estimation results. The coefficient of size was 
found to be negative and statistically significant at 5% level in the Difference GMM; and yet, size 
was found to be still insignificant in the System GMM estimations. 
Finally, consistent to the findings in the static panel model fixed effect estimation, the coefficient of 
the minimum capital regulation dummy variable was found to be statistically significant at 5% in the 
Difference GMM estimation. On the contrary, the coefficient of the regulatory pressure for capital 
adequacy was found to be positive and statistically significant at 1% in the Difference GMM 
estimation. However, the coefficients of the dummy variables for both the minimum capital 
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regulation and regulatory pressure for capital adequacy were found to be insignificant in the System 
GMM estimation. 
6.2.1.3.2. Asymmetrical Target Capital Structure Adjustment Model Estimation 
 
This subsection presents the empirical results for the estimations of asymmetrical target capital 
structure adjustment model equation (5). Unlike the symmetrical target capital structure adjustment 
model that implicitly assumes a homogeneous speed of adjustment, the target capital structure 
adjustment may be asymmetrical for overleveraged and underleveraged firms (Byoun, 2008; 
Drobetz et al., 2013). As mentioned earlier, overleveraged firms are expected to reduce leverage or 
increase equity financing within target capital structure adjustment dynamics (Flannery & Hankins, 
2007). On the other hand, underleveraged firms are expected to increase leverage or decrease 
equity financing to revert towards the target (Flannery & Hankins, 2007; Byoun, 2008). Hence, the 
adjustment costs of increasing equity financing for overleveraged firms may differ from the 
adjustment costs of increasing debt financing for underleveraged firms (Flannery & Hankins, 2007; 
Byoun, 2008). Besides, the benefits of reducing leverage in overleveraged firms may be 
asymmetrical to the benefits of increasing leverage in underleveraged firms (Faulkender et al., 
2012; Drobetz et al., 2013). 
In the light of the above idea, the present study estimated the dynamic panel model equation (5) 
that considers the possible asymmetric target capital structure adjustment for overleveraged and 
underleveraged banks, as shown in Table 6.5.  In this estimation, the study used two interactive 
variables (TDE it.Dit above and TDE it .Dit below). These interactive variables would allow the speed of 
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adjustment to vary between the overleveraged and underleveraged banks in estimations (Byoun, 
2008). In doing so, the study also used a two-stage procedure (Fama & French, 2002; Byoun, 2008; 
Drobetz et al., 2013). In the first stage, the fitted value of the target leverage for each bank-year has 
been obtained by using the fixed effect estimation coefficients of factors in the static panel model 
(Drobetz et al., 2013). In the second stage, the deviation from the target leverage (TDE) has been 
computed as the difference between the fitted value of the target leverage obtained in the first stage 
and the actual lagged leverage ratio for each bank-year (Byoun, 2008; Drobetz et al., 2013). These 
procedures allow to specify indicator variables (Dit above and Dit below) and interactive variables (TDE it.Dit 
above and TDE it .Dit below). 
Then, once the indicator and interactive variables have been specified, the study also makes a 
statistical comparison of the pooled OLS, random effect and fixed effect estimators. In this regard, 
the study used the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test to compare the pooled OLS and panel data 
model estimators (random effect and fixed effect). As shown in Table 6.5, the LM test statistic 
result rejects the null hypothesis that that unobservable individual effect is not relevant to explain 
the change in leverage. Hence, the panel model estimators are preferred to the pooled OLS. 
Besides, to compare the random effect and fixed effect estimators, the study used the Hausman 
test. As a matter of fact, the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that unobserved effect is 
uncorrelated with explanatory variables at 1% significance level. For this reason, the fixed effect 
estimator is favored over the random effect estimator. However, for the purpose of comparison, 
Table 6.5 depicts the results of the pooled OLS, random effect and fixed effect estimators. 
Further, the null hypothesis of the joint insignificance of all coefficients of the estimated 
parameters has been rejected in the Wald and F test at 1% statistical significance level. 
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Table 6.5. Estimation Results of Asymmetrical Capital Structure Adjustment Model 
Dep. Variable:     
 
Change In Leverage(∆ Levit ) 
Independent variables Pooled OLS Random effect Fixed Effect 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. Std. Err. z P>z Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
TDE it .Dit 
above
 0.03521 .15215 0.23 0.821 0.03521 .152152 0.23 0.817 0.54683 .237084 2.31 0.038 
TDE it .Dit 
below
 0.49954 .03813 13.10 0.000 0.49954 .0381252 13.10 0.000 0.51305 .036470 14.07 0.000 
Constant -0.00418 .00369 -1.13 0.278 -0.00418 .0036889 -1.13 0.257 0.00212 .003152 0.67 0.512 
Observation 109    109    109    
R2 0.4730        0.6018    
Adjusted R2 0.4631        0.5375    
LM (χ2 ) test (P> χ2)     11.29(0.0015)        
Hausman(χ2 )Test(P>χ2)     27.52**(0.0000)     
Wald(χ2 ) (P> χ2)     273.69 (0.0000)     
F   (P> χ2) 136.84***(0.0000)     94.23***( 0.0000) 
Root MSE .01837    .01705    0.0171    
Notes: 1. TDEit is the deviations from the target leverage. Dit above is the dummy variable that equals one if overleveraged and, zero otherwise. Dit below is the dummy 
variable that equals one if underleveraged and, zero otherwise .2. The LM (χ2) tests the null hypothesis that unobservable individual effects are not relevant to 
explain the dependent variable. 2. The Hausman test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis that unobservable individual effects are not correlated with the 
explanatory variables. 3. The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of non-significance as a whole of the parameters of the explanatory variables. 
4. The F test has normal distribution and tests the null hypothesis of non-significance as a whole of the estimated parameters. 5. Robust Standard errors (clustered at 
bank level). 6. Coefficients: are statistically *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; and * significant at 10% level.. 7. The estimates include 
constant term.
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As depicted in Table 6.5, the coefficients of both overleveraged and underleveraged banks were 
found to be statistically significant in the chosen fixed effect estimation. This estimation result 
addresses the fourth sub-question/specific objective/hypothesis of this research. In effect, the result 
specifically, rejects the null hypothesis that the dynamics of the target capital structure adjustment is 
not asymmetrical for overleveraged and underleveraged banks. 
As presented in Table 6.5, the coefficient of underleveraged banks was found to be positive (φ2= 
0.51305) and statistically significant at 1% level in the fixed effect estimation. Consistently, this 
positive coefficient of underleveraged banks also holds both in the pooled OLS and random effect 
estimations. Similarly, the coefficient of overleveraged banks was found to be positive (φ1=0.54683) 
and statistically significant at 1% level in the chosen fixed effect estimation. However, the 
coefficient of overleveraged banks was found to be higher than the coefficient of underleveraged 
banks.  Hence, the result implies that overleveraged banks  tend to adjust towards the target more 
rapidly than underleveraged banks in Ethiopia. 
6.2.1.3.3. Estimations of Model of Heterogeneous Capital Structure Adjustment  
 
This subsection contains the empirical results in estimations of the dynamic model of 
heterogeneous target capital structure adjustment, as given in equation (8). Unlike the asymmetrical 
target capital structure adjustment model estimation that emphasizes only the relative target 
deviation, this dynamic panel model of heterogeneous capital structure adjustment estimation is 
helpful to examine the possible cross-sectional heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment, with 
respect to a broad set of bank characteristics (Elsas & Florysiak, 2011). 
  
148 
 
To that end, in this dynamic model estimation, the speed of adjustment has been endogenized 
over a range of bank-specific factors (Drobetz & Wanzenried, 2006).  These determinants of the 
speed of adjustment include deviation (absolute) from target leverage, size, growth, liquidity, 
regulatory pressure for capital adequacy and ownership of banks, as reported in Table 6.6(A). 
However, to check for the robustness and possible efficiency of the heterogeneous capital structure 
adjustment model, the factors that were found to be significant in the static panel model (effective 
tax rate and profitability) were also included in the heterogeneous speed of adjustment, as shown in 
Table 6.6(B). Besides, these determinants were considered one at a time for the estimation to be 
tractable (Drobetz & Wanzenried, 2006).  
Further, in estimations of the heterogeneous capital structure adjustment model equation (8), the 
study also used the Difference GMM and the System GMM estimators. In doing so, different 
specifications concerning the exogeneity and/or endogeneity of the explanatory variables have been 
tested (Drobetz & Wanzenried, 2006; Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). However, the results reported in 
Table 6.6 assume that all of the determinants are endogenous (Drobetz & Wanzenried, 2006). 
Besides, the consistency of coefficient estimates in both the Difference GMM and the System 
GMM estimators depends on the absence of second-order autocorrelation (m2). To this end, the 
second-order autocorrelation test (m2) has been conducted. The test results failed to reject the null 
hypothesis of no-second-order autocorrelation at 5% in all model specifications. Nevertheless, 
these test results of second-order autocorrelation have been maintained, by including the 
unreported coefficient of a second lag of the dependent variable (Drobetz & Wanzenried, 2006). 
This second lag of leverage has been included in the model only for a statistical reason (Drobetz & 
Wanzenried, 2006). Besides, in checking the validities of instruments used, the Sargan test result 
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failed to reject the null hypothesis of instruments validity at 5% in both the difference and system 
GMM estimations. Furthermore, the Wald test statistic results reject the null hypothesis that all 
coefficients of the explanatory variables are jointly equal to zero at 1% significance level in all 
model estimations. 
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Table 6.6(A). Estimation Results of Model of Capital Structure Adjustment with Heterogeneous Speed of Adjustment 
Dep. Variable :Leverage Difference GMM System GMM 
Independent  variable   Coef.        Robust Std. Err.       z            P>|z| Coef.                 Robust Std. Err.        z            P>|z| 
Lev i,t-1   .6050958          .1237084               4.89         0.000 .8277074                .0851869            9.72            0.000 
Lev i,t-1x  Deviation  3.596437           .833959                4.31         0.000 3.255685                 1.852638           1.76            0.079 
Wald(χ2) 42178.26 (9) (P> χ2=0.0000) 66114.45 (11) (P> χ2=0.0000) 
Sargan (χ2)  77.3295 (73) (P> χ2= 0.3422) 155.556 (160) (P> χ2= 0.5845) 
m1 -2.4118 (P> z= 0.0159) -2.5134 (P> z=  0.0120) 
m2 -1.0622 (P> z= 0.2881) -1.2961 (P> z= 0.1950) 
Lev i,t-1 2.887324             .5597205              5.16          0.000 1.742504                 .7704109              2.26           0.024 
Lev i,t-1x Size -.1046957             .028261              -3.70          0.000 -.0709433                .0281399             -2.52           0.012 
Wald(χ2) 1486.65 (9) (P> χ2=0.0000) 15086.92 (10) (P> χ2=0.0000) 
Sargan (χ2)  79.33883 (73) (P> χ2= 0.2860) 163.0212 (164) (P> χ2= 0.5069) 
m1 -2.237 (P> z= 0.0253) -2.3678 (P> z=  0.0179) 
m2 -1.77 (P> z= 0.0767) -1.5839 (P> z=  0.1132) 
Lev i,t-1 .7103824             .1435648              4.95         0.000 .9530533               .0938848                 10.15           0.000 
Lev i,t-1x Growth .1576097             .2021715              0.78        0.436 -.2335534               .159732                  -1.46           0.144 
Wald(χ2) 4079.25 (9) (P> χ2=0.0000) 4373.99 (10) (P> χ2= 0.0000) 
Sargan (χ2)  74.86692 (73) (P> χ2= 0.4175) 153.047 (164) (P> χ2= 0.7196) 
m1 -2.6872 (P> z= 0.0072) -2.6111 (P> z= 0.0090) 
m2 -1.2392 (P> z= 0.2153) -1.8122 (P> z=  0.0700) 
Lev i,t-1 .4850085              .1156805          4.19        0.000 .7020243                .0649083           10.82              0.000 
Lev i,t-1x Liquidity .2442868              .2527028          0.97        0.334 -.2203083                .1743852           -1.26              0.206 
Wald(χ2) 8424.44 (10) (P> χ2=0.0000) 5898.80 (10) (P> χ2=0.0000) 
Sargan (χ2)  90.04923 (81) (P> χ2= 0.2302) 183.1952 (172) (P> χ2=  0.2654) 
m1 -2.2523 (P> z= 0.0243) -2.3202 (P> z= 0.0203) 
m2 -1.6132 (P> z= 0.1067) -1.7249 (P> z=  0.0846) 
Lev i,t-1 .8591858              .1168031         7.36       0.000 .9229727               .0618184             14.93            0.000 
Lev i,t-1x Regulatory pres -.2955906             .1052489          -2.81       0.005 -.1925058              .1101028                -1.75           0.080 
Wald(χ2) 9630.00 (10) (P> χ2=0.0000) 723155.56 (11) (P> χ2=0.0000) 
Sargan (χ2)  76.40094 (72) (P> χ2= 0.3391) 153.09 (154) (P> χ2=   0.5056) 
m1 -2.0317 (P> z= 0.0422) -2.2775 (P> z= 0.0228) 
m2 .25057 (P> z= 0.8021) -1.3679 (P> z=  0.1713) 
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Lev i,t-1 .5615343             .0466685         12.03      0.000 .7592394                  .0655013              11.59          0.000 
Lev i,t-1x Ownership  .134934               .0654098         2.06      0.039 .1051511                  .0444655               2.36           0.018 
Wald(χ2) 147281.58 (9) (P> χ2=0.0000) 118673.59 (11) (P> χ2=0.0000) 
Sargan (χ2)  75.61918 (73) (P> χ2=  0.3939) 142.9531 (156) (P> χ2=  0.7649) 
m1 -2.278 (P> z=  0.0227) -2.3649 (P> z=  0.0180) 
m2 -1.7692 (P> z= 0.0769) -1.181 (P> z= 0.2376) 
   
 
Table 6.6 (B)- Estimation Results of Model of Capital Structure Adjustment with Heterogeneous Speed of Adjustment 
 
Dep. Variable :Leverage Difference GMM System GMM 
Independent  variable   Coef.          Robust Std. Err.       z            P>|z| Coef.                 Robust Std. Err.        z            P>|z| 
Lev i,t-1   .5997156                  .1168885           5.13        0.000 .7994024                  .0897062                8.91           0.000 
Lev i,t-1x  ETax  .4216078                  .182954             2.30        0.021 .0978689                  .1574004                0.62           0.534 
Wald(χ2) 9631.50 (9) (P> χ2=0.0000) 3272.00 (9) (P> χ2=0.0000) 
Sargan (χ2)  68.09217 (63) (P> χ2= 0.3082) 145.6388 (145) (P> χ2=  0.4695) 
m1 -1.6977 (P> z= 0.0896) -1.868 (P> z=   0.0618) 
m2 -1.4266 (P> z= 0.1537) -1.2161 (P> z=  0.2240) 
Lev i,t-1 .4897552                 .1381163            3.55       0.000 .7185683                   .0941635                 7.63         0.000 
Lev i,t-1x Prof 3.260328                 1.065399            3.06       0.002 .9157277                   1.267392                 0.72         0.470 
Wald(χ2) 630.20 (9) (P> χ2=0.0000) 1248.60 (9) (P> χ2=0.0000) 
Sargan (χ2)  69.35428 (63) (P> χ2=  0.2719) 147.2223 (145) (P> χ2=  0.4329) 
m1 -1.6593 (P> z=  0.0970) -1.8192 (P> z=  0.0689) 
m2 -1.2897 (P> z= 0.1972) -1.2761 (P> z=  0.2019) 
Notes: 1. The Wald (χ2) tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the explanatory variables. 2. The Sargan (χ2) tests the null 
hypothesis of the significance of the validity of the instruments used. 3. The m1 tests the null hypothesis of the absence of first-order autocorrelation. 4. The m2 tests 
the null hypothesis of the absence of second-order autocorrelation. 5.  All variables are defined in the same way as they are defined in Table 6.2. 
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As reported in Table 6.6, estimation results of the dynamic panel model for heterogeneous capital 
structure adjustment reveal interesting results/findings. These estimation results are closely linked 
to the fifth sub-question/specific objective/ of the research, as presented/formulated in the first 
chapter. Specifically, these estimation results provide evidences to test the null hypothesis that the 
dynamics of the target capital structure adjustment is not heterogeneous across banks in Ethiopia, 
which differ in their characteristics (deviations from target, size, growth, liquidity and ownership) 
and regulatory pressure. 
Then, as the concern of the study is to examine the possible cross-sectional heterogeneity in the 
rate of adjustment, Table 6.6 discloses only the coefficient estimates of the lagged leverage and 
interaction terms between the determinants of the speed of adjustments and lagged leverage 
(Drobetz & Wanzenried, 2006). Specifically, to investigate the heterogeneous target capital 
structure adjustment dynamics, the coefficient of interaction terms is examined. In interpreting the 
estimated result, the negative sign for interaction terms of lagged leverage and determinants of the 
speed of adjustment in the specified dynamic panel model need to be considered (Drobetz & 
Wanzenried, 2006). 
 In this regard, important findings can be identified with respect to the heterogeneity of target 
capital structure adjustment as reported in Table 6.6(A). Firstly, the effect of distance from target 
leverage (absolute deviation) on the speed of adjustment was found to be negative and statistically 
significant at 1% level and 10% level in the Difference GMM and System GMM estimations, 
respectively (Dang et al., 2012). Besides, the relationship between the size of banks and the speed 
of adjustment was found to be positive and statistically significant at 1% and 5% in the Difference 
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GMM and the System GMM estimations, respectively (Flannery  & Hankins, 2007; Byoun, 2008). 
Similarly, the effect of regulatory pressure for capital adequacy on the speed of adjustment was also 
found to be positive and statistically significant at 1% level and 10% level in the Difference GMM 
and the System GMM estimations, respectively. Further, the relationship between ownership of 
banks and speed of adjustment was found to be negative and statistically significant at 5% level in 
both Difference GMM and System GMM estimations.  
However, the coefficient for interaction term of growth opportunities of banks and lagged leverage 
was found to be statistically insignificant consistently in both Difference GMM and System GMM 
estimations. Similarly, both estimation results also revealed an insignificant coefficient of the 
interaction between liquidity and lagged leverage of banks.  
Further, the estimation results of the heterogeneous capital structure adjustment model presented 
in Table 6.6(B), using the factors that were found to be significant in the static panel model 
(effective tax rate and profitability), provide mixed evidences. In the Difference GMM estimation, 
the relationship between effective tax rate and speed of adjustment was found to be negative and 
statistically significant at 5% level. Similarly, the effect of profitability on the speed of adjustment 
was found to be negative and statistically significant at 5% level in the Difference GMM estimation.  
However, the coefficients of both effective tax rate and profitability were found to be statistically 
insignificant in the System GMM estimation. 
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6.2.2. Cross-Sectional Survey Results  
 
This section primarily reports the cross-sectional survey results documented from the responses of 
the questionnaire distributed to the selected chief financial officers (CFOs) of banks38. Unlike the 
panel study that solely uses secondary data, the cross-sectional survey gathers firsthand 
information, in that the present study also collected firsthand data (from responses of the selected 
CFOs of bank firms in Ethiopia)39 to examine the determinants and capital structure adjustment 
dynamics in multiple perspectives (De Jong & van Dijk, 2001; Beattie et al., 2006).  
Hence, the results of the cross-sectional survey responses are organized into two main subsections. 
The first subsection primary focuses on the survey results on the determinants of the capital 
structure decision of banks under study. The second subsection emphasizes the cross-sectional 
survey results on the target setting behavior and adjustment dynamics of banks. 
6.2.2.1. Survey Results on Determinants of Capital Structure 
 
The survey responses given to the questions on the determinants of capital structure of banks are 
presented in Table 6.7 and Table 6.8. Respondents were asked to rate both the relative 
importance of the factors related to the financial decision of banks (Table 6.7) and their views on 
the general statements regarding the factors in financing decision of banks (Table 6.8) (Beattie et 
                                                          
38 As used in present study, CFOs is the “generic” name for selected individuals at the executive/senior management 
level of banks, who are likely to be knowledgeable and play an active role in the strategic financing decision of banks in 
question. In this respect, depending on the nature of the organizational structure of banks, it (CFOs) also represents 
Finance Directors, Finance managers, Fund managers, Treasurers and Controllers.  
39
 Using continuous follow up and reminder of the respondents (CFOs), all the distributed questionnaires have been 
replied and returned.  
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al., 2006). All of the questions have been measured using a five-point Likert scale (Beattie et al., 
2006). Hence, based on the survey responses, the percentages of responses within each rank or 
rate categories and the mean scores of responses for each factor have been documented (Pinegar & 
Wilbricht, 1989). To investigate the possible differences of the survey results on the determinants 
of capital structure conditional on bank characteristics (size, liquidity and ownership), the study 
also used the non-parametric Mann-Whitney test. 
These cross-sectional survey results are closely linked to the first and the second research sub-
questions/specific objectives/ hypotheses of the study. Besides, these survey results would be useful 
to corroborate the findings regarding the determinants of capital structure of banks in the static 
panel model estimations. 
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 Table 6.7. Relative Importance of Factors in Financial Decision of Banks 
 Items % of response within each rank Mean Size Liquidity  Ownership 
1 2  3 4 5 Small Large U Low High  U Public Private U 
a The tax advantage of interest deductibility 14.3 14.3 23.8 42.9 4.8 3.095 3.182 3.000 53.00 
(0.882) 
2.667 3.267 33.00 
(0.326) 
3.500 2.933 36.00 
(0.461) 
b The level of interest rates on deposits & other debts 9.5 4.8 14.3 33.3 38.1 3.857 3.909 3.800 52.00 
(0.824) 
4.000 3.800 41.50 
(0.775) 
4.500 3.600 28.50 
(0.177) 
c Available tax economies related to other non-taxable 
allowance (such as depreciation) 
19.0 19.0 19.0 38.1 4.8 2.905 3.273 2.500 36.00 
(0.164) 
2.500 3.067 32.00 
(0.293) 
3.500 2.667 28.00 
(0.169) 
d  Risk and  costs of financial distress & insolvency 0.0 9.5 19.0 47.6 23.8 3.857 4.091 3.600 40.50 
(0.274) 
3.500 4.000 31.00 
(0.243) 
4.333 3.667 26.50 
(0.123) 
e The volatility/changes in bank’s earnings and cash flows  4.8 9.5 19.0 33.3 33.3 3.810 4.182 3.400 38.00 
(0.212) 
4.000 3.733 38.00 
(0.570) 
4.167 3.667 32.50 
(0.310) 
f Size of free cash flows   0.0 4.8 14.3 61.9 19.0 3.952 4.182 3.700 31.00 
(0.052) 
4.000 3.933 44.50 
(0964) 
4.167 3.867 36.50 
(0.446) 
g Financial flexibility or Profitability 0.0 4.8 9.5 42.9 42.9 4.238 4.273 4.200 50.00 
(0.701) 
4.167 4.267 39.50 
(0.641) 
4.167 4.267 39.50 
(0.641) 
h Investment policy or Growth Opportunities  4.8 0.0 9.5 38.1 47.6 4.238 4.455 4.000 44.50 
(0.419) 
4.167 4.276 33.00 
(0.307) 
4.167 4.267 37.00 
(496) 
i The consequences of breaching regulatory capital 
requirement 
4.8 0.0 9.5 42.9 42.9 4.191 4.546 3.800 30.50 
(0.060) 
4.000 4.267 27.00 
(0.127) 
4.500 4.067 36.00 
(0.446) 
j Capital held by your bank’s peers 4.8 23.8 23.8 33.3 14.3 3.286 3.727 2.800 30.00 
(0.069) 
3.000 3.400 35.00 
(0.421) 
3.500 3.200 38.00 
(0.573) 
k Change in the regulation & supervision framework 0.0 0.0 19.0 52.4 28.6 4.095 4.091 4.100 53.50 
(0.908) 
4.167 4.067 41.50 
(0.765) 
3.833 4.200 32.50 
(0.285) 
Notes: 1. Categories represent that 1-Not important, 2-Little important, 3- Fairly important, 4-Important and 5-Very Important. 2. Means are calculated by assigning 
scores of 1 through 5 for rankings from "not important" to “very important," respectively, and by multiplying each score by the fraction of responses within each rank. 
3. U represents the Mann-Whitney test result with asymptotical significance 2 tailed in brackets. 
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Table 6.8. Responses to General Statements about Factors in Financial Decision of Banks 
 Items % of response  within each rank Mean Size Liquidity Ownership 
1   2 3 4 5  Small Large U Low High  U Public Private U 
a Use of deposits & other debts would decrease 
relative to equity if debt interest were no longer tax-
deductible. 
4.8 28.6 33.3 19.0 14.3 3.095 2.727 3.500 35.50 
(0.155) 
3.167 3.067 40.50 
(0.717) 
2.333 3.400 19.00 
(0.036) 
b The decision to issue debt or equity is affected by 
the existence of tax loss carried forwards. 
4.8 28.6 28.6 33.3 4.8 3.048 3.000 3.100 51.50 
(0.797) 
3.167 3.000 41.00 
(0.745) 
3.167 3.000 40.50 
(0.715) 
c We issue common stocks to complement to risk 
management. 
4.8 23.8 42.9 23.8 4.8 3.000 3.273 2.700 34.00 
(0.118) 
3.000 3.000 45.00 
(1.000) 
3.167 2.933 38.00 
(0.568) 
d A bank issue shares, though present needs are not 
great, to build up a cushion against unexpected 
losses arising from material risks.  
4.8 23.8 23.8 42.9 4.8 3.191 3.455 2.900 40.00 
(0.264) 
3.167 3.200 44.00 
(0.934) 
 
3.000 3.267 41.00 
(0.742) 
e We issue debt when our recent profits are not 
sufficient to fund our activities. 
4.8 28.6 28.6 33.3 4.8 3.048 3.182 2.900 46.50 
(0.532) 
3.167 3.000 40.50 
(0.715) 
3.167 3.000 40.50 
(0.715) 
f We  issue common stock when we are unable to 
obtain funds using other sources. 
4.8 0.0 38.1 52.4 4.8 3.524 3.455 3.600 53.00 
(0.875) 
3.833 3.400 30.50 
(0.208) 
4.167 3.267 15.00 
(0.009) 
g We issue debt when we have accumulated profits. 4.8 33.3 42.9 14.3 4.8 2.810 3.000 2.600 39.00 
(0.231) 
2.333 3.000 25.00 
(0.098) 
2.333 3.000 25.00 
(0.098) 
h We issue common stock to finance long term 
business strategy  or growth. 
0.0 0.0 4.8 71.4 23.8 4.191 4.091 4.300 45.00 
(0.372) 
4.333 4.133 37.00 
(0.430) 
4.167 4.200 43.00 
(0.844) 
i Given the regulatory capital requirement, we assess 
how much additional capital we should hold.  
0.0 4.8 14.3 38.1 42.9 4.191 4.091 4.300 51.50 
(0.791) 
4.500 4.067 34.50 
(0.379) 
3.833 4.333 31.00 
(0.241) 
j We assess capital needed to run the business & 
then, verify  whether it meets regulatory requirement 
4.8 9.5 4.8 57.1 23.8 3.857 4.091 3.600 50.00 
(0.694) 
3.833 3.867 42.50 
(0.828) 
3.833 3.867 42.50 
(0.828) 
Notes: 1.Categories represent that 1-Strongly disagree 2-Disagree, 3- Neutral, 4-Agree and 5-Strongly Agree. 2. Means are calculated by assigning scores of 1 through 
5 for rankings from "strongly disagree" to " strongly agree" respectively, and by multiplying each score by the fraction of responses within each rank. 3. U represents 
the Mann-Whitney test result with asymptotical significance 2 tailed in brackets. 
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As per the survey results reported in Table 6.8 and Table 6.9, the focus of the five questions were 
on the perceived effect of taxation on the capital structure decision of banks (rows a, b and c of 
Table 6.7; rows a and b of Table 6.8). As a result, high percentage of respondents rated (mean 
rating=3.095) the tax advantage of interest deductibility as important and very important factors to 
be considered in capital structure decision of banks (row a of Table 6.7). Similarly, majority of 
respondents rated (mean rating=3.857) the level of interest rate of deposits and other debts of 
banks as important and very important factor in capital structure decision of banks (row b of Table 
6.7). High percentages of respondents also agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that states 
the use of deposits and other debts would decrease relative to equity if debt interest were no longer 
tax deductible (mean rating=3.095; row a of Table 6.8). Besides, high percentage of the 
respondents showed their agreement to the statement that states capital structure decision of banks 
is affected by the existence of tax loss carried forwards (row b of Table 6.8). In general, these 
survey results validate the evidences documented on the static panel model estimations regarding 
the effect of effective tax rate on the capital structure decision of banks. However, the survey 
responses disregard the importance of tax economies for other non-taxable allowances such as 
depreciation as important factor in capital structure decision of banks (row c of Table 6.7) 
The next four questions mainly focus on the perceptions of CFOs on the relevance of profitability 
and/or size of free cash flow on capital structure decision of banks (rows f and g of Table 6.7; rows 
e and g of Table 6.8). As per the survey results, most of the respondents revealed that size of free 
cash flow and profitability in capital structure decision of banks are important (rows f and g of 
Table 6.7). These survey results are also consistent with some of the respondents that responded 
that banks issue debt when they accumulate profits (row g of Table 6.8). It is, however, consistent 
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with majority of the respondents that agreed with the statement that states banks issue debt when 
profits are not sufficient to fund their activities (row e of Table 6.8). Similarly, around 57% of the 
respondents agreed with the statement that underscores banks issue common stock when they are 
unable to obtain fund from other sources (row f of Table 6.8). Further, CFOs were asked two 
questions if investment policy/growth opportunities are relevant to the capital structure decision of 
banks (row h of Table 6.7; row h of Table 6.8). Accordingly, the survey results revealed that high 
percentages of the respondents (75%) rated the importance and/or very importance of the 
investment policy or growth opportunities in financial decision of banks with high mean score of 
4.238 (row h of Table 6.7). Similarly, the large proportion of the respondents posited their 
issuance of common stocks to finance growth (row h of Table 6.8). Thus, these survey results also 
substantiate the evidences reported in the static panel model estimations regarding the effect of 
profitability and growth on the capital structure decision of banks.  
The Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) were also asked four questions that primarily focus on the 
effect of risk on capital structure decision of banks (rows d and e of Table 6.7; rows c and d of 
Table 6.8). The survey result disclosed that majority (70 percent) of the respondents confirmed 
that the volatility of earnings and cash flows are important or very important factor to be 
considered in financial decision of banks with mean scores of 3.819 (row d of Table 6.7). Similarly, 
high proportions of the survey responses indicated the importance or very importance of risk and 
costs of financial distress in financial decision of banks with mean scores of 3.857 (Row e of Table 
6.7). However, these cross sectional survey results contradicted the found out evidence that states 
the insignificant effect of earning volatility on the capital structure decision of banks in the static 
panel model estimation. But majority of the survey respondents disagreed or were neutral to the 
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common stock issuance to complement risk management (row c of Table 6.8). However, few of 
the survey respondents agreed with the issuance of stocks to build up the cushion against the 
unexpected losses (row d of Table 6.8). 
 
The last five questions also primarily focus to find out CFO’s perception on the effect of regulatory 
pressure on the capital structure decision of banks (rows i, j and k of Table 6.7; rows i and j of 
Table 6.8). As a result, high percentages of the respondents underscored the importance of 
meeting the minimum regulatory capital requirement on capital structure decision of banks with a 
mean rating of 4.191 (row i of Table 6.7). Similarly, majority of the respondents regarded changes 
in regulatory and supervision framework as the important factors in financial decision of banks 
(row k of Table 6.7). These survey results are also consistent with CFOs’ higher tendency to assess 
the additional capital to be held by the bank given the regulatory capital requirement (row i of 
Table 6.8). High percentages of the survey respondents also disclosed that they assess the capital 
needed to run their business and verify whether it meets the regulatory capital requirement (row j 
of Table 6.8). Hence, these survey results are also found to be consistent with the evidences 
documented in static panel model estimation. 
 
However, in analyzing the survey results on the determinants conditional on the bank size, liquidity 
and ownership, the results showed no significant differences in mean scores using the Mann-
Whitney test (Table 6.7 & Table 6.8). 
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6.2.2.2. Survey Results on Target Setting Behavior and Adjustment Dynamics 
 
This subsection presents the responses given to the different question items which are expected to 
address possible target capital structure setting behavior as well as possible capital structure 
adjustment dynamics as depicted in Panel A and Panel B of Table 6.9 below. This cross sectional 
survey constitutes different items measured on the nominal scale and the order scale. Hence, 
depending on the type of the measurement scale, either percentage of responses or mean scores 
have been computed for each categorical responses. Besides, in analyzing these survey responses 
conditional on bank size, liquidity and ownership, the study has used either likelihood ratio test or 
Mann-Whitney test, as appropriate. 
These survey results are also linked to the formulated third, fourth and fifth sub-questions/specific 
objectives/hypotheses of the study. These cross-sectional survey results are also used to substantiate 
the empirical results documented in dynamic panel model estimations. 
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 Table 6.9. Responses to Target Capital Structure Setting Behavior and Adjustment Dynamics 
 Panel A         
 Item Response Categories % Size  Liquidity  Ownership  
Small Large Lχ2 Low High Lχ2 Pub Priv Lχ2 
a In raising new funds to finance 
investments, your bank seeks to 
maintain a target capital structure.  
Yes 65 72.7 50.0 1.156 
(0.282) 
33.3 73.3 2.875 
(0.090) 
100 60 0.082 
(0.775) 
No 35 27.3 50.0 66.7 26.7 0 40 
b In raising new funds to finance 
inv’ts,your bank follows a hierarchy.  
Yes 75 40 57.1 0.011 
(0.916) 
33.3 55.6 0.032 
(0.859) 
50 50 1.032 
(0.310) No 25 60 42.9 66.67 44.4 50 50 
c Indicate the extent to which your 
bank seeks to maintain the target 
debt to equity ratio.  
Very Strict Target 25 36.4 20.0 5.296 
(0.151) 
0 40.0 7.812 
(0.050) 
0 33.3 3.590 
(0.309) Somewhat Tight Target/Range 15 18.2 20.0 50 16.7 50 13.3 
Flexible Target 40 45.5 30.0 33.3 30.0 50 33.3 
No Target Ratio or Range 20 0 30.0 16.7 13.3 0 20 
d Indicate how your bank target 
capital ratio differs from actual 
capital ratio. 
Actual capital ratio usually exceeds target   capital ratio 15 27.3 10.0 2.189 
(0.534) 
33.3 0 1.163 
(0.762) 
50 0 3.430 
(0.330) Target capital ratio  usually exceeds actual capital ratio 25 36.4 30.0 0 11.1 0 10 
Target capital ratio is usually very close to actual  capita ratio 30 27.3 30.0 0 22.2 0 20 
Actual capital ratio may exceed or fall below target  cap ratio 30 9.1 30.0 66.7 66.7 50 70 
e Suppose your bank’s actual capital 
deviates from desired capital due to 
non-transitory reasons. 
Adjust quicker if  Overcapitalized than the opposite   35 63.6 10.0 7.956 
(0.034) 
33.3 40 3.765 
(0.229) 
50 28.6 3.085 
(0.362) Adjust quicker if Undercapitalized than  the opposite 50 18.2 70.0 66.7 33.3 50 42.9 
Pace of adjustments in both cases will be the same 15 18.2 20.0 0 26.7 0 28.6 
 Panel B         
 Item  Mean Size  Liquidity  Ownership  
Small Large U Low High U Pub Priv U 
a Indicate the extent to which your 
bank’s actual capital ratio adjusts 
towards the target capital ratio in 
the deviations due to non-transitory 
factors. 
 A)  If actual capital is above target capital, we will 
reduce the actual capital as quickly as possible 
2.55 2.818 2.400 35.00 
(0.123) 
2.667 2.600 29.50 
(.244) 
3.000 2.467 30.50 
(.184) 
  B)If actual capital is below target capital, we will 
increase the actual capital as quickly as possible 
3.80 3.273 3.800 35.50 
(0.001) 
3.833 3.400 27.00 
(.158) 
3.333 3.600 37.50 
(.365) 
Note 1- Mean scores computed only for ranked responses and calculated by assigning scores of 5 through 1 for rankings (from 5-very likely, 4-likely, 3-neutral, 2-unlikely 1- very unlikely, respectively) and  by assigning scores of 3 through 1 for 
rankings (from  3-1st rank,2-2nd rank,  1- 3rd rank, respectively), and by multiplying each score by the fraction of responses within each rank
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The survey results shown in Table 6.9 reveal target capital structure setting behavior and capital 
structure adjustment dynamics.  
A) Survey Results on Target Capital Structure Setting Behavior 
Firstly, to investigate the target capital structure setting behavior of banks, the respondents were 
asked if target setting tendency exists and about the extent to which they seek to maintain target 
capital structure (rows a and c of Panel A in Table 6.9). As shown in Table 6.9, majority (65%) of 
the respondents indicated the existence of target capital structure setting behavior towards raising 
new funds for financing. With regard to the extent to which banks seek to maintain target debt to 
equity ratio, only few (20%) of the respondents replied the absence of target debt equity ratio or 
range, while greater number (40%) claimed the presence of flexible target debt to equity ratio. The 
remaining 40% of the respondents said that they had somewhat tight target or very strict target debt 
to equity ratio (Graham & Harvey, 2001). This survey result provides evidence to the prediction of 
tradeoff theoretical model. This implies that banking firms tend to balance benefits of leveraging in 
the form of tax shield and reduce agency problems on free cash flows with the costs of leveraging 
from the possible costs of distress, agency costs of debt and regulatory costs. These results 
corroborate the finding on the symmetrical dynamic panel model estimations regarding the mean 
reverting behavior of banks towards their capital structure decision. 
As shown in Table 6.9, the target capital structure setting behavior of banks is also analyzed in 
terms of bank characteristics, i.e., their size, liquidity and ownership. Hence, the survey responses 
and the likelihood test results revealed that target capital structure setting tendency is found to be 
higher in relatively highly liquid bank than in relatively weakly liquid banks. That is, high 
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percentage of the respondents (73.3%) of relatively higher liquid banks indicated their stronger 
tendency to seek to maintain target capital structure than the respondents (33.3%) of relatively 
lower liquid banks (Lχ2 (1) =2.875, p = 0.090). Similarly, the percentage of respondents (56.7%) of  
relatively higher liquid banks indicated their tendency to seek at least to the extent of somewhat 
tight target or very strict target which is higher than the  relatively lower liquid banks(50% )( Lχ2 (3) 
= 7.812, p =0.050).   
However, target setting behavior is found to be insignificantly associated with bank size and 
ownership. That is, despite high percentage(72.7%) of respondents of smaller banks tend to seek 
to maintain target capital structure in raising new funds when compared to larger banks(50%), size 
of banks is found to be insignificant in likelihood ratio test(Lχ2 (1) =1.156, p = 0.282). Similarly, 
high percentage (54.6%) of respondents of smaller banks replied their tendency to seek to the 
extent of somewhat tight target or very strict target debt to equity ratio when compared to the 
tendency of larger banks (40%). But, size of banks is found to be insignificantly associated with 
such target setting tendency of banks in likelihood ratio test (Lχ2 (3) =5.296, p =0.151).  
Likewise, despite high proportion of respondents (50%) of public banks replied their tendency to 
seek to the extent of somewhat tight target or very strict target capital structure compared to private 
banks (46.6%), target capital structure setting behavior is found to be independent of ownership of 
banks, in likelihood ratio test (Lχ2 (1) = 0.082, p =0.775 and Lχ2 (3) =3.590, p = 0.309).  
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B) Survey Result on Capital Structure Adjustment Dynamics 
The survey result reported in Table 6.9 reveals the results on capital structure adjustment 
dynamics. To investigate the possible asymmetrical capital structure adjustment dynamics, the 
respondents were asked firstly about their relative deviation from target equity capital ratio (row d 
of Panel A in Table 6.9). Then, the respondents were also probed about the rate or the extent to 
which banks tend to adjust towards the target, given the relative deviation from their target (Row e 
of Panel A; row a of Panel B in Table 6.9).  Hence, as per the responses given to the relative 
deviation of the actual capital ratio from target equity capital ratio, only 30% of the respondents 
replied that target capital ratio is usually very close to actual capital ratio. Despite some variations 
of the responses as to how it deviates (it may only exceeds, only fallen or may exceed/fall), the 
remaining 70% of the respondents said that target equity capital ratio deviates from actual capital 
ratio.  This implies that a given bank is not always at the desired or target capital structure. It could 
be either over-capitalized (underleveraged) or under-capitalized (overleveraged) at a given point in 
time. Besides, in response to the rate of adjustment given the deviation, 50 % percent of the 
respondents revealed that the speed of adjustment towards the target in under-capitalized (over-
leveraged) banks is faster than the speed of adjustment in over-capitalized(under-leveraged) 
banks(35%)(row e of Panel A in Table 6.9). Similarly, the mean scores reveal the faster rate of 
adjustment of under-capitalized banks (3.80) than over-capitalized banks (2.55) (row a of Panel B 
in Table 6.9). These results substantiate the finding documented in the asymmetrical dynamic 
panel model estimations depicted in Table 6.5.  
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As indicated in Table 6.9, the survey results on capital structure adjustment dynamics were also 
examined against bank characteristics. That is, to examine the possible heterogeneity on capital 
structure adjustment dynamics, the responses about the dynamics of target capital structure 
adjustment of banks are cross-tabulated along with bank size, liquidity and ownership (Table 6.9). 
Hence, based on the survey responses and the likelihood ratio test results, the tendency of 
overleveraged (under-capitalized) banks to adjust faster is found to be higher for larger banks (70%) 
than their smaller counterparts (18.2%) (Lχ2 (2) = 7.956, p = 0.034).  Besides, the mean scores  of 
the responses and the Mann-Whitney test results of bank size also revealed that the tendency of 
banks to adjust towards target capital structure is found to be associated with bank size (U=35.00, z 
=-1.151, ns ,U= 35.50, z =-3.48, p <.001)(row a of Panel B in Table 6.9). 
However, in the documented likelihood ratio test (row e of Panel A in Table 6.9) and Mann-
Whitney test results (row a of Panel B in Table 6.9), bank liquidity is found to be insignificantly 
associated with the speed of adjustment of banks in reverting towards their target capital structure 
(Lχ2 (2) =3.765, p = 0.229; U = 29.50, z = -0.730, ns, U = 27, z = -0.957, p <0.158). These results 
substantiate the finding documented in estimations of the heterogeneous target capital structure 
adjustment dynamic panel model. Similarly, both the likelihood ratio test and Mann-Whitney test 
results revealed that the ownership of banks is insignificantly associated with the asymmetrical 
speed of adjustment of banks towards their target capital structure (Lχ2 (2) =3.085, p = 0.362 ; U = 
30.50, z = -0.730, ns ,U = 37.50, z = -0.957,ns) (row e of Panel A; row a of Panel B  in Table 6.9).  
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6.2.3. Summary of the Results  
 
The study investigates the determinants and the dynamics of capital structure based on estimation 
of static and dynamic panel data models, and cross-sectional survey.  In static panel model fixed 
effect estimation, effective tax rate, profitability, growth, dummy for minimum capital regulation 
and dummy for regulatory pressure for capital adequacy are found to be significantly related to 
leverage of banks. The effects of collateral values of assets, size and earnings volatility, however, are 
statistically insignificant. In estimation of symmetrical capital structure adjustment model, the study 
also documents the existence of capital structure dynamism. In other words, banks tend to adjust 
towards the target at a relatively rapid speed of adjustment. Besides, in estimation of asymmetrical 
capital structure adjustment model equation, the target capital structure adjustment dynamics of 
overleveraged (under-capitalized) banks and underleveraged (over-capitalized) banks is found to be 
asymmetrical. Further, in the estimation of the dynamic panel model that allows the possible 
heterogeneity of the speed of adjustment, the result revealed that banks’ speed of adjustment 
depends on their absolute deviations from target, size, regulatory pressure for capital adequacy and 
ownership.  
The cross-sectional survey carried out on the determinants of capital structure revealed that the tax 
shield of interest deductibility, size of free cash flows and/or profitability, investment policy/growth 
opportunities and regulatory pressure for capital adequacy are important (and/or very important) 
factors in the capital structure decisions of banks. The survey results also showed the presence of 
the target capital setting behavior and asymmetrical rate of adjustment of banks. 
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6.3. Discussions  
 
The study investigated the central research question: What determines the capital structure 
decision of banks and how do they adjust capital structure dynamically in Ethiopia?  Hence, this 
section presents the discussions made, in line with theoretical predictions and empirical literatures 
on the documented results of the estimations of panel models and the cross-sectional survey. 
6.3.1. Discussions of the Results on the Determinants of Capital Structure 
 
The study investigated the determinants of capital structure based on the estimated results of static 
panel model (Table 6.3) and symmetrical dynamic panel model (Table 6.4) and the cross-sectional 
survey results (Table 6.7 and Table 6.8).   
6.3.1.1. Taxation 
 
In the chosen fixed effect estimator, effective tax rate is found to be positive in sign and statistically 
significant at 5% in regressing against bank leverage in a static framework (Table 6.3). Similarly, in a 
dynamic perspective, effective tax rate is found to be positive and statistically significant at 1% level 
both in Difference GMM and in System GMM estimators (Table 6.4).  In the cross-sectional 
survey, the tax advantage of interest deductibility and the level of interest rate on the deposits and 
other debts of banks are also found to be important and/or very important factors in the capital 
structure decision of banks in Ethiopia (Table 6.7)40.  
                                                          
40
 Besides, the survey result provides moderate support for the importance of tax loss carried forward in capital 
structure decision of banks (Table 6.8).  
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When comparing the results of this study with the findings of past empirical studies on banking 
firms (such as Marcus (1983) on US banks, Hortuland (2005) on Swedish banks and Amidu 
(2007) on Ghanaian banks), the results are found to be consistent with each other. The finding is 
also consistent with the evidence Abor (2008) found out by examining Ghanaian non-financial 
firms. Besides, the survey result is also consistent with the available past survey studies conducted 
on banking firms. For example, the survey studies carried out by Marques & Santos (2003) and by 
Iwarere & Akinley (2010) on Portuguese and on Nigerian banks, respectively, found tax economies 
of debt rather than equity financing as one of the internal factors to be heeded in capital structure 
decision of banks (Marques & Santos,2003). Similarly, the survey result of this study is consistent 
with the results documented by various survey studies on corporate financial decision of non-
financial firms in US (Graham & Harvey, 2001), in UK (Beattie et al., 2006; Brounen et al., 2006 ; 
Archbold & Lazirdis, 2010) and in selected European countries (Bancel & Mitto, 2004).   
However, the results documented on taxation contradicted the evidences of some of the past 
empirical studies (for example, Sharp (1995) on Australian Trading banks, Booth et al. (2001) on 
non-financial firms of selected developing countries and Chen & Strang (2006) Huang & Song 
(2006) on Chinese non-financial firms). 
Hence, these results provide empirical support for the predictions of tax benefits and costs of 
financial distress tradeoff model. The increased use of debt financing of Ethiopian banks mainly in 
the form of deposits lowers the effective marginal tax rate more by interest deductions than by 
equity financing (Abor, 2008).  
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6.3.1.2. Profitability and/or Size of Free cash flows 
Profitability of banks is found to be statistically significant at 1% and negatively related to leverage 
using the chosen static panel model fixed effect estimator (Table 6.3). Similarly, profitability of 
banks is also found to be negative and statistically significant at 5% and 1% level in the Difference 
GMM and System GMM estimations respectively (Table 6.4). The survey results also substantiate 
the empirical results of panel model estimations. Specifically, the cross-sectional survey result 
disclosed that profitability/financial flexibility and size of free cash flows as the important or very 
important factor to be considered in capital structure decision of banks in Ethiopia (Table 6.7). 
Given the importance of profitability, the survey result also revealed the lesser tendency of banks 
for debt issuance in the presence of accumulated profit (Table 6.8). Moreover, the survey results 
show the preference of banks for debt issuance in the absence of sufficient profit and at last, stock 
issuance in the absence of other funding sources (Table 6.8). 
In comparison to past studies, these findings are found to be consistent with the evidences 
documented in banking firms. For example, similar result is reported in US and European banks 
(Gropp & Heider, 2009), in banks of selected developing countries (Octavia & Brown, 2008), in 
Ghanian banks (Amidu, 2007), in Turkish banks (Çağlayan & Sak ,2010), in banks of selected 
industrialized countries (Brewer et al., 2008), in European banks (Schaeuck & Cihak, 2007), in 
Portuguese banks (Boucihina & Robeiro, 2007), and in Australian trading banks (Sharp, 1995), 
among others. In general, these studies documented the negative relationship between profitability 
and leverage, or equivalently, positively with capital ratio of banks. Similarly, the survey results are 
also consistent with the results in survey studies of Portuguese banks (Marques & Santos, 2003) 
and Nigerian banks (Iwarere & Akinley, 2010). These survey studies reveal the size of cash flows 
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and profitability as the main internal determinants in the capital structure decision of banks 
(Marques & Santos, 2003). Similarly, the result is also consistent with the results documented in 
the studies of nonfinancial firms---for example,  in US (Fried & Lang, 1988; Titman & Wessels, 
1988; Frank & Goyal, 2004); in G-7 countries (Rajan & Zingales, 1995); in UK (Bevan & Danbolt, 
2004); in Japan (Hirota,1999); in selected developing countries (Booth et al., 2001); in China 
(Chen, 2004; Huang & Song, 2005); in Uruguay (Ignacio, 2002); and in Ghana (Abor, 2008), 
among others. Similarly, the survey result is also consistent with the evidences of survey studies in 
nonfinancial firms―for example, in US (Graham & Harvey, 2001); in UK (Beattie et al., 2006; 
Brounen et al., 2006); and in selected European countries (Bancel & Mitto, 2004), among 
others―also documented the importance of financial flexibility or profitability in the capital 
structure decision of banking firms. 
 At the outset, the documented findings provide empirical support to the prediction of the pecking 
order theoretical model. On the contrary, these results reject the prediction of the tradeoff 
theoretical model41. In the pecking order theoretical model perspective, these results imply that 
profitable banks prefer internal financing to external financing in order to minimize information 
asymmetry related costs (Majluf & Myers, 1984; Myers, 1984; Harris & Raviv, 1991). Alternatively, 
the documented evidences on profitability can be explained based on the legal reserve requirement 
of Ethiopian banks (Directive No.SBB /4/ 95 of NBE). In the legal reserve requirement, banks in 
Ethiopia are required to transfer 25% of their profitability to capital reserves (Directive No.SBB /4/ 
95 of NBE).  
                                                          
41
 In tradeoff, the result implies, the use of deposits and other debts in curbing the self-interest of managers over the 
high free cash flows, expected to be hold in highly profitable banks, is minimal (Jenson, 1986). 
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6.3.1.3. Growth Opportunities and/or Investment Policy 
 
In the fixed effect static panel model estimation, the documented negative coefficient of growth 
opportunities of banks is found to be statistically significant at 5% level to be related with leverage 
of banks in Ethiopia (Table 6.3). However, the coefficient of growth opportunities is found to be 
statistically insignificant in both the Difference GMM and the System GM estimations of the short-
run dynamics (Table 6.4)42. On the other hand, the cross-sectional survey results substantiate the 
static panel model estimation results. Clearly, the survey responses indicate the importance or very 
importance of the investment policy or growth opportunity of banks in their financing decisions 
(Table6.7). Specifically, the respondents regarded growth opportunities as the firstly ranked factor 
in their capital structure decisions (Table 6.7). Moreover, the survey results demonstrate the 
banks’s issuance of common stocks to finance growth opportunities (Table 6.8). In comparison to 
past evidences reported in banking firms, these results are found to be inconsistent with the 
documented evidences, for example, in Ghanaian banks (Amidu, 2007), in Turkish banks 
(Çağlayan & Sak, 2010), in US banks (Berger et al., 2008), and in Australian trading banks (Sharp, 
1995). These studies reported a positive relationship between growth opportunities and leverage of 
banks or alternatively, a negative relationship between growth and capital ratio of banks. Similarly, 
the documented results are also inconsistent with the findings of past studies in nonfinancial firms 
(for example, Kester, 1986; Titman & Vessels,1988; Jordan et al., 1999; Cassar & Holmes, 2003; 
Chen, 2004; Huang & Song, 2005; Chen & Strange, 2006; Abor, 2008). However, the findings of 
                                                          
42 The dynamic panel model estimations reveal the short-run relationship between factors and leverage (Antoniou et 
al., 2008). Hence, it may differ from the static panel model, which may capture the long-term relationship (Antoniou et 
al., 2008). Appropriately, the long-run relation can also be examined by estimating the short-run coefficients in 
dynamic estimations and dividing by the speed of adjustment (Flannery & Hankins, 2007; Antoniou et al., 2008). 
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the study are also consistent with the reported evidences of other empirical studies. For instance, 
similar results are reported in the studies of nonfinancial firms in US (Kim & Sorensen, 1986; 
Barton & Gordon, 1988; Frank & Goyal, 2004), in G-7 countries (Rajan & Zingles, 1995), in Japan 
(Hirota, 1999),  in selected developing countries (Booth et al., 2001), in Saudi Arabia (Al-Sakran, 
2001), in Pakistan (Shah & Khan, 2007) and in Libya (Buferna et al., 2005), among others43. 
Further, the survey results are consistent with the reported evidences in the past survey studies 
conducted in Portuguese banks (Marques & Santos, 2003), in UK banks (Alfon et al., 2004) and in 
Hong Kong banks (Wong et al., 2005). 
 
Hence, the documented results of the study provide empirical support to the predictions of the 
tradeoff theoretical model. In contrast, the findings reject the predictions of the pecking order 
theoretical model. Specifically, from the perspective of the tradeoff theoretical model, the findings 
support the prediction that high-growth opportunities of firms entail high probability of default 
(Frank & Goyal, 2009) and high agency costs of debt, in the form of assets substitution (Jenson & 
Meckling, 1976) and underinvestment (Myers, 1977). In part, these explanations may be relevant 
to the context of Ethiopian banks. However, the alternative explanation of the findings may be 
related to the absence of a well-developed debt market of Ethiopia. Besides, highly growing banks 
are expected to be young, and hence very much stretched in their internal financial resources to 
fund investment opportunities (Chen, 2004; Dang et al., 2012). Thus, in the presence of very 
much underdeveloped debt market (Chen, 2004) and limited internal funds (Dang et al., 2012), 
                                                          
43
 As caveat for comparisons, past studies mainly use the market–to-book value ratio as the proxy for growth 
opportunities. But, still, some of past studies used a similar proxy of change of total assets for growth opportunities. 
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stock issuances become somewhat an “easy way” to finance the growth opportunities of Ethiopian 
banks. 
6.3.1.4. Collateral Values of Assets 
 
In the static panel data model estimators, the coefficients of collateral values of assets are found to 
be negative but statistically insignificant in regressing against leverage of banks in Ethiopia (Table 
6.3).  Consistent with the results in the static panel model estimation, the coefficient of collateral 
values of assets is also found to be statistically insignificant in the dynamic panel model estimations 
(Table 6.4). In comparison to past studies conducted in banking firms, this evidence is inconsistent 
with the results documented, for example,  in US and European banks (Gropp & Heider, 2009); 
in banks of selected developing countries (Octavia & Brown, 2008 ; in Taiwan banks (Kuo, 2000); 
in Turkish banks (Çağlayan & Sak, 2010); and in Ghanaian banks (Amidu, 2007). Similarly, this 
finding is also inconsistent with the evidences documented in the nonfinancial firms of  developed 
countries (Fried & Lang, 1988; Rajan & Zinglas, 1995; Jordan et al., 1998; Hirota, 1999; Bevan & 
Danbolt, 2004; Frank & Goyal, 2004) and developing countries (Booth et al., 2001; Ignacio, 2002; 
Chen, 2004; Buferna et al., 2005; Shah & Khan, 2007;Abor, 2008; Ramlall, 2009).  
 
In effect, the finding provides empirical support neither for the predictions of the tradeoff 
theoretical model nor for the predictions of the pecking order theoretical model.  In the tradeoff 
theory, the result implies that, even if banks are not required to pledge collaterals to raise debt in 
the form of deposit, the collateral values of asset holding of Ethiopian banks have no significant 
effect on raising funds from other debt financing sources.  However, due to the very nature of the 
operations of banking firms, this result can be attributed to the low fixed asset holding of banks.  
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Besides, in the existing thin long-term debt market of Ethiopia, there may be a high reliance of 
Ethiopian banks on the use of deposits and other short-term debts (Booth et al., 2001). 
 
6.3.1.5. Size 
 
In the static panel model estimation, the positive coefficient of size of banks is found to be 
statistically insignificant in regressing against leverage of banks in Ethiopia in the chosen fixed effect 
estimator (Table 6.3). Similarly, in the System GMM estimator, the negative coefficient of size is 
found to be statistically insignificant in regressing against leverage of banks in the dynamic 
perspective (Table 6.4).  
 
In comparison to past  empirical studies conducted in banking firms, this result is inconsistent with 
the reported results of studies in US and European banks (Gropp & Heider, 2009); in Taiwan 
banks (Kuo, 2000); in Ghanaian banks (Amidu, 2007); in Turkish banks (Çağlayan & Sak, 2010); 
in European banks (Schaeuck & Cihak, 2007); in Honk Kong banks (Wong et al., 2005); in US 
banks (Berger et al., 2008 ); in banks of selected industrialized countries (Brewer et al., 2008), 
among others. Similarly, the finding is also inconsistent with the evidences documented in the 
studies of nonfinancial firms, for example,  in US (Fried & Lang, 1988; Frank & Goyal, 2004);  in 
G-7 countries (Rajan & Zingales, 1995); in UK (Jordan et al., 1998; Bevan & Danbolt, 2002; 2004); 
in Japan (Hirota, 1999); in selected developing countries (Booth et al., 2001); in Pakistan (Shah  & 
Khan, 2007;) and in Ghana (Abor,2009).  
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Therefore, this result does not support both the predictions of the tradeoff and the pecking order 
theoretical models. The result implies that, even if larger banks are expected to be more 
diversified, less exposed to defaults, face low agency cost of debt and low costs of information 
asymmetry than their smaller counterparts (Titman & Wessels, 1988; Rajan & Zinglas, 1995), size 
doesn’t matter in the financing decision of Ethiopian banks. 
 
6.3.1.6. Risk 
 
The coefficient of earnings volatility is found to be statistically insignificant in regressing against 
leverage of banks in the chosen fixed effect static panel model estimator (Table 6.3). Consistently, 
earnings volatility is found to be statistically insignificant in the Difference GMM and the System 
GMM estimators (Table 6.4).  However, the cross-sectional survey result revealed the importance 
and/or very importance of volatility of earnings and cash flows in the financing decision of banks 
(Table 6.7). Similarly, the survey responses also rated risk and costs of distress and insolvency as 
important factors in the capital structure decision of banks (Table 6.7).  
 
Compared to past studies in banking firms, the documented evidence in the panel model 
estimations is found to be inconsistent with the findings in US banks (Marcus, 1983; Berger et al., 
2008); in Portuguese banks (Boucihina, 2008); and in Taiwan banks (Kuo, 2000), among others. 
Similarly, this finding is inconsistent with prior evidences reported in nonfinancial firms of selected 
developing countries (Booth et al., 2001), as well as in China (Chen & Strange, 2006) and in 
Ghana (Abor, 2008). However, the survey result of the study is consistent with the findings in the 
survey studies of the UK banks (Alfon et al., 2004) and the Hong Kong banks (Wong et al., 2005). 
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Likewise, the survey result is also consistent with the documented evidences in the survey studies 
of nonfinancial firms in US (Graham & Harvey, 2001), in Europe (Bancel & Mittoo, 2004; 
Brounen et al., 2006), and in UK (Beattie et al., 2006), among others.  
 
As a result, despite its inconsistencies to panel model estimations44, the documented survey results 
provide support to the predictions of the tradeoff and the pecking order theoretical models. In the 
tradeoff theoretical model, the survey results support the view that risk, costs of distress and high 
volatility of earnings imply the expected high probability of default and agency cost of debt (Myers, 
1984; Titman & Wessels, 1988; Abor, 2008). In the pecking order theoretical model, the survey 
results support the prediction that the high variability of earnings of firms leads to the difficulties of 
investors to forecast future earnings of firms using available information (Prasad et al., 2001). 
Then, investors may demand a higher premium for risk forbearance, which in turn raises the costs 
of debt in external financing (Prasad et al., 2001; Shah & Khan, 2007). Hence, in both predictions, 
banks are expected to decrease debt financing or increase equity capital ratio. But, still, a high 
percentage of the respondents disregard the banks’ issuance of shares to complement risk and to 
provide cushion against unexpected losses (Alfon et al., 2004; Wong et al., 2005) (Table 6.8).  In 
effect, the direction (positive/negative) of the importance of risk for the financing decision of 
Ethiopian banks cannot be clearly discerned in the survey results.  
 
 
                                                          
44 Even if empirically defended, the contradiction may be attributed to the proxy of earnings volatility used in panel 
model estimations. Due to the lack of quarterly data and recent history of the private banking sector in Ethiopia, it has 
been measured using the standard deviation of ROA of each bank on three consecutive periods. Hence, it may not 
capture much of the variations in earnings. 
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6.3.1.7. Regulatory Pressure 
 
In the chosen fixed effect estimation, the coefficient of the dummy variable for the minimum paid 
up capital requirement is found to be negative and statistically significant at 1% in regressing against 
leverage of banks in Ethiopia (Table 6.3). Consistently, the coefficient of the dummy variable for 
the minimum paid up capital regulation is also found to be negative and statistically significant at 
5% level in the Difference GMM estimation (Table 6.4). Moreover, the positive coefficient of the 
dummy variable for regulatory pressure for capital adequacy is found to be statistically significant at 
1% level in the fixed effect (Table 6.3) and the Difference GMM estimations (Table 6.4).  In the 
cross-sectional survey, the regulatory pressure factors are also found to be important and very 
important factors to be considered in the capital structure decision of banks in Ethiopia (Table 6.7 
& Table 6.8). Specifically, the survey results revealed the importance or very importance of  the 
consequences of contravening the regulatory minimum capital requirement and changes in the 
regulatory and supervision frameworks in the financing decision of banks (Alfon et al., 2004; 
Wong et al., 2005) (Table 6.7). 
 
The findings of the study are consistent compared to the reported evidences of past studies45, for 
example, in US banks (Jacques & Nigro, 1998; Osterberg & Thomson, 1996), in Malaysian banks 
(Ahmed et al., 2009), in Norwegian banks (Lindquest,  2004) and in Australian trading banks 
(Sharp, 1995), among others. The survey results are also found to be consistent with the evidence 
documented in Portuguese banks (Marques & Santos, 2003), in UK banks (Alfon et al., 2004) and 
                                                          
45 In these comparisons, the possible significant differences in the institutional and regulatory frameworks of past 
studies need to be considered. 
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in banks of Honk Kong (Wong et al., 2005). However, the findings are inconsistent with the 
reported results in other studies of US banks (Marcus, 1983; Berger et al., 2008; Flannery & 
Rangan, 2008); US and European banks (Gropp & Heider, 2009) and Swedish  banks (Hortuland, 
2005), among others.  
Thus, the documented results of the study generally reveal the relevance of regulatory factors to 
explain the capital structure decision of Ethiopian banks. Expressly, the minimum paid up capital 
regulation dummy variable is expected to capture the effect of the minimum paid up capital 
requirement imposed on the Ethiopian banks established during the years prior to and following 
1999. Hence, the document result confirms the minimum paid capital regulation as one of the 
pertinent regulatory factors to explain the capital structure decision of Ethiopian banks. To adhere 
to the required minimum paid up capital amount, Ethiopian banks tend to increase equity capital 
financing and be constrained in their choice of leverage (Flannery & Rangan, 2008).  Besides, the 
finding on the regulatory pressure for capital adequacy supports the view that, even if low-
capitalized Ethiopian banks hold capital ratio below the banking industry average, their capital ratio 
is above the regulatory minimum (Ahmed et al., 2009). Thus, they tend to increase leverage or 
decrease equity capital ratio (Ahmed et al., 2009). This tendency of Ethiopian banks to hold 
capital ratio in excess of the regulatory minimum has also been revealed in the survey results. 
Specifically, a high percentage of survey respondents replied that banks firstly assess the capital 
required to run their operation, and then confirm whether it meets the regulatory required capital 
minimum (Wong et al., 2005) (Table 6.8). On the other hand, the survey results also disclosed the 
tendency of banks to assess the additional capital needed for their operation, given the regulatory 
minimum (Wong et al., 2005) (Table 6.8). In both survey responses, Ethiopian banks consider the 
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regulatory capital minimum in their capital structure decision (Wong et al., 2005). But, still, they 
tend to hold in excess of the regulatory minimum (Alfon et al., 2004; Wong et al., 2005). In 
contrast, the documented result on the regulatory pressure for capital adequacy in the panel model 
estimation rejects the prediction for the presence of higher regulatory pressures in low-capitalized 
bank to raise their capital ratio than in highly capitalized banks (Marcus, 1983; Berger et al., 2008; 
Ahmed et al., 2009).  
6.3.2. Discussions:  Evidences on Target Capital Structure Adjustment Dynamics 
 
To investigate the capital structure adjustment dynamics, the study examined the estimation results 
in dynamic panel models of symmetrical capital structure adjustment (Table 6.4), asymmetrical 
capital structure adjustment (Table 6.5), and the capital structure adjustment dynamics with 
heterogeneous rate of adjustments (Table 6.6).  Besides, the study also analyzed the cross-sectional 
survey results with respect to target setting behavior and adjustment dynamics (Table 6.9). 
6.3.2.1. Symmetrical Target Capital Structure Adjustment and Target Setting Behavior 
In the symmetrical capital structure adjustment dynamic panel model, the coefficient of lagged 
leverage is found to be positive and statistically significant consistently in the Difference GMM and 
the System GMM estimations (Table 6.4). In these Difference and System GMM estimations, the 
partial speed of adjustment towards the desired leverage of Ethiopian banks is found to be 41.6% 
and 37.3% per year, respectively (Table 6.4). Considering both estimations, the average 
symmetrical partial rate of adjustment would be 39.45 % per annum (Drobetz et al., 2013). This 
result implies that, on average, Ethiopian banks can close just about 39.45% of the deviation from 
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their desired leverage (Dang et al., 2012). In terms of hal- life, the documented rate of adjustment 
matches the half-life of around 1.38 years (Dang et al., 2012; Drobetz et al., 2013)46. The survey 
results also confirm the presence of the target capital structure setting tendency of banks (Table 
6.9). To be specific, the survey respondents replied about the presence of high tendency of banks 
to seek to maintain target capital structure in raising funds to finance new investment (Table 6.9). 
Besides, the survey results also disclosed that banks that tend to seek target capital structure also 
usually deviate from the target in a given period (Table 6.9).  
In comparison to past studies, the estimated speed of adjustment is closer to the reported speed of 
adjustment of 46% in EU and US banks (Gropp & Heider, 2009) and 44.3% in nonfinancial firms 
of UK (Ozkan, 2001).However, the estimated rate of adjustment is faster than the estimated speeds 
of 14% in Australian trading banks (Sharp, 1995), 20% to 23% in US banks (Marcus, 1983), 12% 
in banks of industrialized countries (Brewer et al., 2008), and 17% to 35%  in nonfinancial firms in 
US (Flannery & Rangan, 2006; Lemmon et al., 2008; Huang & Ritter, 2009), among others. In 
contrast, the estimated rate is slower than the reported estimated speed of 71.9% in nonfinancial 
firms of Spain (De Miguel & Pindado, 2001). The survey result is also consistent with the 
evidences reported by survey studies conducted in UK banks (Alfon et al., 2004); in Hong Kong 
banks (Wong et al., 2005); in US nonfinancial firms (Graham & Harvey, 2000); and in UK  
nonfinancial firms (Beattie et al., 2006). 
Hence, the documented results provide empirical support to the predictions of the target capital 
structure adjustment theory (Fischer et al., 1991). The finding confirms the presence of dynamism 
                                                          
46
 The period for a half-life is computed as: ln(1/2)/ln(1-speed of adjustment) (Dang et al, 2012; Drobetz et al., 2013). 
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in the capital structure decision of Ethiopian banks (Antoniou et al., 2008). Specifically, Ethiopian 
banks tend to adjust towards their target capital structure through time (Myers, 1984). In the 
theoretical predictions, the speed of adjustment depends on the cost of adjustment and costs of 
deviation from target (or the benefits of target adjustment) (Flannery & Hankins, 2007). Thus, the 
documented speed of adjustment implies the presence of somewhat higher deterrent adjustment 
costs than the benefits of target adjustments (or the costs of deviation from the target) (Flannery & 
Hankins, 2007).   
6.3.2.2. Asymmetrical Target Capital Structure Adjustment 
 
In estimating the asymmetrical capital structure adjustment model, the coefficients of 
overleveraged banks and underleveraged banks are found to be positive and statistically significant 
at 5% level and 1% level, respectively, in the chosen fixed effect estimation (Table 6.5). But, still, 
the coefficient of underleveraged banks is lower than the estimated coefficient of overleveraged 
banks (Table 6.5). This evidence implies the presence of asymmetrical target capital structure 
adjustment (Byoun, 2008). Relatively, there is a rapid pace of adjustment in overleveraged 
(undercapitalized) banks than in underleveraged (overcapitalized) banks (Berger et al., 2008; 
Byoun, 2008). These estimation results suggest that overleveraged banks need around 0.88 years to 
adjust half of the deviation from the desired leverage. On the other hand, underleveraged banks 
need about 0.96 years to close half of the deviation (Dang et al., 2012). The cross-sectional survey 
results also corroborate the findings on the asymmetrical dynamic panel model estimations (Table 
6.9).  A high percentage of respondents replied about the presence of a rapid pace of adjustment 
when their actual equity capital ratio is below the desired equity capital ratio (undercapitalized) 
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rather than overcapitalized (that is, when the actual equity capital ratio exceeds the target equity 
capital ratio) (Wong et al., 2005).  
 
As compared to past studies, the finding is consistent with the results documented in US banks 
(Berger et al., 2008). Likewise, this evidence is also consistent to the reported results of 
nonfinancial firms in US (Byoun, 2008; Faulkender et al., 2012); in G-7 countries (Drobetz et al., 
2013); and in selected Central and Eastern European countries (De Haas & Peeters, 2004). The 
survey result is also consistent with the documented evidences in UK banks (Alfon et al., 2004) 
and in Hong Kong banks (Wong et al., 2005).  
 
The estimated result confirms the presence of asymmetrical capital structure adjustment. To be 
specific, overleveraged banks adjust faster than underleveraged banks (Byoun, 2008). As pointed 
out earlier, the speed of adjustment depends on the cost of adjustment and costs of deviation from 
target (Flannery & Hankins, 2007; Drobetz et al., 2013). Hence, the documented results imply that 
adjustment costs and/or benefits of adjustment are asymmetrical for overleveraged and 
underleveraged banks (Drobetz et al., 2013). Then, the plausible explanation for a relatively quick 
rate of overleveraged banks can be the presence of higher benefits of increasing capital 
ratio/decreasing leverage (reducing costs of distress, agency costs of debt and regulatory pressure 
costs) than benefits of decreasing capital ratio/increasing leverage (benefits of tax shield and 
reducing agency problems of free cash flows) (Drobetz et al., 2013). Moreover, adjustment costs 
may be lower for overleveraged (undercapitalized) banks than for overcapitalized (underleveraged) 
banks (Byoun, 2008). 
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Further, the survey result also disclosed that the size of banks significantly associated to the 
asymmetrical target capital structure adjustment47. Specifically, the tendency of overleveraged banks 
to adjust faster is found to be higher in larger banks than in their smaller counterparts (Table 6.9). 
This survey result supports the prediction that larger banks have easier access to raise funds via 
external equity financing to increase their capital ratio when undercapitalized or overleveraged than 
smaller banks.  
 
6.3.2.3. Heterogeneous Target Capital Structure Rate of adjustment 
 
In examining the possible heterogeneity in target capital structure adjustment, the study estimates 
the dynamic panel model of heterogeneous capital structure adjustment (Table 6.6). In these 
estimations, the deviations (absolute) from target leverage, size, growth, liquidity, regulatory 
pressure for capital adequacy and ownership are included as the determinants of the speed of 
adjustment. Thus, estimation results revealed the existing cross-sectional heterogeneity in the rate 
of adjustment (Table 6.6).  
 Deviation (Absolute Deviation) from target and Target Adjustment 
To investigate the possible heterogeneity in the rate of adjustment, the study firstly tested the effect 
of deviation (absolute deviation) of banks from their target leverage on the rate of adjustment 
((Table 6.6). In the Difference GMM and the System GMM estimations, the coefficients of the 
interaction between deviation from target leverage and lagged leverage are found to be positive and 
                                                          
47
 However, both liquidity and ownership of banks insignificantly associated with the asymmetrical target capital 
structure adjustment dynamics of banks (Table 6.9.) 
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statistically significant at 1% level and 10% level, respectively (Table 6.6). Because of the specified 
negative sign in the dynamic panel model equation, the estimated result implies that the effect of 
deviation from target leverage on the speed of adjustment is found to be negative. In comparison 
to past studies, this evidence is consistent with the reported results in UK firms (Dang et al., 2008). 
On the contrary, this finding contradicts the findings of Drobetz & Wanzedrid (2006) in Swedish 
firms and the findings of De Haas & Peeters (2004) in the selected transition countries. 
The finding supports the view that adjustment costs tend to increase with the deviation from target 
(Dang et al., 2008). Banks deviating significantly far away from their target tend to adjust slowly 
(Dang et al., 2008). The alternative explanation of the finding may be the preference of Ethiopian 
banks for internal adjustment over external adjustment (Heshimite, 2001; Dang et al., 2008). The 
preference of internal adjustment may be to avoid the possible prohibitively high fixed costs of 
external adjustment through stock issuance spontaneous to deviation (Drobetz & Wanzenried, 
2006; Dang et al., 2008). However, this internal adjustment depends on the magnitude of internal 
funds availability and dividend payout policies (Drobetz & Wanzenried, 2006; Dang et al., 2008). 
Moreover, internal funds of banks may be earmarked for the use of other competing priorities of 
banks (Dang et al., 2008). Hence, due to the possible constraints of internal funds availability and 
relatively “sticky” payout policies of banks, this internal adjustment may be slower than external 
adjustment (Drobetz & Wanzenried, 2006; Dang et al., 2008). On the contrary, the finding rejects 
the prediction that rebalancing costs may mainly constitute fixed cost and then banks that 
considerably deviate from the desired leverage tend to adjust quickly (Heshimite, 2001; Drobetz & 
Wanzenried, 2006; Dang et al., 2008). 
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 Size and Target Adjustment 
In the Difference GMM and System GMM estimations of the heterogeneous capital structure 
adjustment model, the coefficients of interaction terms of size and lagged leverage are found to be 
negative and statistically significant at 1% level and 5% level, respectively (Table 6.6). Considering 
the specified negative sign of interaction terms in the estimated dynamic panel model, the result 
implies that size of banks are positively related to the speed of adjustment of banks towards the 
target (Drobetz & Wanzedrid, 2006; Flannery & Hankins, 2007). Compared to past studies, this 
evidence is in line with the results of Lööf (2003) and Banerjee et al(2000) in UK firms. In 
contrast, the finding is inconsistent with the finding of Drobetz & Wanzenried (2006) in Swedish 
firms. 
This evidence supports the view that adjustment cost is lower for larger banks than smaller banks 
(Heshimitie, 2001).  If the adjustment cost mainly constitutes fixed costs, the economics of scale 
advantage of larger banks would be far better than smaller banks (Heshimitie, 2001; Dang et al., 
2008). Alternatively, the finding may be explained based on the view that the expected lower cost 
of external financing in adjustments of larger banks than smaller counterparts (Drobetz & 
Wanzenried, 2006). Consistent to the prediction of the too-big-too fail hypothesis and their 
diversification possibilities, larger banks can raise funds easily, and then adjust readily than smaller 
banks (Drobetz & Wanzenried, 2006). However, this finding refutes the opposing argument that 
larger banks would have less incentive to adjust towards the target due to their expected less 
earnings volatility and costs of distress (Drobetz & Wanzenried, 2006; Dang et al., 2012). 
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 Growth Opportunities and Target Adjustment 
The effect of growth opportunities of banks on the dynamics of capital structure adjustment is also 
envisaged. In both Difference GMM and System GMM estimations, the coefficient of the 
interaction between growth and lagged leverage is found to be statistically insignificant (Table 6.6). 
In comparison to past studies, this evidence contradicts findings by Drobetz & Wanzenried (2006) 
in Swedish firms and by Dang et al. (2008) in UK firms. 
This result implies that growth opportunity is not relevant to explain the possible cross-sectional 
heterogeneity in the capital structure adjustment dynamics of Ethiopian banks. In effect, the 
finding rejects the prior prediction that low growth opportunities of firms imply a relatively less 
reliance on the external financing than high-growth firms. Hence, low-grow firms can easily adjust 
their capital structure due to the expected low information asymmetry related costs in rebalancing 
(Dang et al., 2008). Besides, this evidence is inconsistent with the opposing argument that high 
growth opportunities of firms imply frequent visits of different sources of finance, and then, they 
would have wide rooms to change their financing mix readily than low-growth firms (Dang et al., 
2008).  Further, this evidence is inconsistent with the view that low-growth opportunities of firms 
imply the tendency of firms to rely on internal adjustment than external adjustment (Dang et al., 
2008). Hence, as it may be impaired by internal fund availability, the rate of internal adjustment of 
low growth is expected to be slow (Drobetz & Wanzenried, 2006; Dang et al., 2008).    
 Liquidity and Target adjustment 
In estimating the heterogeneous capital structure adjustment model equation, the coefficient of 
interactive variable of liquidity and lagged leverage is found to be statistically insignificant 
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consistently in Difference GMM and System GMM estimations (Table 6.6). This evidence is 
inconsistent with the finding of Memmal & Raupach (2007) in banks of Germany. 
This evidence rejects the prediction that highly liquid banks holding relatively less risky assets tend 
to adjust faster than banks with relatively high illiquid loans (Memmal& Raupach, 2007). Besides, 
this evidence also rejects the view that highly liquid banks imply holding excess free cash flows that 
is more susceptible to agency problems of expropriations (Jenson, 1986; Panno, 2003) and tend to 
adjust slowly.  
 Regulatory Pressure for Capital adequacy  and Target Adjustment 
 
In both Difference GMM and System GMM estimations, the coefficient of the interaction terms of 
regulatory pressure for capital adequacy and lagged leverage are found to be negative and 
statistically significant at 1% and 10% levels, respectively (Berger et al., 2008). Given the negative 
sign of interaction term in the specified dynamic model, estimation results imply the presence of a 
positive effect of regulatory pressure for capital adequacy on the speed of adjustment. The finding 
is consistent with the empirical evidence documented by Berger et al. (2008) in US large banks. 
 
The finding suggests that low-capitalized Ethiopian banks that hold capital ratio below the industry 
average tend to adjust towards the desired leverage at a rapid pace than highly capitalized banks. At 
first, the finding supports the view that as the regulatory pressure for capital adequacy in the low-
capitalized banks would be higher than in highly capitalized banks, they tend to adjust quickly 
(Berger et al., 2008). The other plausible explanation is that most of the low-capitalized Ethiopian 
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banks are relatively large in size compared to highly capitalized banks (Table 6.2). In effect, these 
banks can raise funds easily and tend to adjust readily toward the target.   
 
 Ownership of Banks and Target Adjustment 
To test the possible differences in the speed of capital structure adjustment, the dummy variable 
for ownership of banks is interacted with lagged leverage and estimated (Table 6.9). In both the 
Difference and System GMM estimations, the coefficient of interaction term of ownership and 
lagged leverage is found to be positive and statistically significant at 5% level (Table 6.9). Once 
again, considering the specified negative sign in the dynamic model estimated, the result implies 
the private ownership of banks is negatively related with the rate of adjustment towards the target. 
In comparison, this finding is inconsistent with evidence reported by Memmal & Raupach (2007) 
in banks of Germany.  
This finding contradicts the prior prediction that private banks adjust towards the target at a rapid 
pace than publicly owned banks. Specifically, the result rejects the view that, as the primary 
objective of private banks is shareholders’ wealth maximization and facing high costs of market 
pressure than public banks, they tend to maintain leverage within a narrow interval and adjust 
quickly than public banks (Memmal & Raupach, 2007). The possible explanation of the finding is 
that public-owned banks in Ethiopia are relatively dominant, aged in history of banking of 
Ethiopia, reputable and highly diversified than private banks. Hence, they can adjust readily by 
choosing among alternative sources of financing with low costs of rebalancing than private bank in 
Ethiopia.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1. Introduction 
 
The study examined the determinants of capital structure and the existing dynamics of capital 
structure adjustment in banks of Ethiopia. To this end, secondary data in panel data set have been 
collected from the annual reports of the selected 14 commercial banks over a period time from 
2000 to 2012. Moreover, the study collected primary data from the survey responses of selected 
chief financial officers (CFOs) of banks48. Further, the study estimated panel data models both in 
static and dynamic frameworks and analyzed the cross-sectional survey responses using appropriate 
statistical techniques. This chapter constitutes the conclusion of the study and recommendations 
for further research. 
7.2. Conclusion 
 
The study investigates the determinants of the capital structure and capital structure adjustment 
dynamics based on estimation of static and dynamic panel models and cross-sectional survey.  
Evidences on the determinants of the capital structure of banks in both static panel model and 
symmetrical dynamic panel model estimations revealed the existence of a significant positive 
coefficient of effective tax rate, thereby supporting the predictions of the tradeoff theoretical 
model. Likewise, a significant negative coefficient of growth in regressing against leverage of banks 
in Ethiopia has been documented in the static panel model estimation. This finding is consistent 
                                                          
48 It includes also Finance Directors, Fund managers, Treasurers and Controllers. 
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with the prediction of the tradeoff theory, but it contradicts the prediction of the pecking order 
theory. In contrast, estimation results on profitability support the predictions of the pecking order 
theory and yet reject the views of the tradeoff theory. Consistently, in both static and dynamic 
frameworks, the coefficient of profitability is found to be negative and significant in regressing 
against leverage of banks in Ethiopia. Similarly, the cross-sectional survey results on the 
determinants of the capital structure of banks disclosed that the tax shield of interest deductibility, 
profitability and/or size of free cash flows, and investment policy or growth opportunities are 
important and very important factors in the capital structure decision of banks. However, the 
collateral values of assets, size and earnings volatility are found to be statistically insignificant in 
regressing against leverage of banks in Ethiopia, consistently in both static and symmetrical 
dynamic panel models estimations. These results reject the predictions of both the tradeoff and the 
pecking order theoretical models. However, the survey results revealed that earnings volatility or 
change in profitability is rated as important or very important determinant of the financing decision 
of banks.  
Further, evidence on the determinants of the capital structure of banks in panel model estimation 
also revealed that the regulatory pressure variable for the minimum capital requirement is 
significantly related to leverage of banks in Ethiopia. Specifically, in both static and symmetrical 
dynamic panel model estimations, the regulatory pressure on the minimum capital requirement is 
found to be negatively and significantly related with leverage of banks in Ethiopia. In contrast, the 
relationship between regulatory pressure for capital adequacy and leverage is found to be positive 
and statistically significant consistently in both static and symmetrical panel model estimations. In 
the cross-sectional survey, maintaining the minimum capital requirement is found to be an 
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important and a very important factor in the financing decision of banks. Banks usually tend to 
hold capital above the regulatory minimum. 
Evidence on the symmetrical capital structure dynamics showed that banks in Ethiopia set the 
target capital structure and tend to adjust towards it at a fairly rapid symmetrical partial speed of 
adjustment. Similarly, the cross-sectional survey result revealed the banks’ tendency of target capital 
setting behavior. In estimation of asymmetrical capital structure adjustment model equation, the 
target capital structure adjustment dynamics is also found to be asymmetrical, in that the rate of 
adjustment of overleveraged or undercapitalized banks is shown to be higher than the speed of 
adjustment of underleveraged or overcapitalized banks. As corroboration, in the cross-sectional 
survey, the rate of adjustment is found to be asymmetrical, whereby undercapitalized 
(overleveraged) banks adjusts faster than overcapitalized (underleveraged) banks. This 
asymmetrical rate of adjustment is also found to be heterogeneous, conditional on size of banks. 
The documented evidence also revealed heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment towards target. 
To be specific, the banks’ speed of adjustment towards the target capital structure depends on their 
absolute deviation from target, size, regulatory pressure for capital adequacy and ownership, in 
estimating the dynamic panel model. However, the growth opportunities and liquidity of banks are 
found to be insignificant to induce heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment towards the target. 
To sum up, these documented evidences of the present study would have academic contributions 
and policy implications, as discussed in the following subsections, respectively. 
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7.2.1. Academic Contributions  
By empirically investigating the determinants of the capital structure and dynamics of capital 
structure adjustment of Ethiopian banks, the study contributes to filling the gaps in the literature in 
many ways: 
Firstly, despite a large number of studies have been documented on capital structure, surprisingly 
there are an insignificant/inadequate number of studies carried out to examine the possible 
asymmetrical and/or heterogeneous capital structure adjustments of banks. This is particularly true 
for banking firms of developing countries. Hence, the study contributes to filling the gap in 
literature as it explicitly examined the possible asymmetrical and/or cross-sectional heterogeneity in 
the target capital structure adjustment dynamics of the banking sector in Ethiopia. 
Secondly, most of previous empirical studies on the capital structure of firms that have tested the 
tradeoff and the pecking order theories mostly neglect banks and other financial firms (Gropp & 
Heider, 2009; Baranoff et al, 2008). On the other hand, previous studies on the capital structure of 
banks have mainly focused on regulatory factors (Gropp &Heider, 2009). Therefore, by integrating 
the standard corporate finance theory and regulatory view of banks’ capital structure, the study 
contributes to the extant body of academic literature in two main ways. First, different factors that 
are predicted in the tradeoff and the pecking order theoretical models and found to be valid in the 
existing empirical literature on corporate nonfinancial firms in developed countries also hold in the 
context of Ethiopia. Specifically, these factors are found to be significant to explain the capital 
structure decision and target capital structure adjustment dynamics of firms in least developing 
countries, particularly in banks of Ethiopia. Then, these would imply (i) that the capital structure 
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decision of banks in Ethiopia is not at random as propounded in the MM irrelevance proposition 
(Modigilani & Miller,1958; Gaud et al.,2003); (ii) that capital regulation is not  the only friction that 
constitutes the overriding departure from the MM irrelevance proposition as advocated in a 
regulatory  view of banking  literature; and (iii) that, despite the fact that the pecking order and the 
tradeoff theoretical models are not found to be mutually exclusive, the tradeoff (or target 
adjustment) theoretical model is more powerful  than the pecking order theoretical model to 
explain the financing behavior of banks in Ethiopia. Second, pertinent regulatory pressure on the 
capital holdings of banks is found to be relevant to explain the financing decision of banks. Hence, 
the empirical evidences documented in the present study would transcend the previous evidences 
documented in the literature on capital structure of banking and nonfinancial firms. These results 
would imply that factors predicted in the corporate finance theoretical models or market forces 
alone do not explain the capital structure decision and adjustment dynamics of banks in Ethiopia. 
Regulatory pressure factors interact with the market forces to explain the financing decision of 
banks. This is a particularly important contribution to the existing body of literature on the banking 
sector, as the study was based on actual data on the regulatory pressure factors typical to the 
banking sector in Ethiopia which operates in the absence of explicit deposit insurance49.  
Further, in midst of the existing puzzles in capital structure and lack of studies in the least 
developing countries, particularly in Ethiopia, the study will extend the empirical literature by 
providing evidences on the explanatory power of theoretical models in the context that differs from 
                                                          
49 In its presence, banks are expected to hold low capital ratio from their moral hazard tendency (Wall & Peterson, 
1996). Hence, capital regulation would be binding (Sharp, 1995; Brewer et al., 2008). 
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their originations (Rajan & Zinglas, 1995). Specifically, the study tries to untangle the capital 
structure decision of banks, especially its dynamics, under the context of the least developed 
financial system where there is no secondary market and oligopolistic financial sector.  
7.2.2. Practical/Policy Implications 
The documented findings of the study would have several practical/policy implications, as 
summarized below.  
First, the study contributes by drawing attention to the mundane practices of the capital structure 
policy formulation of bank managers. The capital structure decision of banking firms is one of the 
key strategic decisions, whereby the documented evidences would call up on managerial attention. 
Despite the fact that the findings of the study would provide empirical support to the tradeoff or 
target capital structure adjustment theoretical model50, there is a need to a clear understanding of 
the determinants of capital structure and adjustment dynamics and thereby, the wealth of 
shareholders of banks may be further maximized. Hence, in the strategic financial decision of 
banks, CFOs (financial managers) need to understand how the factors in theoretical models, 
including taxation, costs of distress, agency cost and information asymmetry, interact with the 
regulatory pressure.  
Second, in the target capital structure adjustment dynamics, the study revealed the general 
tendency of banks to adjust quicker when overleveraged (undercapitalized) than when 
underleveraged (overcapitalized). Besides, in the heterogeneous capital structure adjustment 
                                                          
50
 This tendency of banks may be attributable to deregulation of financial sector in Ethiopia in the post-1994 period. 
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dynamics, the negative relationship between target adjustment and private ownership of banks has 
been documented. This tendency of banks may be related to the agency problems. In the agency 
problems, the management of banks may hold excess equity capital ratio in pursuit of a “riskless, 
quiet life” (Wong et al., 2005). Moreover, in the presence of banks with a widely dispersed 
ownership, bank managers (or the agents) may prefer excess equity capital holding and keep long 
excursions from the desired leverage or capital ratio (Wong et al., 2005). But these possible actions 
of bank managers (management) would be at the expense of the shareholders of banks (Jenson & 
Meckling, 1976; Wong et al., 2005). Thus, there is a need to consider such agency problems in 
bank capital regulation (Wong et al., 2005). 
Further, in estimations of both static and dynamic panel models, the effect of the regulatory 
pressure for capital adequacy is found to be significant and positive. The result implies that the 
low-capitalized banks that hold capital ratio below the industry average tend to increase leverage. 
This result would have two implications for policymakers. First, even though the capital holdings of 
low-capitalized banks fall below the industry average, they hold capital in excess of the regulatory 
minimum. The other implication is that the effectiveness of peer-based regulatory pressure for 
capital adequacy is questionable. Finally, in the evidences documented in both static and dynamic 
panel models estimations, the effect of the minimum paid up capital requirement on banks’ capital 
holding is found to be significant. Similarly, the survey results also disclose the presence of banks 
holding capital in excess of the minimum regulatory requirement. In light of the deregulation of 
the banking sector, these results imply the effectiveness of the prevailing regulatory pressure on 
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capital holding of banks in ensuring the desired bank solvency and financial stability51. However, 
the continual of tightening of the policy instruments on capital regulation would imply the 
deleveraging of the banking sector and then the deleveraging of the rest of the economy (European 
Banking Federation, 2010).  Hence, in all efforts to design and revise the instruments of banks’ 
capital regulation, there is a need to consider the possible tradeoff between the risk of deleveraging 
banks to maintain the desired solvency and financial stability and the risk of leveraging banks to 
induce investment that can accelerate economic growth (European Banking Federation, 2010). 
7.4. Recommendations for Further Research 
 
Given the limitations stated in Chapter Five, further research can be conducted in the following 
perspectives: 
 Comparative Study – The present study focused only on examining the determinants and 
capital structure adjustment dynamics of the banking industry in Ethiopia. This may limit 
the implications of evidences on the validities of theoretical models and regulatory pressure 
for other financial firms of the sector. Hence, as there is a notable development and 
expansion of the insurance industry and microfinance institutions (enterprises) in Ethiopia, 
there is a need to test the generalizability of the findings across all firms in the financial 
sector.  Besides, available few studies done using data of Ethiopian firms are limited to 
examining the determinants of financing decision of firms only in static framework. As a 
                                                          
51
 The leverage ratio or capital ratio decisions of banks are closely linked to financial and economic stability (Santos, 
2001). This can be easily discernible in the observed economic scramble in the aftermath of the current financial crises 
(Buehler et al., 2009). 
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result, there is a need of further comparative study that will examine the adjustment 
dynamics of nonfinancial firms of Ethiopia. Further, as can be read in the literature on 
banking, there are theoretical contributions that attempt to explain the cross-sectional 
variations in the optimal bank capital structure driven by the market pressure (Gropp & 
Heider, 2009). As the lead proponents of this theoretical perspective of bank capital, 
Diamond & Rajan (2000) hypothesized that the optimal bank capital structure would be 
obtained at the point that balance the capability to create liquidity and credit with stability 52. 
Hence, there is a need of further study that will examine the cross-sectional variations in 
capital structure as a reflection of banks catering to different clienteles (Diamond & Rajan, 
2000; Gropp & Heider, 2009) and compare the results with the documented evidences in 
the present study.  
 
 Cross-Country Study - The study also examined the capital structure decision of banks 
operating in a single country. In effect, this may limit the robustness of the findings. Thus, 
considering the cross-country differences in macroeconomic and regulatory factors, there is 
a need to test the robustness of the findings on determinants of bank capital structure and 
capital structure adjustment dynamics across different countries. 
 
 Corporate Governance and Target Capital Structure Adjustment Dynamics - In the target 
capital structure adjustment dynamics of firms, there is a wide range of theoretical and 
empirical literature that examined the corporate governance and target capital structure 
                                                          
52
 This suggests that banks’ capital structure is a function of the degree to which the banks’ customers rely on liquidity 
and credit (Diamond & Rajan, 2000). 
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adjustment of firms. Hence, there is a need for further study that will examine in depth the 
validities of target capital structure adjustment models, by explicitly examining the 
corporate governance factors and adjustment dynamics of banks. 
 
 Methodological Issues - Due to lack of ample observations inherent in the limited number 
of target population and then the sample size53,   the study has been limited to test the 
dynamic tradeoff theory, looking for the presence of unique target capital structure in the 
panel model estimation. For a similar reason, factors in the cross-sectional survey have 
been examined based on firsthand data or responses gathered (from CFOs of banks) using 
a questionnaire that constitutes items that directly ask about the relationship between 
factors and financing decisions. Hence, to directly test the prediction of the dynamic 
tradeoff model, further research needs to be conducted based on the dynamic panel 
model54 that allows to directly test the presence of a target leverage (or, a target capital ratio) 
range in which banks may choose to swing through time rather than unique target (Fisher et 
al., 1989; Leary & Roberts, 2005; Dang et al., 2008). Besides, to minimize the possible  
response bias of the instrument (questionnaire) that directly asks about the relationship 
between factors and financing decisions, further research may be conducted based on the 
                                                          
53
 Attributable to the recent history of private banking sector in Ethiopia 
54 In this regard, Dynamic Panel Threshold model (Dang et al., 2008) and Hazard analysis (Leary & Roberts, 2005) 
may be helpful. 
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survey instrument that directly asks about only the determinants rather than about the 
relations to be examined (De Jong &van Dijk, 2001; De Jong et al, 2003)55.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
55 The relationship may be examined by regressing the responses to the determinants and financing decisions using the 
structure equation modeling ((De Jong &van Dijk, 2001; De Jong et al., 2003)55. 
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ANNEXES 
 
Annex 1- Equity Capital Ratio 
 
Figure 8.1- Cross Sectional and Time Series Variations of Equity capital Ratio of banks in Ethiopia 
 
 
Source  : Annual Report  of banks  to National Bank of Ethiopia  
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Annex 2- Normality Test 
 
Figure 8.2- Residual Plot 
 
Figure 8.3-Normal  Probability (P-P) plot 
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Annex 3- Survey Instrument 
                                              
Questionnaire 
 
Dear Sir/Madam                                                                                                                                                                                                             
                                                                                                                                   
This is the survey questioner developed to conduct a research entitled “Capital Structure 
Decision of firms: Evidences on Determinants and Dynamics of Capital structure in Banks 
of Ethiopia”. The purpose of this research is in the fulfillment of Doctor of Business 
Leadership Degree at UNISA.  
 
Hence, your sincere cooperation to fill the enclosed questioner is highly appreciable. It will 
take few minutes to complete filling the questioner and you may found it enjoyable 
experience. As there are very few respondents for the survey, your response will be highly 
important. I assure that all responses will be kept strictly as highly confidential. 
 
Thank you in Advance for your Cooperation!                                                                                                                                                                              
                                                                                                          
Sincerely,                      
                        
Teramaje Walle Mekonnen 
Mobile No- 0934-55550      
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General Instruction for filling the Questionnaire 
 
This questionnaire includes several questions that will help us to understand different factors or 
determinants of capital structure and capital structure adjustment dynamics in banks. There are no 
right or wrong answers to any of these questions. This questionnaire has also several different 
kinds of questions that appear in different formats. It may ask you to circle the number for rank of 
alternatives or check or put tick mark in the circle.  
 
Below are examples of how to do this. 
Circle the appropriate number      
                                            
Not important  Little important Fairly important Important Very important 
1 2  4 5 
 
 Check one  
                        Yes                               No                             
Please be sure that you choose the response that comes closest to how you feel. Be sure to look at 
the different answer choices before answering. 
 
Definition of Key Terms in the Questionnaire 
 Capital Structure- the mix of debt and equity capital financing of a bank. 
 
 Debt financing- the proportion of funds raised from deposits and other borrowings. 
 
 Equity capital financing- the proportion of funds raised from shareholders or retention. 
 
 Target Capital structure- the mix of debt and equity financing that balance the marginal 
costs of debt financing or equity financing with the marginal benefits of debt financing or 
equity financing. 
 
 Target or Desired Capital ratio - the ratio of equity financing to total asset of a bank that 
balance the economic costs of equity financing with the economic benefits of equity 
financing. 
 
 
3 
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1. Please indicate the relative importance of the following factors in the capital structure decision of your bank 
(Please circle one response for each item-On a scale of 1 to 5). 
 
No Items Not 
Important   
Little 
Important 
Fairly 
Important 
Important Very 
Important 
a The tax advantage of interest deductibility from debt finance 1 2 3 4 5 
b The level of interest rates on deposits & other debts 1 2 3 4 5 
c Available tax economies related to other non taxable 
allowance(such as depreciation) 
1 2 3 4 5 
d Risk and  costs of financial distress and insolvency 1 2 3 4 5 
e The volatility of bank’s earnings and cash flows (the change 
in bank’s profitability) 
1 2 3 4 5 
f Size of free cash flows   1 2 3 4 5 
g Financial flexibility or Profitability 1 2 3 4 5 
h Investment policy or Growth Opportunities  1 2 3 4 5 
i The consequences of breaching regulatory capital 
requirement 
1 2 3 4 5 
j Capital held by your bank’s peers 1 2 3 4 5 
k Change in the regulation and supervision framework 1 2 3 4 5 
       
 
2. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following general statement regarding the financing 
decision of your bank (Please circle one response for each item-On a scale of 1 to 5). 
 
No Items Strongly 
Disagree   
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
 Agree 
a Use of deposits & other debts would decrease relative to 
equity if debt interest were no longer tax deductible. 
1 2 3 4 5 
b The decision to issue debt or equity is affected by the 
existence of tax loss carry forwards. 
1 2 3 4 5 
c We issue common stock to complement to risk management 1 2 3 4 5 
d A bank issues shares , though present needs are not great, to 
build up a cushion against  unexpected losses arising from 
material risks to be faced. 
1 2 3 4 5 
e We issue debt when our recent profits are not sufficient to 
fund our activities 
1 2 3 4 5 
f We  issue common stock when we are unable to obtain 
funds using other sources 
1 2 3 4 5 
g We issue debt when we have accumulated profits 1 2 3 4 5 
h A bank issue common stock to finance long term business 
growth strategy 
1 2 3 4 5 
i Given the regulatory capital requirement, we assess how 
much additional capital we should hold.  
1 2 3 4 5 
j We assess capital needed to run the business & then, verify  
whether it meets regulatory requirement 
1 2 3 4 5 
       
 
3. In raising new funds, your bank: 
 
a Seeks to maintain a target capital structure by using approximately constant proportions of debt and 
equity financing simultaneously. (Check or put tick mark in one circle only). 
        Yes 
        No 
 b Follows a hierarchy in which the most advantageous sources of funds are exhausted before other 
sources are used. (Check or put tick mark in one circle only). 
        Yes 
        No          
 
4. Indicate the extent to which your bank seeks to maintain the target debt to equity ratio in raising new funds. 
(Check or put tick mark in one circle only). 
 
a Very Strict Target  c Flexible Target         
b Somewhat Tight Target/Range  d No Target Ratio or Range         
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5. Please indicate how your bank desired capital differs from actual capital. (Check or put tick mark in one 
circle only). 
 
a Actual  capital ratio  usually exceeds 
desired equity capital ratio 
 c Desired  capital ratio is usually very close to actual 
capital 
 
b Desired capital ratio usually exceeds 
actual capital ratio 
 d Actual capital ratio may exceed or fall below 
desired capital ratio 
 
   
6.  Indicate the extent to which your bank’s actual capital adjusts towards the target or desired capital ratio in the 
deviations. (Please circle one response for each item, on the scale of 1 to 5 ). 
 
No Items Very 
Unlikely 
Unlikely Neutral Likely Very  
Unlikely 
a If actual capital ratio is above desired capital ratio, we will 
reduce the actual capital ratio as quickly as possible 
1 2 3 4 5 
b If actual capital ratio is below desired capital ratio, we will 
increase the actual capital ratio as quickly as possible 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
7. Suppose your bank’s actual capital deviates from desired capital.(Check or put tick mark in one circle only). 
 
a Actual capital will be adjusted to meet desired capital more quickly if actual capital exceeds desired 
capital than if the opposite( that is, if desired capital exceeds actual capital) is the case 
        
b Actual capital will be adjusted to meet desired capital more quickly if desired capital exceeds actual 
capital than if the opposite(that is, if actual capital exceeds desired capital) is the case 
        
c The pace of adjustments in both cases will be the same  
 
8. Please indicate the firmographics (bank characteristics) that best describe your bank. (Check or put tick mark 
in one circle only). 
a Ownership of the bank          Public           Private  
b Total assets of the bank(at the end of year 2012)        <Br4bil           Br4-8bil          >Br8bil 
c Liquidity ratio of the bank(at the end of year 2012)        <30%                 30-45%           >45% 
 
9. Please indicate the demographics that best describe the respondent. (Check or put tick mark in one circle 
only) 
a Your current position in  the bank  
b Your experience  in the current Job          <4years             4-9years               9-15 years            < 15years 
c Age          <40years             40-49years              50-59 years            > 60years 
d Educational Level          BA/BSc                Masters               >Masters  
 
===End === 
=== Thanks A lot for Your Participation!!!== 
 
  
221 
 
Annex 4- Ethical Clearance Certificate 
 
